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To Her Highness the Princess Brambilla
Et je  vous dis que la vie est réellement obscurité
sauf là où il y a élan 
Et tout élan est aveugle sauf là où il y savoir  
Et tout savoir est vain sauf là où il y travail 
Et tout travail est vide sauf là où il y a amour  
( . . . )  Et qu’est-ce que travailler avec amour ? 
( . . . )  C ’est mettre en toute chose que vous façonnez
un souffle de votre esprit, 
Et savoir que tous les morts  bienheureux se tiennent
auprès de vous et veillent. 
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A b str a c t
The present thesis deals with some consequences of the existence 
of external effects à la Romer, i.e. positive spillovers from  the cap­
ital stock onto the efficiency of labour, and is mainly considering 
problems o f discrete dynamics in the absence o f any intrinsic (i.e. 
exogenous) shock. In the first chapter, using a one-sector three- 
period OLG model with borrowing constraints, it is shown that the 
standard result stating that, in the presence o f externalities, any 
simple tax/subsidy policy undertaken to get rid o f a bubble on an in­
trinsically useless asset creates an lO U  which has exactly the same 
negative effects as the bubble itself, fails i f  there are agents who must 
borrow at some moment of their life. The other three chapters are 
mainly studying the problem o f endogenous fluctuations in competi­
tive equilibrium models. The second chapter looks at the possibility 
o f Hopf bifurcations in the dynamical system characterizing a two- 
sector OLG economy meeting all neo-classical assumptions from  the 
point o f view of the private sector, and its ILA analogue : it demon­
strates the existence of economies with stable closed orbits, derives 
some conditions on the parameters and compares the results to the 
continuous time modelization, concluding to a non robustness with 
regard to the time structure assumption. The third chapter is consid­
ering endogenous fluctuations in self-sustaining growth : using the 
same framework as previously, but under another assumption on the 
externalities, we establish that even i f  production inputs substitute 
perfectly and savings increase monotonically with the interest rate, 
cycles or even chaotic trajectories of the growth rate are possible. 
We show that this requires a strong externality in the consumption 
good sector in the absence of bubbles or sunspots, but not necessarily 
in their presence. Furthermore, we prove the existence o f economies 
where, in the absence of any intrinsic uncertainty, the only possible 
equilibria involve bubbles or sunspots. The last and very short fourth  
chapter is a critical note on a recently published paper ; its main pur­
pose is to show why current mathematical knowledge does not allow 
to sustain the claim of chaos in the proposed ILA framework.
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“Überzeugungen sincl gefàhrlichere 
Feinde der Wahrheit als Lügen\"  
Friedrich Nietzsche (1878), 
Menschliches, Allzumenschîiches.
Introduction
Pure economic theory, normative economics, applied economics, ideolog­
ical economics : there exist many branches of economic investigation, each 
characterized by its specific goal and methodology. Some people consider the­
oretical economics as completely useless, and describe them as the frivolous 
activity of slightly degenerate minds. The critiques usually put forward are 
the utmost reductionism necessarily characterizing any mathematical mod­
élisation of very complex phenomena implying human activity, the fact that 
most results of theoretical economics are apparently empirically refutated and 
that it is possible to prove anything and its contrary by the adequate choice 
of the model. Furthermore, the more and more intensive use of mathem at­
ics, and especially of ‘high technology’ tools of modern mathematics scares 
or irritates many people. However, even a brief and necessarily superficial 
reflection on the nature of economics clearly establishes the fundamental role 
pure theory has to play. Our ideas about the functioning of the economic
^ C o n v ic t io n s  arc M ore  D a n g e r o u s  E n n e m ie s  oF 1 rutli t h a n  Lies.
mechanisms are the result of cultural and social a prioris and of simplifica­
tions, the official discourse on economics is highly ideological ; furthermore, 
the common use of language is imprecise or abusive, and the rhetorical use 
of sophisms to persuade other people of the truth of a claim is very common.
Theoretical economics constitute a critical activity in so far as their aim  
is to investigate the validity of pre-existing conceptions. The intention is 
to go beyond the appearances, to show that certain hidden mechanisms can 
account for observable facts, and to question well established convictions 
about what seems to be obvious. The methodology is hypothetico-deductive 
in the classical sense : the economist chooses a set of assumptions to build a 
model and studies the implications of his assumptions.
Economic theory seeks logical consistency and tries to highlight the role 
of assumptions. Obvious simplifications and idealizations, the existence of 
apparently ridiculous assumptions like rationality of agents, existence of a 
representative agent, perfect competition etc., lead some people to declare 
the uselessness of theoretical economics. The existence of simplifications is, 
of course, very often the result of the problem of tractability which forces 
economists to choose specific assumptions to be able to illustrate their ideas. 
But does the lack of realism imply futility ?
T h e  answer is ‘n o ’ for different reasons. F irs t  of all, the  reflection on 
m odels , even if these seem ou trageously  simplified, can develop ou r  in tu ­
ition  a b o u t  the  involved m echanism s, can help us to isolate the  fu n d am e n ta l  
d e te rm in a n ts  of certain p henom ena  and  thus enhance  our ability to under-
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stand real world events ; the use of different modelizations allows to specify 
the role of assumptions and thus develops our sense of rigour and critique. 
Leaving aside the auto-justification of all search for knowledge and internal 
consistency, we can immediately underline that idealization can give precious 
information about the implications of deviation from the idealized situation ; 
furthermore, even a very simple and unrealistic model can definitively inval­
idate ideas that are deep-rooted in our minds, contribute to a revolution in 
our conceptions, and have direct practical implications : an example of this 
is the introduction of the rational expectations hypothesis. In fact, a number 
of theories are developed simply in order to gainsay other theories, and this 
activity is of absolute importance not only from the point of view of pure 
science : since political decisions are often justified by arguments relying on 
economic theories in order to give them the stamp of truth, it is fundamen­
tal to know on which assumptions their recommandations are based and to 
dispose of counterarguments to open the debate.
Logical consistency is of extreme importance in all social sciences, includ­
ing economics, simply because, unlike in physics for instance, theory cannot 
be sanctioned by experiments. A lot of, not to say most, physicists do not 
care about mathematical rigour, use approximative reasonings and practice 
mathematical acrobatics ; in their eyes, the really important thing is com­
patibility of the conclusions of their theories with the results of experiments. 
Since experiments cannot be performed in the field of economics and experi­
ence can only invalidate a theory, logical rigour is a fundamental requirement.
|) orv'itL pff
like ‘we consider families, dynas ties’ etc. : the  t ru th  is simply th a t  neither of 
these two modélisations is satisfactory®.
Furtherm ore, it is not at all clear th a t  OLG models with m any periods 
cannot exhibit fluctuations : as a  m a tte r  of fact, the  a rgum ent to claim the 
impossibility relies on Aiyagari (1988), bu t its validity is easily gainsaid since 
Aiyagari considers very specific OLG models and cannot claim any general­
ity. The possibility of endogenous fluctuations, even if not on a business cycle 
scale, is in itself a fundam enta l result. In our eyes, none of the  two types 
of models can be considered as ‘more ad eq u a te ’ or ‘b e t t e r ’. In view of the  
imperfections characterising current modelization, we believe th a t  the  fact 
tha t  endogenous fluctuations can occur in both  types of models constitu tes 
itself the  most im portan t  point.
Finally, let us point ou t th a t  we always consider extremely simple m od­
els : in the  economies we deal with, agents are all characterised by the  same 
tastes, and there is no intrinsic uncertainty, which means th a t  we consider 
a world not subm itted  to any exogenous shock, neither on tastes nor on 
technologies. Indeed, we consider entirely determ inistic  models where the 
fundam entals are even assumed to be s ta t ionary  (time independent) . Fur­
thermore, we consider one-sector models, or two-sector models with only one
^ B la n c h a r d ’s (1 9 8 5 )  c o n t in u o u s  t im e  O L G  m o d e l  w ith  uncerta in  l ife - t im e ,  w h ich  could  
appear ,  a t  first g la n ce ,  as an im p r o v em e n t ,  is no t  m ore  sa t i s fa c to ry  s in c e  the  probab i l i ty  
o f  d e a th  is in d e p en d e n t  o f  the  a g e n t ’s  age,  and th e  a g e n ts  are n o t ,  even  after  a  million  
years ,  dead for sure. It is easy  to see  th a t  th is  m odel  is form ally  o f  th e  ILA ty p e  if we 
in troduce  insurance  through  a m utu a l  fund.
Hi
ternalities has very important implications is well known by now. From basic 
game theory, for instance, we know that the presence of positive spillovers 
implies to non optimality of Nash equilibria and that, coupled with strategic 
complementarity, it can lead to multiplicity of symmetric Nash equilibria. 
Another standard result is that in dynamic equilibrium models, externali­
ties constitute one source of non optimality of perfect competition equilibria 
which can be struggled against : for instance, in the case of an externality à 
la Romer (1986), i.e. of positive external effects operating in the production 
sectors from the aggregate capital stock onto the efficiency of labour (the 
standard interpretation is that of ‘learning by doing’), then a public policy 
which aims to increase savings can lead to a Pareto improvement.
We shall consider here exclusively such externalities à la Romer. This has 
several explanations. There is, to be honest, the extreme formal tractability 
of models with this type of externality, which constitutes a non négligeable 
argument in our eyes : we are personally more interested in problems of exis­
tence than in questions of generality ; our aim and pleasure is to find simple 
models which can be used to illustrate the possibility of certain phenomena, 
and perhaps to gainsay well established ideas. Genericity within a given set 
of models, or structural stability of a given modeP, are of course important.
^Let us  br iefly  recall  th e  d e f in i t io n s .  L et  A i  b e  a  s e t  o f  m o d e l s ,  and  K  t h e  s u b s e t  
o f  m o d e l s  for w h ich  a  g iv en  p r o p e r ty  h o ld s .  G e n e r ic i ty  is o f ten  d e f in e d  by t h e  fa c t  t h a t  
K .  is d e n s e  in M .  T h e  id e a  is t h a t  i f  w e  b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e  true  m o d e l  l ies in A i ,  t h e n  th e  
p r o p e r ty  will  h o ld  w ith  h igh  p r o b a b i l i ty  if  g e n e r ic i ty  h o ld s .  W e i m m e d ia t e ly  s e e  t h a t  there  
is a  c o n fu s io n  b e tw e e n  d e n s i t y  and m e a su r e  : ra t io n a l  n u m b e r s ,  for in s t a n c e ,  are  d e n s e
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but we made the choice not to investigate these aspects. Secondly, our aim 
here is not a, for sure highly interesting, comparison of the differing effects 
of several types of externalities^, but rather the description of several impor­
tant facts due to the presence of externalities ; in this perspective, it seems 
rather natural to use only one type of externality if the models we obtain 
allow interesting conclusions.
Externalities à la Romer can cause increasing returns to scale at the ag­
gregate level, and thus allow to construct models where growth does take 
place in the long run ; as we know, this is not the only possibility, since a 
standard result is that a linear production function can lead to self-sustaining 
growth in the ILA framework'^ ; this also holds in multi-sector OLG models 
where a concave production function in the investment good sector must be, 
at least asymptotically, linear in capital^, but is not true in the one-sector 
OLG model where endogenous growth requires increasing returns to scale. 
Romer type externalities can give self-sustaining growth, and even balanced 
growth (i.e. with a constant growth rate), in an easy and tractable way. We 
shall see below why this is of extreme importance.
in [0 ,1 ] ,  b u t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i ty  t h a t  a  r a n d o m ly  c h o se n  n u m b e r  o f  th i s  in terva l  is r a t io n a l  is
zero .  T h e  c o rr e c t  d e f in i t io n  m u s t  th erefo re  b e  ; i f  we  can  de f ine  a  m e a s u r e  o n  A i ,  th e n
g e n e r ic i t y  m e a n s  d e n s i t y  and  s t r i c t ly  p o s i t iv e  m e a su r e  o f  t h e  s u b s e t  AC. S tr u c t u r a l  s t a b i l i t y
m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r ty  h o ld s  for all m o d e l s  in t h e  v ic in i ty  o f  a  g iv e n  m o d e l .
^ A n  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h i s  t y p e  has  b e e n  p er fo rm ed  by C a z z a v i l la n  (1 9 9 4 )  in h is  P h D  th e s is ,
w h ic h  d e a ls  w i t h  t h e  s t u d y  o f  d if ferent  t y p e s  o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  in a  c o n t in u o u s  t im e ,  tw o -
s e c to r  IL A  f r a m e w o r k .
.See J o n e s  a n d  M a n u c l l i  (1 9 9 0 ) .
^See O ’Neil  F ish e r  (1 9 9 2 ) .
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The models we shall study are all of one or the other of the two stan­
dard types of dynamic models, namely Infinitely Lived Agents (ILA) models 
and Overlapping Generations (OLG) models. Let us recall here one of the 
main differences between these two types of dynamic equilibrium models. 
Under strict neo-classical assumptions on utilities and production, thus in 
the absence of any externality, and assuming perfect markets and rational 
expectations, ILA models admit a unique perfect competition equilibrium  
which is Pareto optimal, whereas OLG models exhibit indeterminacy of per­
fect foresight equilibria and can, if there exist at least three sectors, admit 
perfect competition equilibria which are not Pareto optimal. This constitutes 
indeed a major difference, and finds its explanation in the incompleteness of 
markets in the OLG context (agents cannot trade with people who are not 
yet born). Purely neo-classical ILA models thus will not exhibit certain types 
of dynamics which can be easily obtained in the OLG framework, such as 
sunspot equilibria.
Sunspots are the archetype of situations with extrinsic uncertainty. The 
terminology intrinsic/extrinsic uncertainty, has been introduced to distin­
guish respectively uncertainty affecting the fundamentals of the economy 
from uncertainty having absolutely no influence on them. A sunspot is de­
fined as a random phenomenon without any effect on usable technologies, 
available ressources or tastes of the economic agents. According to the ob­
ject] vist conception, sunspots should not matter and have no influence on
13
economic variables. Yet Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1983), 
Chiappori and Guesnerie (1987) showed that even if agents form totally un­
founded expectations, these can be self-enforcing (‘self-fulfilling prophecies’). 
If everybody believes in the sunspots’ influence on prices, then the prices will 
indeed depend on the sunspot realisation. More complex situations where, 
for instance, one part of the population believes in sunspots and the other in 
moonspots, can easily be dealt with^. These illustrations of the direct action 
of representations on the economy are quite spectacular.
Cass and Shell’s (1987) conjecture, which is a sort of ‘folk theorem’ of 
neo-classical growth theory, says that sunspots require some sort of frictions 
which violate the fundamental theorem of welfare economics, imperfection 
of financial markets or externalities, for instance. The first to note that 
an ILA economy with liquidity constraints can, in a certain sense, mimic 
an OLG model and thus admit sunspot equilibria, was Woodford (1986). 
Forward stability of perfect foresight equilibrium, a sufficient condition for 
the construction of sunspot equilibria, was obtained by Kehoe, Levine and 
Romer (1990) in an ILA model of finitely many agents with externalities 
(and indeed, distortionary taxes). Spear (1991) finally established, with a 
very special type of externality^, the possibility of sunspots in the presence 
of a continuum of agents. The existence of externalities thus not only im­
plies non Pareto optimality of perfect competition equilibria, but can lead to 
indeterminacy even in the ILA framework.
®See A z a r ia d is  a n d  G u e sn e r ie  (1 9 8 3 ) .
' S p i l lo v e r  o f  th e  a v e ra g e  s a v in g s  o f  all a g e n ts . . .
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A very classical critique addressed to the OLG modélisation concerns 
the length of the periods. Indeed, the most tractable and therefore most 
commonly used OLG framework is the two-period model à la Diamond (1965) 
where young agents work, consume and save for their old age, and old agents 
consume their savings. Imagine now that we want to build a model exhibiting 
endogenous fluctuations, probably in order to give an endogenous explanation  
to at least part of real world fluctuations. Until recently, most models of 
endogenous fluctuations were OLG models, for the reasons indicated above. 
However, the most recently presented models are mainly ILA models, simply 
because the introduction of externalities or the consideration of imperfect 
competition now allow to exhibit, relatively easily, tractable models ; the 
authors proposing these models all claim that ILA models with endogenous 
fluctuations are far more exhilarating because fluctuations do not occur on 
large time scales as in the OLG context (25-30 years in the case of a two- 
period OLG model...).
W hat is the value of their argumentation ? We are inclined to say 
‘naught’, for both types of models lack realism, and none can be said better 
than the other. In the OLG modélisation, the length of the life of each agent 
is predetermined, the different phases of life are fixed and all are the same 
for everybody. In the ILA framework, the horizon of the agents is infinite®, 
a very unappealing idea even if we try to justify it by scabrous arguments
'^Ancl th i s  im p l ie s  an e x t r e m e ly  d e m a n d in g  a s s u m p t i o n  on  t h e  a g e n t s  ra t io n a l i ty ,  
w h e r e a s  in th e  O L G  c o n t e x t  th e  fo res ig h t  is l im i te d  to  a  f in ite  n u m b e r  o f  p e r io d s . . .
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like ‘we consider families, dynasties’ etc. : the truth is simply that neither of 
these two modélisations is satisfactory^.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that OLG models with many periods 
cannot exhibit fluctuations : as a matter of fact, the argument to claim the 
impossibility relies on Aiyagari (1988), but its validity is easily gainsaid since 
Aiyagari considers very specific OLG models and cannot claim any general­
ity. The possibility of endogenous fluctuations, even if not on a business cycle 
scale, is in itself a fundamental result. In our eyes, none of the two types 
of models can be considered as ‘more adequate’ or ‘better’. In view of the 
imperfections characterising current modélisation, we believe that the fact 
that endogenous fluctuations can occur in both types of models constitutes 
itself the most important point.
Finally, let us point out that we always consider extremely simple mod­
els : in the economies we deal with, agents are all characterised by the same 
tastes, and there is no intrinsic uncertainty, which means that we consider 
a world not submitted to any exogenous shock, neither on tastes nor on 
technologies. Indeed, we consider entirely deterministic models where the 
fundamentals are even assumed to be stationary (time independent). Fur­
thermore, we consider one-sector models, or two-sector models with only one
^ B la n c h a r d ’s  ( 1 9 8 5 )  c o n t in u o u s  t im e  O L G  m o d e l  w ith  u n ce r ta in  l i f e - t im e ,  w h ic h  co u ld  
a p p e a r ,  a t  first g la n c e ,  as an im p r o v e m e n t ,  is n o t  m o re  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s in c e  th e  p r o b a b i l i ty  
o f  d e a t h  is in d e p e n d e n t  o f  th e  a g e n t ’s age ,  and t h e  a g e n t s  are n o t ,  e v e n  a fter  a  m i l l io n  
y e a r s ,  d ea d  for su re .  It is e a sy  to  s e e  t h a t  th is  m o d e l  is fo r m a l ly  o f  t h e  IL A  t y p e  i f  we  
i n t r o d u c e  in su r a n c e  th r o u g h  a  m u tu a l  fund.
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type of capital. These assumptions, along with thoses on the form of utili­
ties and production functions, will greatly simplify the calculus and allow to 
exhibit nice and strong results. Again, this kind of simplification can inspire 
some criticism which we shall try to argue against : quite standard results 
are that heterogeneity of agents or multiplicity of types of capital are sources 
of complexity of equilibrium dynamics ; the theory of nonlinear dynamical 
systems shows that the higher the dimension of a dynamical system, the 
larger the set of possible exotic dynamics. Furthermore, imperfect compe­
tition or imperfect markets^^ also constitue potential causes of endogenous 
fluctuations. To look for the most simple possible models therefore imposes 
more constraints, and does not mean to simplify basely ones task.
2 T h e  T h e s is ’ C o n te n t
Since the abstract gives a description (a very brief one, we must admit) of 
the content of each paper, we believe that, rather than giving a linear pre­
sentation of the papers, it is more interesting to talk here about the two 
big themes raised in this thesis : welfare implications  (and the possibility 
of Pareto improvement through public policies) and the possibility of en­
dogenous f luctuations  generated by the presence of externalities. The first 
problem finds some answers in the first and the third paper, the second one 
is dealt with in the second, third and fourth paper.
10O f  c o u r se ,  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  can  be  in te r p r e te d  a s  m a r k e t  fa i lu res . . .
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2.1 P resen ce o f E xternalities, and W elfare
The fact that perfect competition equilibria are not Pareto optimal if exter­
nalities operate in the economy has been alluded to previously, and a policy 
to improve the social welfare has been exposed in the case which we are 
interested in here, namely externalities à la Romer : policies that lead to 
an increase of savings. But saying this, we implicitly assumed that we were 
considering what is traditionally called the ‘fundamental’ equilibrium of the 
economy. What is meant by that ?
Consider the following system of linear first order difference equations :
Yt = aEt{Yt+i) +  cXt (*),
where Yt is the vector of state variables, Xt  a vector of exogenous variables, 
and where a and c are constants. If the constant a is strictly less than one, 
and if lim^^+oo a^’^ ^E{YT+t) =  0, then the simplest solution of (*) is obviously
+00
i=0
This is the ‘fundamental’ solution. It is not the only one, since we know that 
a solution of (*) is the sum of the just exhibited particular solution of (*) 
and a solution of the associated homogenous equation. Indeed, consider a 
sequence such that Di =  aE{Bt+i) .  Yt +  Bt is obviously a solution
of (*). Bt sequences are traditionally called bubbles, the inspiration for this 
denomination coming from the finance area, where the idea is that an asset 
share’s price can be decomposed into the sum of the fundamental (reflecting
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the ‘true’ value of the asset) and the bubble component (due to self-fulfilling 
beliefs). There can exist ever-expanding bubbles, bubbles which have a cer­
tain probability to explode at each instant etc. The bubble component is not 
founded on the fundamental, and results from self-fulfilling prophecies.
Let us here note an important point, concerning the possibility of bub­
bles, which can be interpreted as degenerate sunspots. A still common view 
is that bubbles cannot occur in deterministic sequential market economies 
with a finite number of agents (see, for instance, Tirole (1982) still invoked in 
the latest edition of Blanchard and Fisher (1989...)). The reasoning leading 
to this assertion is incorrect : Kocherlakota (1992) showed that Tirole simply 
forgot to impose a no-Ponzi game condition, condition which is required for 
the existence of any equilibrium and which can support bubbles in an ILA 
model with a finite number of agents.
Traditional economic theory implicitly considers that, if a dynamic equi­
librium model with rational expectations admits an equilibrium, than there 
exists a fundamental equilibrium (and, perhaps, some odd ‘bubble’ equilib­
ria). Let us immediately criticize this attitude by using one of the results of 
chapter three : there exist economies admitting no fundamental equilibrium  
but equilibria with bubbles. This is illustrated in the context of a two-sector 
OLG model with production externalities ; a bubble in the OLG context can 
be interpreted as Hat money, for instance. The result is shown to be due the 
presence of a. non convexity at the aggregate level in the investment good
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s e c to r ^ T h e  standard terminology, stemming from the nearly exclusive fo­
cus on linear or linearised models, can thus be misleading.
An interesting problem is to study and compare the welfare effect of 
bubbles in strictly neo-classical models and in models with externalities. The 
seminal papers on bubbles on intrinsically useless assets in the neo-classical 
OLG framework have been written by Jean Tirole (1982), (1985) and (1990). 
It appears that in the neo-classical world, bubbles can occur only if the 
economy is inefficient (there is over-accumulation of capital) and their effect 
on the welfare is positive (the unique stationary bubble even completely 
eliminates the inefficiency). Thus, there is no reason for the government to 
intervene.
On the other hand, Grossman and Yanagawa (1992) have shown that 
in the context of a one-sector OLG model meeting all the neo-classical as­
sumptions from the point of view of the private sector, but with externalities 
à la Romer in the production sector, bubbles can appear (remember that 
here there is always itnderaccumulation of capital), and they have always a 
negative effect on the welfare since they divert capital from productive in­
vestment. Thus, in this situation, there exists a reason for the government 
to attem pt to get rid of the bubble. Unfortunately, as say Grossman and 
Yanagawa, any simple tax/subsidy policy intended to reduce the number of 
shares of the useless asset in the market necessarily creates an lOU which
r e la ted  resu lt ,  in a n o t h e r  c o n t e x t ,  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  e c o n o m ie s  w i th  o n ly  
s u n s p o t  e q u i l ib r ia  h a s  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  by P ie t r a  (1 9 9 0 ) .
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has exactly the same effects as the bubble. The problem is that the authors 
conclude on a very specific model, namely a model in which no agent ever 
has to borrow.
Our first chapter shows that there can exist the possibility of simple 
tax/subsidy schemes that progressively eliminate all the shares of the bubble 
asset and improve the welfare of all agents : for this, we use a one-sector 
three-period OLG model with production externalities and borrowing con­
straints, where young agents must borrow on their future income. Thus, in 
this type of world where the appearence of a bubble leads to a loss in wel­
fare, the situation is not necessarily as hopeless as we would previously have 
thought : Pareto improvements through government policies can be achiev­
able under some conditions.
Let us note here a strange consequence of the odd result of chapter three 
cited previously : if there exist economies with externalities where no ‘funda­
m ental’ equilibrium exists, but equilibria with bubbles are possible, can we 
say that the existence of bubbles means a loss in welfare ? It would certainly 
be interesting, in such a situation, to compare the welfare loss due to the 
different possible bubbles.
Let us add some further general remarks : the research on speculation 
and bubbles has shown that prices do not necessarily reflect market funda­
mentals, multiple equilibria, and therefore indeterminacy, can be observed.
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Speculation has been shown not to be necessarily stabilising^^, and cannot 
anymore be viewed as the force which brings back the price to its fundamental 
level. The following conception :
“...People who argue that speculation is generally destabiliz­
ing seldom realise that this is largely equivalent to saying that 
speculators lose money, since speculation can be destabilising in 
general only if speculators on the average sell when the currency 
is low in price and buy when it is high...”
Milton Friedman (1953), Essays in Posit ive Economics
is thus invalidated. Speculative bubbles, on the other hand, are no longer 
viewed as necessarily the effects of irrationality. An important result is also 
that government intervention might lead to a Pareto improvement compared 
to the traditional laisser-faire attitude.
In the financial and monetary spheres, price formation does not reflect 
exclusively a logic of rarity, but implies dynamics of self-validation of antici­
pations which are not necessarily linked to the fundamentals. To understand 
these dynamics of formation of expectations appears therefore to constitute 
a fundamental problem. Unfortunately, there exist very few papers which 
try to explain the emergence of financial bubbles, and their explosion^^, but 
the topic seems to have become more ‘en vogue’ most recently.
i^ See  H a r t  a n d  K r e p s ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  de  L o n g  e t  alii  (1 9 8 7 ) .  
i^ A n  e a r ly  e x c e p t i o n  is H arr ison  an d  K re p s  (1 9 7 8 ) . . .
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2.2 E ndogenous F lu ctuation s in th e  P resen ce  o f  E xter­
nalities
As we indicated previously, this problem constitutes the larger part of our 
work, and three out of our four papers deal with it. Surveys of the m od­
ern literature on endogenous fluctuations can be found in chapter two and 
three. We prefer to expose here the reasons of the renewal of interest in an 
area which becomes more and more fashionable if we judge by the number 
of publications on this topic in the major economic journals.
The modern literature on endogenous fluctuations tries to show that opti­
mising behaviour, rational expectations and stationarity of the fundamentals 
of the economy, like tastes, technologies, institutional setup etc., do not rule 
out persistent, non explosive fluctuations. This is, of course, at the opposite 
of the classical view of the economy either converging to a nice steady state, 
or diverging on an ‘explosive’ path, in the absence of shocks. To practice 
research in the area of endogenous fluctuations does not, of course, mean to 
negate the effects of exogenous shocks on the economic path. Some inter­
pret it as an attem pt to show that fluctuations can find, at least partially, 
endogenous explanations. Woodford (1990) argues that the true point of 
the endogenous cycle literature is rather the suggestion that the determi- 
nacy theses of the orthodox business cycle theory might be too restrictive. 
This is indeed the probably fundamental point, since the knowledge of the 
possible forms of equilibrium paths in the limiting case of absence of any
2.3
intrinsic uncertainty does not necessarily give any information on the be­
haviour of the economy in the case of presence of exogenous shocks. Let 
us note however that certain results have a direct implication for a theory 
of purely exogenous fluctuations, as is stressed in Guesnerie and Woodford 
(1994). Unfortunately, the mathematical difficulties encountered in nonlinear 
dynamic models do not allow, at this stage, to deal with nonlinear economies 
subject to extraneous uncertainty. Future developments in the concerned 
mathematical fields will hopefully enable economists to acquire one day an 
understanding of the properties of this kind of models.
The idea that internal mechanisms could be responsible for the observed 
variations in prices, employment, output was studied by von Hayek (1933), 
Shumpeter (1939), for instance, and endogenous cycles were obtained in Key­
nesian macroeconomic models^^ by Allais (1956), Goodwin (1951), Harrod 
(1936), Hicks (1950), Kaldor (1940) and many others. Nonlinearities and 
time lags constituted the source of persistent economic fluctuations. Many 
of these early models were brilliant in conception, their authors relying on 
an intuitive understanding of the problem at hand to build them. However, 
the problematic features of theses models were manifold : endogenous cy­
cle models are essentially nonlinear, and this implied technical difficulties 
given the mathematical knowledge in the area of dynamical systems several 
decades ago (some very rich models could not be conveniently exploited), and
t h r o u g h  th e  in te r a c t io n  o f  th e  c o n s u m p t io n  m u l t ip l ie r  and  se v e ra l  v e r s io n s  o f  th e  
i n v e s t m e n t  a c c e le r a to r . . .
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the type of dynamics which could then be described, namely "periodic cycles, 
were easily empirically refutated. Optimizing behaviour was not incorporated 
in these models, and stability results obtained for many simple equilibrium  
models with explicit optimizing behaviour, like the Turnpike Theorems for 
ILA models, could easily lead to think that endogenous cycles were incom­
patible with optimization. Furthermore, econometric models were estimated  
that produced business cycle type data when submitted to repeated exoge­
nous stochastic shocks, while converging to a steady state in the absence 
of shocks from the outside^^. This type of considerations explains why the 
comforting vision of a self-stabilising market mechanism became so popular, 
leading to the overwhelming success of the so-called Slutsky-Frish-Tinbergen 
methodology.
The empirical arguments against the endogenous fluctuations theory nowa­
days appear to have lost of their strength : to-day, we know that an entirely 
deterministic system can generate erratic trajectories, qualified as chaotic, 
with autocorrelation functions and spectra which mimic those of a ‘stable’ 
linear stochastic modeP®. Furthermore, Blatt (1978) established that the lin­
ear autoregression fit to the data generated by the Ilicks cycle model leads to 
conclude to a stable second order autoregressive process for output, the type 
of process which is obtained from autoregressions of actual GNP data. To 
distinguish stochastic fluctuations from data generated by a chaotic system,
^^See Adel man and A del man (1959).  
^*^Sakai and T o k n m a n i (1980).
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nonparametric tests for nonlinearity and instability are required ; some have 
been developed by Eckmann and Ruelle (1985) for the natural sciences, es­
pecially physics ; Brock(1986), Brock and Sayers (1988), Brock and Dechert 
(1987), Scheinkman and LeBaron (1986), (1987) and many other papers re­
fine and improve these tests. Unfortunately, it seems that results cannot be 
obtained if we do not have quite large samples at our disposal, which means 
that there is little hope to come to a conclusion by this way in the field of 
economics.
Endogenous cycles in OLG models were obtained by Gale in 1973, but the 
very first general equilibrium models establishing the possibility of chaotic 
economic dynamics were Benhabib and Day (1982) and Grandmont (1985). 
As we noted previously, the indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria 
in the OLG framework allowed to find rather easily different types of mod­
els exhibiting endogenous fluctuations : pure laisser-faire economies without 
or with production and fluctuations in fundamental or in sunspot equilibria, 
economies with government intervention^^. But economist had to realise that 
unicity of the perfect foresight competitive equilibrium in the neo-classical 
ILA framework and existence of turnpike theorems for some classes of models 
do not imply that perpétuais oscillations are excluded. This was shown by 
Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986) ; unfortunately, their constructive proof im­
plies very high discount rates, and Sorger (1991) has established that purely 
neo-classical (thus strictly concave) ILA models exhibiting chaotic dynamics
’^ Farm er ( 1 9 8 6 ) .
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of logistic, tent or Henon map type as optimal equilibrium path necessarily 
imply very high discount rates (respectively 110, 100 and 80 %).
However, Sorger’s results concern very specific dynamics and the assump­
tion of small discounting does not rule out endogenous fluctuations in general 
(see Benhabib and Rustichini (1989)). Nonetheless, a general characteristic of 
neo-classical OLG or ILA models giving endogenous fluctuations is that some 
non-standard hypothesis concerning utilities (for instance negative interest 
rate elasticity of saving (lES) in Grandmont-type models, very high rate of 
im patience...) or production (Leontieff production function in at least one 
sector...) always exists. One aim of research is therefore to find models with  
more acceptable assumptions. Furthermore, all known neo-classical models 
with endogenous fluctuations are models whithout ‘real’, ongoing growth, 
and describe only closed orbits of the capital stock. It is thus important to 
build models of self-sustaining growth with endogenous fluctuations, and a 
natural way to achieve this seems to be the use of externalities.
The introduction of externalities or the consideration of imperfect, mo­
nopolistic competition constitute the two principal recent attempts to obtain  
richer and nicer models. For instance, we know that neo-classical ILA models 
admit a, unique perfect foresight equilibrium ; the introduction of external­
ities can imply indeterminacy even in this framework, as has been shown 
by Howitt and McAfee (1988), Benhabib and Farmer (1991), Spear (1991) 
or Boldrin and Rustichini (1992, 1994). The same can occur when we intro-
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duce monopolistic competition^®. The results obtained in the ILA framework 
with the assumption of externalities (or of monopolistic competition) differ 
less from those obtained in the analogous OLG framework. Research in the 
area of equilibrium dynamics has established the possibility of multiple equi­
libria, of cycles generated by flip bifurcations, closed orbits around a steady 
state generated by Hopf bifurcations and completely aperiodic, chaotic tra­
jectories under laisser-faire in the fundamental equilibrium and, furthermore, 
of sunspot equilibria, in the ILA as well as in the OLG framework.
Let us briefly comment here our own findings. Chapter two is mainly 
interested in the consequence of the time structure choice, and studies the 
possibility of Hopf bifurcations in a discrete time two-sector OLG model, 
and its ILA analogue, in order to compare the results to those obtained for 
the continuous time ILA model by Cazzavillan (1992). The interesting re­
sults are that the dynamics are of exactly the same type for the OLG and 
the ILA model under the assumption of a high coefficient of intertemporal 
substitution, and that the discrete time assumption leads to less demanding 
conditions on the economies parameters than the continuous time hypothe­
sis. Chapter three gives the most interesting results, because it deals with 
endogenous fluctuations in the context of self-sustaining growth. In this 
chapter, using the same OLG model as in the preceding chapter, but now 
under the necessary assumption on the externality operating in the invest­
ment good sector for the possibility of balanced growth, we establish the
^^See B e n h a b i b  and  Peril  ( 1 9 9 d)  or Gal i  ( 1 99 d) .
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possibility of flip-cycles^^ and of chaotic trajectories of the growth rate. This 
is a nice result because it allows to link the ideas of self-sustaining growth 
and endogenous fluctuations. Two preceding papers tried to do this, but 
both failed : Cazzavillan (1993) considered a discrete time one-sector ILA 
model with externalities onto the agents’ utilities and onto production of a 
flow of public services financed through a lump sum tax ; unfortunately, his 
results require an assumption he uses but which is, at second glance, com­
pletely unacceptable : in his model, production requires public services as an 
input, but this input is financed through the current production, and logic 
would ask for a lag (public services which enter production as an externality 
are those financed through the taxes on previous period output), the intro­
duction of which annihilates all the nice results. Boldrin and Rustichini^° 
(1994) propose a two-sector ILA model with an externality à la Romer in the 
consumption good sector and a linear production function in the investment 
good sector. For this model, using results exposed in a paper by Boldrin and 
Persico (1993, 1994), they claim the possibility of endogenous growth with 
a chaotic growth rate. Unfortunately, Boldrin and Persico’s paper contains 
some important errors and establishes the possibility of observable chaos in 
fact only in the case of complete depreciation of capital in each period, an
^^C ycies g e n e r a t e d  th r o u g h  flip b i fu r c a t io n s  are p e r io d ic ,  w h ic h  is n o t  n e c e s sa r i ly  th e
c a se  for t h e  c lo s e d  o r b i t s  g e n e r a te d  th r o u g h  H o p f  b i f u r c a t io n s  in c h a p t e r  tw o .  F l ip -c y c le s
are n o n e t h e l e s s  o f  in te re s t  for a p p l ie d  e c o n o m ic s  i f  th e ir  p e r io d  is h ig h ,  s in c e  t h e y  w il l
a p p e a r  a p e r io d ic  over  r e la t iv e ly  s h o r t  t im e  in terv a ls .
^ °A n  o ld  v ers io n  o f  th e ir  p a p er  c ir cu la te d  s in c e  1992  a n d  c o n c e r n e d  in d e t e r m in a c y  o f
eq u i l ib r ia ,  b u t  th e  new  1994 vers ion c la im s  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  ch a o s .
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assumption which is unacceptable since the periods are supposed to be short 
in the ILA framework. To say it shortly, Boldrin and Persico completely 
forgot that the technique of Lagrange multipliers was not invented to annoy 
people ; they have a fundamental role to play in all optimisation problems 
where some constraints are binding from time to time, which is the case in the 
problem they consider. The critique of the two mentioned papers constitutes 
chapter four.
Let us finally emphasize a nice result obtained in chapter three : the 
possibility of Hopf bifurcations generated by bubbles, positive or negative, in 
the two-sector OLG framework with utilities and production function m eet­
ing all neo-classical assumptions from the point of view of the private sector. 
This result is important because Farmer (1986) proved that in one-sector 
OLG economies, only negative bubbles (which correspond to private debt 
toward the government) can generate Hopf bifurcations, and Reichlin (1986) 
exhibited a two-sector OLG model where positive bubbles could cause this 
type of bifurcation only if the lES was strictly negative.
A general remark on all the models obtained until now, including those 
presented in this thesis, is that the introduction of externalities allows to 
build models exhibiting endogenous fluctuations with very standard utilities 
(CRRA, for instance) or production functions (Cobb-Douglas, augmented 
with externalities), with more acceptable rates of time preference etc. ; never­
theless, they nearly all require very important, certainly unrealistic, external 
effects. The only exception is exposed in chapter three, where it is shown
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that endogenous fluctuations require less strong externalities, in some cases 
even none at all, in the consumption good sector if bubbles are present in 
the economy. However, the disappointment about the often very unappeal­
ing requirements for endogenous fluctuations in the fundamental equilibria 
remains.
Let us finally talk about the really problematic point of the theory : if 
perfect competition equilibria are indeterminate, then there exists obviously 
a problem of coordination. Agents do not have a firm basis on which to 
form their expectations, since the knowledge of the econom y’s fundamentals 
is insufficient (note that the assumption of perfect information about the 
fundamentals, even if common in the major part of economic theory, already 
makes us smile). Multiplicity of expectations-driven equilibria then poses the 
problem of knowledge of the others anticipations. This raises the question of 
the ‘implementation’ of a rational expectations equilibrium, i.e. of the pro­
cess according to which the values of variables predicted by the equilibrium  
are actually reached. As a matter of fact, the problem of implementation is 
old (think about the tâtonnement process to justify the equilibrium in the 
standard general equilibrium framework), but the consideration of dynamic 
models adds the problem of formation of expectations. The claim that
“...the rational expectations hypothesis is nothing else than 
the extension of the rationality hypothesis to expectations...”
.J. Muth (1961), “Rational Expectations and the Theory of 
Price Movements” , Economr.trica 39, pp 315-333
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is clearly erroneous, and we must build a theory explaining how the rational 
expectations equilibrium is reached (and which r.e.e, is reached if there is 
multiplicity ; learning convergence can then be viewed as a selection proce­
dure or a refinement device). Therefore, learning must be introduced, and 
learning processes must be modelized, specifying which information about 
current and past states of the economy is used by each agent and how fore­
casts are made. The implied complexity of the description of the economy’s 
dynamics is easy to imagine, and explains the difficulties encountered in this 
area of research. We shall not give here a survey of the literature on learning, 
but restrain ourselves to the allusion to one rather spectacular result con­
cerning stability under learning in the classical Grandmont (1985) model : 
Grandmont and Laroque^^ (1986) established that it may happen that the 
only equilibrium cycle that is stable under learning is unstable in the simple 
mathematical sense. This shows that we cannot conclude too quickly, for 
a given equilibrium path, from stability or instability, in the mathematical 
sense, to its economic relevance or irrelevance.
3 S o m e  F e a tu r e s  a n d  I m p lic a t io n s  o f  ^C haos’
The object of this section is to define the notion of ‘chaos’ and to expose 
some of the implications of the existence of deterministic dynamics gener­
ating erratic trajectories. The discovery of deterministic dynamics yielding 
trajectories that mimic the realisations of stochastic processes has raised
21 S ee  a l so  F u c h s  (1 9 7 9 ) .
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a passionate and violent debate among scientists and philosophers on the 
problem of determinism. We shall talk about this ‘quarrel’, and insist on the 
confusion of concepts and errors of reasoning which sometimes explain the 
divergences.
3.1 D escrip tion  o f th e Idea o f ‘C haos’
Let us note, first of all, that some very distinguished mathematicians like 
René Thom do not accept the now common terminology, and prefer to speak 
about ‘sensitivity on initial conditions’ rather than ‘chaotic behaviour’. And 
this indeed was the original denomination used by those who built the first 
models exhibiting a property which we nowadays call ‘chaos’. The denomina­
tion ‘chaos’ was in fact introduced by Li and Yorke (1975) and has led to many 
misuses and misinterpretations of the mathematical ideas. This is not re­
ally astonishing given the traditional analogy cosmos/chaos, order/disorder. 
Chaos is confusion, absence of structure :
. . .Ante mare et terras et, quod tegit omnia, caelum 
Vnus erat toto naturae uultus in orbe,
Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigestaque moles 
Nec quicquam nisi pondus iners congestaque eodem 
Non bene iunctarum discordia semina rerum.
Nullus adhuc mundo praebebat lumina Titan,
Nec noua crescendo reparabat cornua Phoebe,
Nec circum.fuso pen deb at in acre tel lus
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Ponderibus librata suis, nec bracchia longo 
Margine terrarum porrexerat Amphitrite.
Vtque erat et tellus illic et pontus et aer,
Sic erat instabilis tellus, innabilis unda,
Lucis egens aer : nuUi sua forma manebat 
Obstabatque aliis aliud, quia corpore in uno 
Frigida pugnabant calidis, umentia siccis,
Mollia cum duris, sine pondéré habentia pondus...
P. Ovidii Nasonis, Metamorphoseon,  Liber Primus.
Secondly, and this evolution seems significant of the great influence of the 
so-called ‘school of com plexity’ (Nicolis, Prigogine, Stengers and many oth­
ers), the terminology introduced by the american school in the seventies was 
‘deterministic chaos’, but the qualificative ‘deterministic’ is usually omitted  
nowadays. Out of sheer laziness ? In general, certainly, and we ourselves 
have to plead guilty ; but it is important to remain conscious of the danger 
of semantic glide, and we leave it to the reader to judge the innocence of 
some authors fond of ‘complexity’.
We shall give now an intuitive definition of ‘chaos’ in its most common 
acceptance^L
^^There  e x i s t  tw o  o th e r  c o n c e p t s  o f  ch a o s ,  n a m e ly  t o p o l o g i c a l  a n d  e r g o d i c  c h a o s .  A ll  
th e  fo r m a l  d e f in i t io n s  can be  fo u n d  in c h a p te r  four. W e  c o n s id e r  here  w h a t  is s o m e t i m e s  
q u a l i f ied  as  ‘t u r b u le n t ’ c h a o s ,  a n d  is th e  m o s t  c o m m o n l y  c o n s id e r e d  t y p e  o f  c h a o s .
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We consider, for simplicity, discrete time models but the definitions are 
analogous for the continuous time case where we deal with differential equa­
tions instead of difference equations. The set of states of a system is rep­
resented in a space C called phase space. The evolution of a deterministic 
system  is defined by a map $  : C ^  C such that, if Xt  is the state at time 
/, then =  $(% (). Suppose that there exists an 0-invariant subset K  of 
C. Then the map 0  is said to be chaotic on /C if there exists sensitivity on 
initial conditions, if the map admits a dense orbit^^ and if periodic points 
are dense in /C. Sensitivity on initial conditions means that, for all initial 
conditions, any arbitrarily small perturbation leads to an orbit that diverges 
from the initial one.
The first example of sensitivity on initial conditions can be found in a pa­
per written by the french mathematician Jacques Hadamard and intitled Les 
Surfaces à Courbures Opposées et leur Lignes Geodésiques (1898), where 
Hadamard shows that if we interpret the geodesics of surfaces with negative 
curvature as trajectories of points moving on these surfaces, then any per­
turbation of the initial direction suffices to lead to a complete change in the 
form of the trajectory.
To say that the extreme importance of this finding was not generally 
reckognised until some decades ago constitutes a euphenism. However, some 
few people became aware earlier of the bearing of the discovery and, for in-
m o r e  g e n e ra l  d e f in i t io n  a sk s  for ‘to p o lo g ic a l  t r a n s i t i v i t y ’, w h ic h  is a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  
th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  d e n s e  o rb it .
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stance, as soon as 1906, Duhem^'* insisted on the irreducible character of 
the distinction between mathematical determinism and physical prediction. 
Hadamard’s example remained for a long time the only tractable example of 
a model with sensitivity on initial conditions ; furthermore no link to prob­
lems arising in the natural sciences was apparent, which explains why so few 
scientists took notice of it or, if they did, considered it at best as a mathe­
matical curiosum.
The interest started to increase when the american meteorologist E.N. 
Lorenz (1963) showed, by using numerical integration procedures on com­
puters, that a standard three dimensional system of differential equations 
describing the convection of a gas or a liquid placed between two horizontal 
isotherm plates and submitted to a vertical temperature gradient could ex­
hibit sensitivity on initial conditions. Since then, and with the help of the 
mathematical theory of nonlinear differential systems^^, quite a lot of dynam­
ics encountered in the areas of physics, astronomy, meteorology, chemistry, 
biology, economics have been shown to be exhibit this property.
P ie r r e  D u h e m  ( 1 9 0 6 ) ,  “E x e m p le  de  D e d u c t io n  M a t h é m a t i q u e  à  t o u t  j a m a i s  in u t i l i s ­
a b le ” in  L a  T h é o r i e  P h y s i q x i e .  S o n  O b j e i  e i  s a  S t r u c i u r e .
^^The m o d e r n  t h e o r y  w a s  d e v e lo p e d ,  e s s e n t ia l ly  on th e  b a s is  o f  t h e  work o f  P o in c a r e ,
by A n d r o n o v ,  A n o s o v ,  A r n o ld ,  ITopf, K o lm o g o r o v ,  M o se r ,  SinaY, S m a l e  and  m a n y  o t h e r s .  
T h e  h i s t o r y  o f  im p r o v e m e n t  in th i s  field is a b s o lu t e ly  fa sc in a t in g .
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The following constitutes probably the simplest example^® of determin­
istic chaotic dynamics : consider a circle of center O, and let A be a given 
point on the circle ; any point M on the circle can be characterised by the 
angle X  =  A O M .  We take 27t as unit. We then define the ‘angle-doubling’ 
dynamics by :
Xt+i  =  2Xt  mod (1).
This seems really trivial, but we shall see that the dynamics are complex. 
Any perturbation of the initial condition is doubled after one period. To 
be able to make an even gross estimation, say with a precision of 0.5, after 
ten iterations, we must have a precision on the initial condition of 1/1000. 
After fifty iterations, we would need a precision of 10"^®, which is practically 
excluded by any physical experiment. The system exhibits sensitivity on 
initial conditions.
Consider now the dyadic development of an initial condition%o : it is 
given by the sequence ( a i ,«2, 0 3 ,..., «n, where
+ 0 0
2'
a, =  0 or 1.
i=0
The action of the angle-doubling map is then simple to describe : 
( G 1 ,  G 2 ,  G 3 ,  • • • ,  . . . . )  I ^  ^ G 2 ,  G 3 ,  ,  ( ^ f i i  • • • • )
"^See D e v a n e y  ( 1 9 8 7 ) .  T h e  o th e r  .standard e x a m p l e ,  t h e  lo g is t ic  m a p  d e f in e d  o n  [0 ,1 ]  
by — A"t), is s im p ly  l inear ly  t o p o lo g ic a l ly  c o n j u g a t e  to  th e  here  p r e se n te d
m a p .
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It is easy to see that the set of initial conditions having a dense orbit is of 
full measure. Not all do have a dense orbit : a rational X q has a periodic (if 
its denominator is odd) or a pre-periodic (if it is even) orbit, some irrational 
initial conditions have an orbit which is dense in a Cantor set^?. Thus, the 
dynamics are chaotic in the sense defined previously.
If we introduce a very small noise :
Xt+i =  2Xi  T tt mod (1),
where Ct is chosen at random in the interval [— +1 0 “ ^^ ], then the noise is 
unmeasurable, but the system has become intrinsically ‘non-deterministic^®’ 
in the sense of stochastic, uncertainty increasing in each period and filling 
the whole space after fifty iterations.
The ‘Pursuit’-lemma states then the following : to any trajectory (X^^)tgjv 
of the model with noise corresponds an initial condition %o such that its tra­
jectory (X<)<ç/v in the deterministic dynamics verifies \X^ — Xt\  <  10“^^ . 
This has important implications. First of all, if we cannot detect errors of 
the order of 10“^^ , then the observation of trajectories does not allow to dif­
ferentiate between the deterministic and the stochastic model. For each type 
of model, forecasts are excluded, in the stochastic case this is a tautology, 
and in the deterministic case it is due to the impossibility to obtain measures
“^A d e f in i t io n  o f  th is  n o t io n  can be  fo u n d  in c h a p te r  four.  
“* W e  .shall c o m e  back la ter  to  th is  p o in t  o f  term in o lo g y .
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with the necessary precision. Secondly, computer simulations can be used in 
the field of chaotic dynamical systems. At first glance, this seems quite amaz­
ing since one could be led to think that the existence of sensitivity on initial 
conditions necessarily excludes simulations which always imply truncation of 
intermediate results at each iteration. But the Pursuit lemma guarantees 
that any orbit calculated by a computer is a proxy of a true orbit (of course, 
the value of the initial condition of the true orbit is, and will always remain, 
unaccessible).
3.2 Im plications for Econom ic T heory
Linear deterministic dynamics lead to the following types of equilibria : point 
equilibria, which are either completely stable (well), mixed (saddle-point) or 
completely unstable (source), or periodic cycles. Complex bounded orbits are 
excluded ; furthermore, the periodic solutions are structurally unstable : any 
arbitrary perturbation of the parameters of the model leads to completely 
different trajectories.
Nonlinear deterministic dynamics, on the other hand, can admit bounded, 
periodic or aperiodic, self-sustaining oscillations as solutions and can ex­
hibit structural stability. The techniques used to detect the possibility of 
such trajectories are local bifurcation theory (flip, Hopf...), application of 
the Poincare-Hopf Index Theorem or global bifurcation analysis. We have 
seen that nonlinearity of the characteristic dynamical system can lead to the 
existence of highly complex, ‘chaotic’ trajectories. The spectacular feature 
of chaotic dynamics is their sensitivity on initial conditions which has many
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implications, such as the impossibility to predict the future if the initial con­
dition is not known with absolute precision, the impossibility to distinguish, 
by the use of standard linear econometrics, the data they generate from those 
given by the realisations of stochastic processes.
Nevertheless, as we briefly noted previously, it is possible to determine 
whether a given set of measures is generated by a chaotic, regular or noise- 
contaminated dynamical system. Beyond manifest irregularities, chaotic dy­
namics show hidden regularities. Techniques using the dimension of the at­
tractor, the Kolmogorov-Sinaï entropy (Grassberger-Procaccia algorithm), or 
the Lyapounov exponents which measure the separation of trajectories with 
very close initial conditions, have been developed. Unfortunately, the con­
vergence of the implied algorithms is often very slow, the techniques require 
quite large data sets and a careful attention from part of the researchers. 
This has sometimes led to wrong estimations and erroneous claims of chaos.
It is clear that in the held of natural sciences like physics, it is often easy 
to dispose of very large data sets that can be used to determine the chaotic 
or non chaotic nature of the dynamics of a given system. Unfortunately, 
this is not the true in economics where, except in the very special case of 
hnance, large data sets are not available to the researcher. We shall not give 
here any review of the literature on tests of the chaos hypotheses, and cite 
only a few papers to give a flair of the results and the difficulties encoun­
tered. The search for evidence of low dimensional deterministic chaos has 
provided arguments in favour of nonlinearity in employment, unemployment,
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industrial production etc. (Brock and Sayers (1988)). An interesting point 
is that Neftçi and McNevin (1986) found some evidence of nonlinearity in 
disaggregated production series, whereas the aggregate real GNP appeared 
linear under the tests applied by Brock and Sayers. There is no evidence 
of the presence of a chaotic attractor, but the tests may reject the null hy­
potheses of deterministic chaos too often when it is true. Ramsey, Sayers and 
Rothman (1990) insist on the fact that the evidence is based on data sets 
which are minuscule compared to those used in natural sciences. Sheinkman 
and LeBaron (1989) studied the question of stock returns and established  
the inadequacy of the ‘random walk’ theory^^ that states that returns are 
independently and identically distributed over time, but they underlined the 
existence of a lot of technical difficulties that had made their investigations 
difficult and sometimes untractable. Even to-day, although a lot of progress 
has been made, strong conclusions cannot apparently be obtained in the area 
of economics, and chaos can neither be rejected nor claimed for.
In one of the preceding sections, we alluded to the fact that the higher 
the dimension of a dynamical system , the larger the possibility of complex 
dynamics. This result should make us think about one of the major ideas of 
‘economic wisdom’, namely the idea that freedom of trade and suppression of 
economic barriers mean an improvement for everybody, simply because what 
is recommended is the creation of a complex economic system  obtained by 
coupling several local economies. And this, as we have seen, bears the risk
G  ranger  and  M o r g e n s te r n  (196.3),  Fa m a  (1 9 7 0 ) .
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of leading to a complicated, chaotic temporal evolution instead of a pleasant 
equilibrium.
“I shall say it in a more brutal manner. Economic text­
books discuss in detail the equilibrium situations between eco­
nomic agents that are capable of predicting exactly the future.
These treatises can give the impression that the role of legislators 
and responsible officials is to find and implement an equilibrium  
which is especially propitious to the community. The examples 
of chaos in physics teach us however that certain dynamic situa­
tions, instead of leading to an equilibrium, give rise to a chaotic 
and unpredictible temporal evolution. Legislators and responsible 
officials are thus confronted to the possibility that their decisions, 
instead of leading to a better equilibrium, will in fact generate 
violent and unpredictible oscillations, with perhaps desastruous 
effects.”
David Ruelle (1985), Hasard et Chaos.
There is certainly some truth in that statement, but we must be very careful 
in our deductions. Existence of endogenous fluctuations does not neces­
sarily imply non optimality in Pareto’s sense of the equilibrium path. Of 
course, the origin of the possibility of endogenous cycles lies quite often in 
the existence of a market failure (externalities, imperfect financial markets 
etc.) which implies non Pareto optimality of perfect competition equilib­
ria. Endogenous fluctuations are thus very often encountered in situations of
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suboptimality. But there exist also many examples of models with Pareto op­
timal endogenous cycles (see, for instance, Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986)). 
Furthermore, it is not clear at all that the creation of a large economy with 
endogenous fluctuations implies a loss in welfare compared to a situation with 
small, local economies in stationary equilibrium. We are thus in a situation  
where we do not know anything a priori ; Ruelle’s statement has therefore 
its importance as long as it has not been refutated, and we should be careful 
in our ‘deductions’ and claims about the effects of free trade. Unfortunately, 
the debate about freedom of trade is highly passionate and ideological ; con­
scious of their utter ignorance, economists should perhaps adopt an attitude  
of modesty and humility.
3.3 T h e End o f ‘D eterm in ism ’?
. . .Noi s iam venuti al loco o v ’i t ’ho detto 
Che tu vedrai le genii dolorose 
C ’hanno perduto il hen de Vintelletto...
Dante Alleghieri, Inferno.
Chaos theory has generated a tremendous excitement and is to-day a 
fashionable topic : one can find messiahs of chaos that assert that “it is 
everywhere” , in the smoke of a cigar, the milk poured in our five o ’clock 
tea, the functioning of our brain, the evolution of our universe, and that all 
this signifies the metamorphosis of science, if not its end. There even exist 
‘chaos-clubs’ where mystics, under the cover of (pseudo-) science, celebrate
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the new religion. An approxinriated truth is often mingled with completely 
invented facts, chaos is proclaimed to exist in fields where, as a matter of 
fact, nobody has yet undertaken any serious research, the notion of chaos 
is often assimilated to hazard, theories are applied in contexts where their 
assumptions are not fulfilled, and a lot of confusion prevails.
Several years ago, meteorologists established that the atmospheric streams 
admit an attractor. From this, some simple-minded creatures immediately 
deduced the now (unbelievably) famous ‘butterfly effect’ : since the atm o­
sphere’s dynamics are sensitive on initial conditions, the fluttering of the 
wings of a butterfly can completely change the weather, not of to-morrow, 
but in the future. Why did these people forget that the poor butterfly is 
a part of the whole system ? The consequence of this simple fact is that 
the problem to consider is not sensitivity on initial conditions, but rather 
structural stability, and to reassure the reader, nothing has yet indicated any 
instability. We can thus rather confindently continue and swat the mosquitos 
which sting our tender skin and suck our precious blood.
The pseudo-scientific delirium even led some people to apply the second 
principle of thermodynamics to the whole universe and predict the ineluctable 
thermic death of our world. All the blabla and nonsense which can be heard 
makes us think about the rise of irrationality which is apparently charac­
teristic of human behaviour at the end of each millenary (or... century ?). 
The role of the médias, always fond of catastrophic news that make people 
quiver with horror and delight, is obvious but some men of science, perhaps 
themselves subject to mystic attacks or simply consumed by the desire of
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fame, adopted a disgraceful attitude and presented, without the care and 
rigour required by scientifc honesty, ‘spectacular’ results on chaos theory in 
‘vulgarising’ books, articles, colloquia and seminars throughout the world.
More seriously, the development of chaos theory and the empirical evi­
dence of the existence of chaotic dynamics in the natural sciences has led 
to a debate on determinism. Some proclaim its death, others its survival, 
and others cannot understand why all this has led to a debate on determin­
ism. Sometimes, there seems to exist a lack of precision which leads easily 
to confusions, and some actors of the debate rejoice in the use of abstruse 
sentences, mistaking hermetism and scientihcity^°.
Our purpose is not and cannot be to cite all the arguments put forward 
pro or contra determinism ; we shall rather expose the problem and show 
why, in our eyes, the use of the existence of chaotic phenomena as an argu­
ment against determinism is erroneous. Note that the bibliography contains 
a list of works of interest on the topics of methodology in science, causality, 
determinism and hnalism.
The term ‘determinism’ is often used, and even by scientists, in an approx­
imative and ambiguous way. Definitions with differing connotations abound.
^ °S ee ,  for in s t a n c e ,  E d g a r  M o r i n ’s a t t e m p t s  to  b e  ta k e n  for an e p i s t e m o l o g i s t  : 
L a  M é t h o d e  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  (1 9 8 0 ) ,  ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  or his m ir t h - p r o v o k in g  e s sa y  in L a  Q u e r e l l e  d u  
D é t e r m i n i s m e  ( 1 9 8 4 ) .
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analytical philosophists, biologists, physicists and mathematicians have in 
general completely different concepts in mind when using the same word, 
and it is out of question to dress a list of all of them. Let us first consider 
here the simplest acceptance, shared by many, but not all mathematicians : 
they distinguish deterministic dynamical system  from stochastic ones. A 
deterministic description of the evolution of a variable A" of a phase space 
M. is then simply given by the modélisation through a system of differential 
equations :
X q given.
Determinism in this acceptance applied to a modélisation of the world is 
then ‘causalism’ in the sense of Leibniz’ doctrine of the principle of efficient 
causality, stating that everything has an antecedent, a ‘cause’ without which 
it could not exist. This doctrine thus claims that every event is ontologically 
determined. It is the doctrine most obviously inherent in the so often quoted 
passage of Laplace :
“We must therefore consider the present state of the universe 
as the effect of its former state, and as the cause of the one which 
will follow...”
Pierre Simon de Laplace (1814), Essai philosophique sur les 
probabilités.
The attem pts to reconcile the notions of freedom and causalism^^ then may
. . . l ike  t l ie  t h e o r y  o f  ‘p r e -e s ta b l is l ie d  h a r m o n y ’ o f  L e ib n iz  h im se l f . . .
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appear as intellectual acrobatics that only underline the inherent contradic­
tions.
Stochastic modélisation is intended to describe ‘aleatory’ events. We 
will come back to the problem of this notion in the following. Consider 
for simplicity a discrete time dynamic model. The idea is that, given the 
value of X  at a date we ‘know’ that there exists a set, finite or infinite, 
of possible states at / -f 1, and a law of probabilities defined of this set. 
The consequence is that we cannot describe the true state at  ^ T  1, but 
only form expectations and describe an anticipated value. The existence 
of situations that we describe by the use of probability distributions finds 
several interpretations. There are, of course, all the situations where the 
obvious complexity of the system leads us to build statistical models even if 
we know that in theory'we could write down a standard deterministic model. 
Furthermore, some people claim that ‘hazard’ exists and rules the world^^, 
others consider that stochastic modélisation often accounts for situations 
where there exist ‘hidden’ variables^^, and others share this conception and 
furthermore defend the attitude consisting in saying that stochastic models 
are simply deterministic models in higher dimensional spaces ; this is the 
position defended, amongst others, by René Thom^'*. Thom argues that 
even in classical mechanics, reality is not described in the ‘natural’ IT  ^ space.
^ ^ P r ig o g in e  an d  S t e n g e r s  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  L a  N o u v e l l e  A l l i a n c e .
^■^For in s t a n c e  in q u a n t u m  p h y s ics .
34  (S e e  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  P a r a b o l e  e  C a i a s t r o f i .
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but in the phase space formed by the vectors (position, kinetic moments). 
Thus, to instaure determinism, the dimension of the space has been increased. 
But this is exactly what is done when we build a stochastic model. Instead of 
considering a classical deterministic system (Ad, F ), we look at a stochastic 
model where a probability distribution m{x)  has an evolution governed by 
the associated Fokker-Planck equation
F  Lie derivative.
Doing this we change the phase space, substituting the space C(Ad) of 
real smooth functions on Ad to the initial space Ad. Determinism is thus 
reinstaured and
“...on ne peut pas faire autrement.”^^
René Thom (1984), “Halte au Hasard, silence au bruit” in 
La Querelle du Déterminisme.
In this sense, we can consider that quantum mechanics are as deterministic 
as classical mechanics, the physical reality at the quantum level being not the 
particle anymore but the wave function which follows Schrodinger’s equation, 
an equation which is certainly more complicated although of the same type 
as the equations ruling classical mechanics.
^ ^ A p p r o x im a te ly  : “we  c a n n o t  p r o c e e d  dilTerently” .
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The progress of science has shown that a same reality can admit several 
types of descriptions. In quantum physics, this could be seen in the duality 
of the respective conceptions of Heisenberg and Schrodinger. The results on 
sensitivity on initial conditions now illustrate the fact that a purely deter­
ministic dynamical system as well as a stochastic model can both describe 
in a satisfactory manner an evolution for which we do not dispose of very 
large data sets. Unfortunately, imprecision and confusion has led some peo­
ple to believe that chaos is then the consequence of hazard, of the existence 
of purely aleatory events in our world. This is a bad mistake.
W hat indeed is the signification of ‘aleatory’ in its strictest sense ? A 
process is aleatory if it can neither be simulated by any mechanism nor de­
scribed by any formalism. This is why the theory of probabilities is not a 
theory of aleatory events in the strict sense, since we suppose that there is a 
certain regularity in the phenomenon that allows us to define a probability 
distribution and describe the evolution in a certain space. Hazard, on the 
contrary, is the unthinkable, the undescribable. To claim the existence of 
‘hazard’ is simply tantamount to adopting the anti-scientific position con­
sidering that there exist natural phenomena that we will never be able to 
describe and understand. As Thom notes
“...this means to renew the position of the famous Ignora- 
himus of Du Bois-Reymond, to resuscitate the wave of irrational­
ity and anti-scientism of the years 1880-1890, the one of the apos­
tles of the “crisis of science” : Bout roux, Le Roy...”
René Thom (1984), ibid.
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Is the world subject to determinism or do there exist aleatory events, 
irreducible to any description ? This question is of metaphysical nature. 
For pure consistency reasons, the position of a scientist must be optim istic 
and postulate that nothing, in the field of nature, is unknowable a priori. 
The glorification and hypostasis of ‘hazard’ by a Nobel prize winner like Ilya 
Prigogine must fill us with astonishment.
Furthermore, the ‘logic’ behind reasonings invoking the existence of chaotic 
phenomena like the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction^® to conclude on the ‘non 
determ inistic’ character of Nature itself leaves us amazed. First of all, no sci­
entist, even in the field of mathematical physics, believes anymore that a 
mathematical model is the direct expression of reality. If the model is deter­
ministic and gives a good description of reality, then this does not mean that 
reality obeys to causal laws, but simply that the deterministic description is 
efficacious. Of course, the converse also holds. So we may ask : why should 
the finding of situations well described by models with sensitivity on initial 
conditions have any implication on the ‘true’ character of Nature ? Secondly, 
the only possible discussion concerns what one could call, following Popper’s 
definition, ‘scientific determinism’, that is the doctrine stating that
“...any event can be rationally predicted with any degree of 
precision as soon as we dispose of a sufficiently precise description 
of past events, as well as of all laws of nature.”
Karl Popper (1945), The Open Society and its Enemies.
F a m o u s  c h e m ic a l  rea c t io n  b e tw e e n  su lp h u r ic  ac id ,  m a lo n ic  ac id ,  n a t r iu m  b r o m a t e  a n d  
c e r iu m  su l ] )h a te .
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To adhere to scientific determinism in this acceptance does not imply any 
pretention to give an answer to the problem of the ‘true’ character of Nature. 
But note : now we can say that chaos invalidates some notion of determin­
ism : indeed, sensitivity on initial conditions exactly implies that there exist 
situations where absolute precision, of course completely excluded in prac­
tice, is necessary for predictions, and that any infinitesimal error on initial 
conditions can lead to completely different evolutions. This means the death 
of the myth of scientific determinism.
We would like to emphasize again the fact that Duhem, reflecting on 
Hadamard’s results on the geodesics of surfaces with negative curvature, 
came to the conclusion :
. . .“l ’idée de conférer un sens physique à la notion, mathématiquement 
bien définie, de déduction de l’évolution à partir des conditions 
initiales est un leurre.
Pierre Duhem, op. cit.
And this was in 1906...
Some people have claimed the end of determinism and interpreted chaos 
as the manifestation of hazard in our world. We have seen that many reasons 
lead to conclude that this type of deduction lacks any logical foundation. Non 
sequitur, modus ponens, false analogies and many other types of sophisms 
abound in the pseudo-epistemological littérature which seems to care more
^ ^ A p p r o x im a te ly  : “to  co n fer  a p h y s ica l  se n s e  to  th e ,  m a t h e m a t i c a l ly  well  d e f in e d ,  n o t io n  
o f  d e d u c t i o n  o f  th e  e v o lu t io n  from  t h e  init ial c o n d i t io n s  m e a n s  to  d e lu d e  o n e - s e l f ” .
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about sales than deontology. Scientific determinism is dead, but determinism  
as a possibility survives.
Let us conclude with a last quotation from the work of Thom concerning 
the essence of scientific investigation :
“Rappelons cette trivialité : du fait même qu’elle vise à la 
constitution d’un savoir commun, la science est par essence dé­
terministe. Qu’on le veuille ou non, la science est une entreprise 
dogmatique, puisqu’elle vise à susciter chez tout observateur la 
même  réaction mentale en face d’un même  donné scientifique, fait 
ou théorie. Tout modèle est “déterministe” puisqu’il vise à nous 
dire quelque chose, à spécifier, à déterminer en quelque manière 
notre connaissance^®.”
René Thom (1984), “En guise de conclusion” in La Querelle 
du Déterminisme.
^ L e t  u s  reca ll  t h i s  t r iv ia l i ty  : g iv e n  t h a t  her a im  is to  c o n s t i t u t e  a  c o m m o n  k n o w le d g e ,  
s c i e n c e  is in her  e s s e n c e  d e t e r m in i s t i c .  W h e t h e r  we w a n t  it  or n o t ,  s c ie n c e  is a  d o g m a t i c  
e n te r p r i s e ,  s in c e  s h e  a im s  a t  in sp ir in g  in e v er y  o b serv er  th e  s a m e  m e n t a l  r e a c t io n  in front  
o f  a  s a m e  s c ien t i f ic  ‘g i v e n ’, fac t  or  theory .  E v ery  m o d e l  is ‘d e t e r m i n i s t i c ’ s in c e  i t s  a im  is  
t o  te ll  u s  s o m e t h i n g ,  t o  sp ec i fy ,  to  d e te r m in e  in s o m e  s e n s e  our  k n o w le d g e .
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A b str a c t
In a three-period OLG model with endogenous growth where young 
agents m ust borrow to consume, the condition fo r  the possibility of 
bubbles does not only reflect parameters of taste and technology : 
bubbles might simply not be possible i f  markets are perfect. Con­
straining borrowings has a positive effect on the rate o f growth of 
capital and can be used to improve the social welfare but, at the 
same time, increases the possibility o f bubbles. We show here that 
when a bubble appears in the economy, the government can, un­
der certain conditions, reduce the expected welfare loss by relatively 
simple tax/subsidy schemes. This result is in opposition with the 
classical results obtained in Diamond-type economies where simple 
tax/subsidy policies create an 10 U which is form ally equivalent to 
the bubble.
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I n tr o d u c t io n
The interaction between productive and non productive savings in a grow­
ing economy has been studied in the setting of neoclassical growth with over­
lapping generations by Tirole in his well-known papers [9], [10] and [11] ; a 
recent paper by Grossman and Yanagawa [4] studies the existence and the 
dynamics of positive bubbles (‘fiat money’) in an OLG model with endoge­
nous growth à la Romer [8]. The conclusions of the latter are that positive 
bubbles can exist provided they are not too large and that the rate of growth 
in the equilibrium without bubbles is larger than the rate of interest. The 
existence condition reflects parameters of taste and production technology.
In the Tirole model, positive bubbles can exist only if the economy is in­
efficient, i.e. when there is overaccumulation of capital, and can improve the 
efficiency of the economy by diverting savings from productive investment. 
In the Grossman-Yanagawa framework on the contrary, such bubbles cannot 
have any positive effect for there is already under-accumulation of capital 
in the fundamental equilibrium, since agents do not internalise the positive 
externality of capital onto the efficiency of labour, and bubbles can thus only 
harm, exacerbating the existing distortion. In Grossman and Yanagawa’s 
model, there is no possibility for a simple government intervention : simple 
tax/subsidy schemes that redistribute income across generations create an 
lOU equivalent to national debt and have exactly the same effect on capital 
accumulation as the bubble they are intended to struggle against.
Indeed, in a Diamond-Romer framework, the first agents to be harmed by 
a bubble, the young of date 1, are not yet born when the bubble appears in
8 1
the economy. As a matter of fact, their actualised income loss is larger than 
the value of the bubble ; but there is no possibility of trading with those who 
sell the unproductive asset at date 0. Therefore, anti-bubble policies have 
to use an intermediary : the government must tax young agents of date 0 in 
order to buy the shares of the unproductive asset, then tax young agents of 
date 1 to subsidize the old agents of date 1, who were the young agents of 
date 0, etc. This shows why tax/subsidy schemes have the same effect on the 
economy as the bubble itself ; the same amount of capital is diverted from 
productive investment.
The OLG model considered here is Jappelli and Pagano’s [5], who used 
it to show the effect of borrowing constraints on the rate of growth of capital 
in an economy with endogenous growth. It is a model with three periods of 
life where young agents have to borrow to consume, their borrowings being 
constrained. In this type of model, the first agents to suffer from a bubble 
appearing in the economy are the young agents of date 0 ; thus, there might 
exist tax/subsidy policies that do not create an lOU with the same effects 
on the economy as the bubble. Furthermore, since the Grossman-Yanagawa 
model showed that the condition for the possibility of bubbles is a condition 
on the rate of growth of capital in the bubbleless equilibrium and the rate 
of interest, we shall obtain results about the effects of borrowing constraints 
on the possibility of bubbles, and their dynamics. The fact that we use 
here a slightly more general assumption about the form of the agents’ utili­
ties (CRRA instead of logarithmic) than Grossman-Yanagawa and Jappelli-
8 2
Pagano does not find its roots in the desire of obtaining (slightly) more 
complex equations, but has a simple explanation : the rate of intertemporal 
substitution plays an important role since, unless assuming an agents’ pref­
erence for future consumption, bubbles cannot appear in the economy with  
perfect markets, i.e. without constraints on borrowing, if this rate is smaller 
than or equal to 1.
1 T h e  E c o n o m y  w it h o u t  B u b b le s
1.1 T h e M odel
The model we shall study here is the one Jappelli and Pagano [5] used 
to show the link between liquidity constraints on the consumers’ side and 
the rate of growth in an economy with endogenous growth. There is one 
consumption good in the economy. People live for three periods ; they borrow 
when young (from a mutual fund, for instance) to finance their consumption, 
work, repay their borrowing, consume and save for their old age in the second 
period of their life and consume their savings when old. We suppose that 
young agents are constrained in their borrowings : they can only borrow a 
fraction P of the present value of their lifetime income. The population is 
assumed to be stationary and the size of each generation is normalized to 
L =  1 without loss of generality. Labour is provided inelastically. There is no 
uncertainty in the model and we assume that agents have perfect foresight.
Utilities are assumed to be identical accross agents, additively separable 
and of the following form (the agents’ discount coefficient for time preference
8 3
is denoted hy ^ =  1/(14-/)), where p G] —1, -f oo[ is the rate of time preference.
-f (3u(Ct,t+i) +  fi^u{Ct t^+2)^
where Ct._t+i is the consumption at time t4-i of an agent born at time t, and 
where u is given by :
u (C) =
Ln(C) ,  6 =  1.
The utility chosen is characterized by a constant coefficient of intertemporal 
substitution cr =  1 /e, thus slightly more general than in Jappelli-Pagano [5] 
for reasons that will become clear below.
The technology is a classical Romer (1986)-type one :
F ( K „ L , )  =
where denotes the capital at time Kt  the aggregate level of capital in 
the economy, Lt the labour input (here, Lt =  1), There is a spillover from 
capital on the efficiency of labour, which firms do not internalize and which 
gives, in equilibrium, increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level and 
thus endogenous growth. Firms are supposed to behave competitively, ignor­
ing the externality operating in the production sector and maximising profits 
using the Cobb-Douglas function A t K t ° ' .
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The consumer’s program is :
maxVt =  '^^'u(Ct, t+i)  
1 = 0





where Rt+i =  1 +  ^f+i, I't+i being the rate of interest on capital from t to 
f +  1, and where e^+i is real labour earnings of agents born at time t.
1.2 T he B ubbleless E conom y
Solving the program, we obtain :
1 — $
where $  =  F if F <  <p and (f otherwise,
1ip =
1 +  +1 )"-' +  / 3 ^ {R ,+ ,R t+ 2 y - '
being the fraction of actualised lifetime income a young agent would like to 
consume if there was no constraint on borrowing.
Net aggregate wealth Wt in this economy is income of middle-aged minus 
their actualised borrowings, their consumption and the borrowings of young 
people :
~ RtCt- \ , t - \  ~  ~  Ct,t
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If we write :
F ( K „ L , )  =  A cU F ( 4 ^ , 1 )  =  A , L J { k , ) ,
then the competitive behaviour of the firms implies ;
=  f ' {k t )  = aALt^~°‘ = a A  =  p,
=  /(^<) — =  (I — (y)ALt^ hi  =  (1 — a ) A Kf
In the absence of bubbles in the economy, equilibrium in the capital mar­
ket implies :
— I^i+i — A (.
Accumulation of capital is therefore given by the following equation :
I<t+i = (1 -A 9t)^ <t =  [1 4-  
a
where P' =  pY~^- Since the rate of interest is constant over time, the
expression of y  is simplified : =  I/ { I  A P' P'"^ )-
It is obvious that is decreasing in 0  ; we have therefore the result that 
the rate of growth of capital is an increasing function of the strength of the 
borrowing constraints. The parameter F could thus be considered as a policy 
instrument : in fact, a government could choose this parameter accordingly 
to a welfare criterion ; there is a trade-off between growth of capital and
8 6
consumption of young agents, and Pareto-improvement constraints must be 
respected. We give in appendix A, for the special case e =  1, an example 
of calculus of the optimal F according to a welfare criterion, and show that 
fixing F in such a way may lead to the possibility of bubbles in an economy 
where bubbles cannot appear if young agents are not constrained.
2 B u b b le s  in  th e  E c o n o m y
As there is only one consumption good and one productive capital good  
in this economy, the price of real capital cannot increase geometrically and 
therefore no bubble can exist on productive assets.
So let us consider an intrinsically useless asset, in the hands of old people 
at time 0, and in supply M .  Under which conditions can a bubble exist on 
this asset ? If an agent is willing to buy shares of the unproductive asset, 
he must expect to get a rate of return at least equal to that of capital. The 
no-arbitrage condition yields :
Bt+\ =  =  (1 +  p)Bt,
where Bt — pt being the price of one share of the asset as of time t.
Let us suppose that all agents share the belief that the asset yields a rate of 
return equal to the rate of interest at each period. Who will buy the shares at 
time 0 ? Young agents have to borrow to consume. W ithout the assumption 
that these agents internalize the effect of the bubble on their future wages, 
which is an assumption difficult to defend in a price-taker economy, only
87
middle-aged agents will be willing to buy shares of the unproductive asset. 
The transmission mechanism of a bubble in a price-taker economy should 
therefore be : at each time t, old agents sell the asset to middle-aged agents.
2.1 D ynam ics o f  th e  Econom y w ith  B ubbles
The equilibrium of the capital market gives now :
=  ^(+1 +  Bt.
If we denote by bt the value of the bubble per unit of capital [bt =  BtfKt)^ 
which is straightforwardly related to the value of the bubble per unit of 
productivity of labor, then we can write :
(l +  $  ^ )(1 +Si) =  -  ^)(l - o i ) A  -  bt
which we rewrite under the following form :
9t) =  -  W-
Eliminating we obtain the dynamics of the reduced bubble [bt) :
u[y)x
^ [ x , y )  =
v(y)  -  X
The necessary condition for the possibility of bubbles is that a portion 
of the curve ^ lies beneath the 45 degree line, condition which we can write
here, since 'I (^O) =  0 and ^  is stric tly  convex in x :
g(0) >  p.
This condition, which says that, for bubbles to be possible, the rate of 
increase in capital of the bubbleless economy must be greater than the rate 
of interest, is of course similar to the one in the Grossman-Yanagawa model. 
But here, we are working with a three period OLG model where young agents 
must borrow, which implies that the condition for the possibility of bubbles 
reflects not only parameters of taste and technology, but also market imper­
fections through the parameter F. It is easy to see that, unless we assume 
strict preference for future consumption, bubbles cannot exist in our model 
when markets are perfect and cr, the rate of intertemporal substitution, is 
smaller than or equal to 1 : the rate of increase in capital is always to low to 
allow any bubbly belief to be consistent :
P < \  and a <  1 => <y(y) ^  g ,: ) <  Z’’
whatever are the parameters a , A  and (3. Indeed, as we have seen previ­
ously, g is decreasing in 0 . Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility 
of bubbles is :
s (0 )  >
r6]o,r[ ,  <7(r) = />.
Thus, (3 < \  and a  <  1, bubbles can only exist in constrained economies
=  F). Furthermore we see that by strengthening the constraint on bor­
rowing (i.e. by reducing F), bubbles may become possible in a world where
8 9
bubbles could not exist before (see Appendix A). The situation is a bit differ­
ent if cr >  L As a matter of fact, under this condition and even when agents 
prefer future consumption, f  might be larger than y , which means that bub­
bles can appear even if young agents are not constrained. In Appendix B, 
we give the formal proof of this result.
The only admissible values for bo are those which are smaller than the 
value of the stationary reduced bubble :
b*{T) = v { r ) - u { r ) .
Indeed, a belief such that bo >  b*{T) would be inconsistent because, at 
some date, Bt would exceed the capital stock of the economy. Hence, the 
possible bubbles are the stationary one and the vanishing bubbles starting 
from below the stationary value. The value of the stationary bubble is de­
creasing in r  ; therefore, the more constrained the economy, the larger the 
range of possible bubbles.
In the presence of the stationary bubble, the economy’s rate of growth of 
capital is always gt =  p. If a bubble starts from below the stationary value, 
then this rate is always greater than the rate of interest, strictly increas­
ing and asymptotically equal to ^(F), the rate in the bubbleless economy. 
Furthermore, the speed of convergence is decreasing in F, in the sense that 
a bubble that is admissible in two economies vanishes quicker in the more 





If r ' <  r , then the range of possible bubbles is larger in the F'-economy. 
We know that in the bubbleless equilibrium, the rate of growth of capital is 
larger in this economy. It is clear that a bubble which is admissible in the two 
economies does not alter the relation gf((F) <  yt(F') ; yet bubbles which are 
not consistent in the F-economy (6q >  b*(T)) can appear in the F'-economy. 
Such bubbles can lower the rate of increase in capital beneath #(F ), the rate 
of growth in the F-economy, for ever in the case of a stationary bubble, for a 
finite lapse of time otherwise. Thus, even if the effect of constraining young 
people is positive in the case of bubbleless equilibria, it is ambiguous if we 
admit the possibility of bubbles.
2.2 Effects on th e  W elfare
The effect of bubbles on the welfare of generations born after or at time 
0 is obviously negative. Indeed, in an economy with endogenous growth, 
there is under-accumulation of capital in the bubbleless situation ; bubbles 
divert capital from saving, and can therefore only have a negative effect. 
This point has been insisted upon by Grossman and Yanagawa [4] : whereas 
a stationary bubble has a positive effect in a Diamond economy (see Tirole 
[10], [11]) by removing the intertemporal inefficiency, the effect of bubbles in 
a Romer-OLG model is always an exacerbation of the existing distortion.
Let us suppose that a bubble of value Bq appears at time 0. The gener­
ation that is old at t= 0  sales a. new asset and therefore increases its welfare.
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Middle-aged agents, which are those who buy the unproductive asset, are 
not affected because their labour income is already determined and the rate 
of interest fixed. But young agents born at time 0, and all subsequent gen­
erations will suffer from the existence of the bubble, labour income being 
reduced (the growth of labour productivity being lowered by the bubble...). 
The actualised income loss of the young agents of time 0 (in fact, the result 
holds for all generations born after time 0) is large enough to compensate 
the old of time 0 for their gain from the unproductive asset (&% denotes the 
income in the bubbleless equilibrium) :
\ OL '
But, first of all, young agents are constrained in their borrowings and, 
secondly, young agents would have to internalize the negative effect of the 
bubble on their life-time income, and this constitutes an unacceptable as­
sumption in a pure price-taker economy in which agents are supposed not 
to internalize the effects of their consumption choices on the level of capital, 
the rate of interest etc.
Nevertheless, we could imagine a public intervention to get rid of the 
bubble or, at least, to lower its effects. Indeed, in our framework, there 
might exist situations where tax/subsidy policies will not necessarily have 
the same effects on welfare as the bubble : in that, a three generations 
OLG model differs fundamentally from a Diamond model where the lOU 
created by a simple tax/subsidy scheme has exactly the same effects as the
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bubble, diverting the same amount of capital from productive investment as 
the bubble (see Grossman-Yanagawa [4] ).
3 G o v e r n m e n t  I n te r v e n t io n
In the preceding sections, we have studied the different equilibria of 
the economy without considering government intervention. But it is clear 
that the type of economy considered here can offer possibilities for Pareto- 
improving policies in the bubbleless equilibrium since the rate of growth of 
capital is an increasing function of the strength of the borrowing constraint 
imposed on young agents. We can imagine two simple ways of improving 
the social welfare : the government could fix P, that means regulate borrow­
ings, or it could intervene indirectly through a tax/subsidy system, taxing  
young agents and increasing investment (injecting the whole amount in the 
productive capital or only a part, giving some fractions to middle-aged and 
old agents..., according to the welfare criterion the government is working 
w ith...). In Appendix A, we give an example of optimal regulation, accord­
ing to a classical welfare criterion, for the special case a =  \.
As we shall see in the following part, and as is easy to understand, if 
the government already uses an optimal regulation policy, then there is no 
possibility left for Pareto-improving intervention through simple tax/subsidy  
schemes in the case of a bubble appearing in the economy : the borrowing 
constraint has then been totally exhausted in a certain sense. The same is 
true of course when there is an optimal tax/subsidy policy in place before a
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bubble appears. But if we think about government intervention, we realise 
that it is never chosen optimally according to a welfare criterion, for many 
reasons (one very simple amongst others is probably the desire of being re­
elected : ref+ i(r)//? t+ i decreases with V decreasing, and the agents are sup­
posed myopic...). Thus, we believe that it is not too shocking an assumption 
to suppose that the policy undertaken by the government in the bubbleless 
equilibrium is not necessarily optimal. The results which follow are obtained 
under the assumption of an already, but non optimally, constrained econ­
omy. The existence of a Pareto-improving public policy obtained under this 
assumption obviously guarantees the possibility of Pareto-improvement in 
unconstrained economies.
In this section, we shall consider the possibility of government interven­
tion in the Ccise of a bubble under the assumption of a policy of borrowing- 
regulation before the bubble appears. We do not treat explicitly the assump­
tion of tax/subsidy schemes in the bubbleless economy because the principal 
result remains unchanged : if the policy undertaken is Pareto-improving, but 
not ‘radicaP, then there can exist possibilities for government intervention 
when a bubble appears. So let us consider now the economy with F E]0, y] 
(if there is regulation before a bubble appears, then F <  y? ; the question of 
possibilities for government intervention is trivial otherwise). We shall look 
for ‘anti-bubble’ policies that are optimal according to some criterion. This 
could give the impression of inconsistence with what we’ve said before, but 
consider that when 6q is small, then an optimal intervention seems to be
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feasable ; for ‘large’ values of 6q, if there exists an optimal policy, then there 
exist non-optimal but feasable policies.
In an economy where young agents have to borrow to consume, there 
might exist ways of lowering the effects of a bubble appearing at date 0. 
Indeed, if young agents of time 0 internalized the negative effect of the bubble 
on their income, they could try to buy some shares of the unproductive 
asset, increasing their future income by diverting part of the bubble from the 
investment market. Of course, there is a trade-off between increasing future 
income and constraining consumption when young. Young agents therefore 
would choose to buy an optimal amount of shares according to this trade­




(1) +  ~E-----+  ~B------5 ---- ^  —5------
(2) Q,, + < r
R <+i
Since we work with the assumption of price-taking agents, young agents 
are supposed not to do this : they remain passive. But let us suppose that the 
government wants to intervene without taking strong centralised decisions as 
in the sense of a central planer who would choose the consumption paths ; the 
government is supposed to let agents choose themselves their consumption at
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each time t. The government could try to buy progressively the unproductive 
asset to make it disappear from the investment market. To finance this policy, 
the government taxes young agents and assures them to give, in the future, 
subsidies equal to the actualised amount of the taxes.
Let us formalize this : let us suppose that at time t, the government levies 
taxes Tt t^ of value Tt t^ =  6tBt on young agents and pays subsidies of value 
S t - 1 ,t =  (1 +  p)Tt-i , t- i  to middle-aged agents of time t (Bt =  (1 +  pYBq 
being the actualised value of the initial amount of non productive asset). We 
suppose that the sequence (#;) is chosen increasing. With the surplus, the 
government buys an amount Tt i^ — St-i,t =  {Ot — 6t- i)Bt  of shares of the non 
productive asset.
But how does the government make the choice of the sequence (#;) ? A 
conceptually very simple way would consist in choosing (#;) according to the 
program young agents of time t would solve if they internalized the effects of 
the bubble (and only its effects) and knew the capital /accumulation equation. 
The condition to make this possible is that the sequence (6t) thus obtained 
is increasing (taxes must finance subsidies..). If this is the case, and if the 
government chooses the sequence according to this scheme, it will obviously 
achieve a Pareto-improvement compared to non-intervention. Of course, this 
kind of behavior puts all the weight on young agents of date t, as it does 
not take into account the effects of intervention at time t on subsequent 
generations. To choose a sequence whilst considering the consequences on 
not yet born agents, the government needs a choice criterion. Such a criterion
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could be of the  following form :
A + r
max
t =  T
{P )  %(^T, ^  %(0, ...,0 ) V < g [t , A  +  r].
(0<7Z)
where % is the indirect utility function of an agent born at time t, agents 




(2)c,., + r,,, < r ^ .
(+1
(P ) is the set of Pareto-improvement constraints. Taxes and subsidies 
do not appear in the budget constraint (1) since the government announces 
that subsidies received when middle-aged equal actualised taxes paid when 
young. A is a decision horizon and R  a social discount factor ; if P  =  0, then 
the government cares only about the current generations and is absolutely 
indifferent to not yet born agents : this is of course the decision criterion 
we first described. We shall see that the case P  =  0 is interesting not only 
because it gives a simple way of achieving a Pareto-improvement, but also 
because it allows us to characterize the type of dynamics of the economy in 
the case P  0, without solving formally the optimisation problem, which 
looks rather tedious if A is large. We shall see that if the tax/subsidy scheme 
allows an improvement in social welfare in the case P  =  0, then the optimal
97
policy is a finite sequence in the sense of Ot equalling 1 after a finite lapse of 
time, the policy becoming a pure tax/subsidy scheme once the entire bubbly 
asset eliminated from the market, and necessarily the policy chosen with a 
R  ^  0-criterion will be finite too.
3.1 A  Sim ple T ax /S u b sid y  P olicy
We shall give here the results for the optimisation problem under the 
assumption i? =  0, i.e. a government which, at each date, cares only about 
the present generation. The solution of the problem of the choice of [9t) is 
the following ;
P r o p o s it io n  : If  ^(F) >  F, where ^ is given by :
W r ]- '  =  i +  {i3' +   ) -
a
then the optimal choice of Oq is 0, and it is easy to verify that at each 
date t, the government will choose Ot =  0, because the condition for  this is 
structural (only related to the parameters of taste and technology and not  
to the size of the bubble...).
Otherwise, since the function (f) is strictly increasing and concave in its 
variable F, there exists a value F such that :
{(i)re]o,f]} =4. 0, = 0 VL 
{(2) r e]f,r[} ^  o , > o  v/.
9 8
Furthermore, if (2) holds, then the sequence {6t) is strict ly increasing until 
6t =  I, which always occurs after a finite lapse of time .
The proof is given in Appendix C, where we exhibit parameter values 
which show the existence of economies such that ^ ( f )  <  P. Appendixes 
A and C show us furthermore the following results for the case e =  1 : 
if we denote by P/?=o the value of F which is optimal for young agents of 
date 0 given K q, then we have an upper bound for all P ’s that are optimal 
according to classical welfare criteria. But ^>(P/?=o) >  PB=o, which implies 
that there are no possibilities for tax/subsidy schemes if P has been fixed 
optimally, whatever is the welfare-criterion the central-planner is working 
with. Another consequence of the strict inequality is that P >  P/?=o does 
not imply the possibility of Pareto-improving intervention through a policy 
of the type considered here. It is even possible to exhibit parameters such 
that P/?=o <  P <  P ; this means that there exist economies in which policies 
of the type considered here cannot be undertaken, even if the parameter P 
has not been chosen very close to Pfi=o-
We suppose now that the condition holds, which means that the govern­
ment policy can achieve a Pareto-improvement by converting progressively, 
and in a finite lapse of time, the bubble into a sort of public debt forced 
onto young agents ; formally, the variables of the economy evolve as if the 
bubble, which would have been transmitted from old to middle-aged agents, 
was now progressively bought by young agents, the economy reaching, after 
a finite lapse of time, a regime with the bubble transmitted from middle-aged
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to young agents. When the government applies the (R =  0)-optimal policy, 
the capital accumulation is given by (we pose 6_i =  0) :
(l +  ^ —~—)(1 + fft) =  ^ ~  “  (1 “  + Y ^
where bt =  B t / K t .  For T* >  +  1, =  Bt and therefore we have :
( l  +  +  g j  =  ^ ( 1  -  $ ) ( i  -  „ )A  +
where St =  St- i^tlKt.  This shows us that the rate of growth of capital 
is increased, at least in the short run, by the action of the government, and 
even beyond the rate of growth of capital in the bubbleles economy. This is 
not surprising : to achieve a Pareto-superior outcome, the government uses a 
policy that is formally equivalent to an increased constraint on borrowing for 
young agents, which implies increased savings, and we know that more saving 
means increased rate of growth of capital. The effect on the growth-rate is 
asymptotically null : St vanishes to 0 as is rather obvious and nevertheless 
shown in the appendix.
The dynamics of bt and Sf, equal to bt after time +  1, are given in 
the appendix. As we have said before, we prove in appendixes A and C, 
for the case e =  1 (this is the only case which can be solved formally ; 
nonetheless, it seems quite reasonable to conjecture that the results hold in 
general), that if P has been fixed by a central planner, which internalizes 
the effect of this parameter on the rate of growth of capital, according to 
a social welfare criterion, then ^(P) >  P and there is no possibility for a
1 0 0
Pareto-superior outcome by simple tax/subsidy schemes. This is easy to 
understand : a central planner chooses a T that is less or equal to the T 
that maximises the welfare of the current young generation (he chooses a 
smaller value if he cares about future generations...). If P has been fixed by 
a central planner, then the increase in future consumption resulting from the 
constraint on first period consumption and from the elimination of a part of 
the bubble does not exceed the loss in consumption of young agents. Thus, 
if r  has been fixed optimally, any attempt to struggle against a bubble using 
a tax/subsidy policy necessarily diminishes the welfare of early generations. 
Furthermore, as we have seen before, the fact that there exists a possibility 
for Pareto-improvement in the bubbleless equilibrium (P >  Pr=o) does not 
imply the possibility of tax/subsidy schemes when a bubble appears, and 
there even exist economies (cr,/9,/4,a) in which tax/subsidy policies never 
lead to a Pareto-superior outcome in the case of a bubble, whatever be the 
parameter P.
3.2 Caring about Future G eiieratious
If the government cares about future generations (R  ^  0), the policy 
described above yields a Pareto-improvement, but is not optimal in the sense 
of the choice criterion. As the problem of finding the (/?, A)-optim al policy 
is rather difficult and tedious, we shall give qualitative characterizations of 
the optimal sequence {0^’^ ).
In the case P G]0,P], the government cannot apply the tax/subsidy  
scheme described here and achieve a Pareto-superior outcome since agents
101
of early generations would incur a welfare loss, gains in lifetime income not 
counterbalancing the loss in consumption when agents are young, at least in 
the first periods.
So let us now consider the case (F G ]f ,f [ )  where Pareto-superior out­
comes are possible. If i l  0, the government cares about the effect of a 
choice Ot on generations born after time t ; intuitively, this should imply 
that 0^’^  is bigger than 0^~^ or 0^’^  =  0^~^ =  1. The larger R  or A , the 
more the government cares about the increase in capital and the less it is 
concerned with the constrained consumption of the current young. Therefore 
0 ^ ' ^  should be increasing in R  and in A.
We give the formal proof of the result of Oq ’^  increasing (in a large sense) 
in R.  The dependence in A can be established in a similar but, because A  
is a discrete parameter, more difficult manner. Considering the structure of 
the economy and of the choice problem, it is immediate to deduce : [Oq '  ^
increasing in R  and A] ^  [0^’^  increasing in R  and A Vi].
• If Oq~  ^ =  1 (which occurs when the value of the bubble is small), then 
of course 0 ^ '^  =  1.
• If Oq~  ^ ^  1, then there are two possibilities : either (a) Po(l )  <  Vo(0) 
or (b) Po(l) >  Vo(0)- is a strictly concave function of 6q  ^ and under 
the assumption on F,  admits a maximum on the interval ]0,1[.  If (a) holds, 
then there is a 0^ such that Vq{0^) =  Vo(0). This is the maximum value 
the government can choose at date 0 if it tries to achieve a Pareto-superior 
outcome. If (b) holds, then I is the largest possible value for Oq.
As long as the solution of the unconstrained maximisation problem is
1 0 2
smaller than the highest possible ^o-value, we have, at the optimum :
K + Ê / ' - K - '
since is independent of Of, t >  t  1. But the effect of an increase of 
Or on the welfare of generations born after or at time r +  1 is unambiguously 
strictly positive. Thus
at the optimum. This implies Oq ’ >  Oq~ .^ But we can show more : the
function
is obviously C ° °  in its variables, and we have d g F  inversible since each 
Vr is strictly concave in Ot, t <  r. From the implicit function theorem we 
deduce :




as a sum of strictly positive terms. Thus we have :
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If the P (0 ) constraint is binding, then 0^’^  =  (case (a)) or 1 (case 
(b)), which is always larger than 6^~^.
The general and rather obvious result is therefore : the more the govern­
ment cares about future generations, the more shares of the unproductive 
asset it will buy at each date, but there is a limiting sequence (0 )^ which the 
government must respect to achieve a Pareto-superior outcome. Thus, 
is decreasing in its arguments but has a Pareto-limiting lower bound T- The 
dynamics of bt and are of course of the same type as those in the case 
i? =  0 , the convergence being accelerated.
C O N C L U S I O N
In the OLG framework considered here, we have seen that there exist 
economies in which bubbles can appear only because markets are imperfect : 
for the parameters of taste and technology that characterize the economy, if 
markets are perfect and agents prefer, in a large sense, present consumption, 
then the rate of growth of capital is always too low to allow bubbly beliefs to 
be consistent. On the other hand, we have shown that there exist economies 
where young agents are not constrained in their borrowings and where bub­
bles can appear. If we rule out preference for future consumption, then a 
necessary condition for this is, in our framework, that the rate of intertem­
poral substitution is large (cr > 1 ). The more constrained an economy with 
given parameters of taste and technology, tlie larger the range of possible 
bubbles.
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Many of the conclusions of Grossman and Yanagawa’s model hold, of 
course, in the three-period OLG model considered here. This is not very 
astonishing, for young agents cannot internalize the effects on their welfare 
of a bubble and therefore do not have the least incentive to intervene in the 
market for the unproductive asset, which means that the transmission mech­
anism of the bubble is similar to that in the Grossman-Yanagawa model : 
the bubble is sold by the old agents that live on their savings and is bought 
by the agents that save (the young in the Diamond model, the middle-aged 
in the present one). Thus, the effect of bubbles on the rate of growth of cap­
ital is negative and asymptotically zero except in the case of the stationary 
bubble.
But the main object of our model was to show that although it is true in 
a Diamond model that eliminating a bubble by a simple tax/subsidy scheme 
does not yield any improvement, this might be false in a three period OLG 
model where young agents must borrow and face market imperfections, here 
in the form of a simple, linear constraint on borrowing. Indeed, the govern­
ment might be able to improve the welfare of all agents by a policy, financed 
by a tax/subsidy scheme, of progressive elimination of the unproductive as­
set. When total elimination of the bubbly asset is achieved, the rate of growth 
of capital is larger than it would have been in the absence of the bubble, be­
cause the policy consists in restraining the consumption of young agents, thus 
increasing the savings. This effect is, of course, asymptotically zero since the 
ratios of taxes and subsidies over capital decrease to zero. Of course, the pos­
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sibility for Pareto-improving policies of the type described here is given only 
if the bubbleless economy allows an improvement by stronger constraints on 
borrowing (see Appendixes A and C). This means that in an economy where, 
in the absence of bubbles, P has been fixed optimally by a central planner or 
where the central planner uses an optimal tax/subsidy scheme to maximise 
the social welfare, the Pareto-improvement possibilities by increased borrow­
ing constraints have been totally exhausted : in such an economy, when a 
bubble appears, no tax/subsidy scheme of the type described above can lead 
to a Pareto-superior equilibrium. Yet, though non-optimality of the policy 
undertaken by the government before a bubble appears is a necessary con­
dition for the possibility of tax/subsidy schemes in the case of a bubble, it 
is not sufficient. There exist economies in which borrowing constraints are 
rather far from being ’optimally’ exploited and where, nevertheless, no policy 
of the form considered here can achieve a Pareto-superior outcome.
A P P E N D I X  A  :
O p tim a l  C o n s tr a in in g
The object of this appendix is to show that if, for social welfare reasons 
holding in the bubbleless economy, the government fixes F, then it can happen 
that it chooses a value such that bubbles become possible whereas they could 
not exist in the unconstrained economy. We suppose e =  1 to enable us 
to exhibit formal solutions (this cannot be done otherwise) ; we then have
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We suppose that at date 0, the economy is characterized by 0 ,  this pa­
rameter being equal to (/? if there has been no constraint on borrowing until 
date 0, and equal to some To <  otherwise. We consider the optimal choice 
of r  in an economy that is not subject to central planing (a central planner 
fixes r , but the agents choose their consumption path according to their own 
desire). We treat a formally simple case where the central planner has a 
criterion of the following classical form :
A
max Wa =  F(}[Ln{Ct,t) +  ^Ln{Ct,t+\) +
(= 0
and we make the assumption that the social discount factor R is in [0 ,1[ 
for simplicity (the result holds in the general case >  0 , the restriction is 
done here for pure calculus reasons in order to obtain nice formulas) ; the 
horizon A can be finite or infinite (we have made the asumption R <  1 ), 
As the choice of P at t= 0  does not have any effect on the welfare of people 
born before this date, we do not have to be preoccupied by them. To achieve 
an outcome that Pareto-dominates the unconstrained economy, the central 
planner must solve the following problem :
A
m a x ^ R '% (P )
<=0
( a  % ( F ) > % ( 0 )  V / G [ o , A | ,
where Vt is the indirect utility function of an agent born at time t, agents 










( i  +  r ^ ) ( i  +  s i)  =  Y ^ ( i  -  $ ) ( !  -
/?
and
( l  +  F—— ) ( 1  +  ^() —  ^ ^-^(1 -  F )(l -  a)A .
Let us solve first the unconstrained problem. The objective function is 
the following :
max Wa = è  ft' [ftn(r) + (^ + ^^)Ln(l -  T)
<=0
+  ( 1  +  ^ +  ^^){tLn{V) — (t +  l)L n (l +  F——— 




a-\r (3 {I +  /? +   ^ 1 1 y ^ J R
for A  finite and :
Q
H ,+ o o  —




Now, if the welfare of young agents of period 0 is increased by the choice 
of r , then all subsequent generations welfare will be increased. The con­
straints therefore remain unbinding as long as the solution of the uncon­
strained maximisation problem is larger than the value <  P r^ro defined 
by Vo(P°) =  Po(^) (remember that Vq is strictly concave in P, admits a max­
imum at P/î=o and tends to — oo when P tends to zero ; P° =  0  of course 
if 0  <  Pr=o)- If this is not the case, then the optimal choice is of course 
P°. In all cases, Ph,a is smaller than Tr=q and decreasing in R  and A . It is 
obvious that once P optimally chosen at date 0, the central planner does not 
have to reconsider the choice at a subsequent date if its choice criterion has 
remained unchanged.
To prove that an optimal choice of P can lead to the possibility of bubbles, 
it is therefore sufficient to exhibit an example where P/?=o is strictly smaller 
than P (the upper strict bound for the possibility of bubbles in a P-economy). 
This is not difficult :
a-\- /3
j - ^ ( l  -a )A  -  ( 1 + a / l )
I + (3 a
Taking /?= !, 0 = 1 / 8  and /l= 1 2 , we get :
Pr=o =  1/17 < 1/9.
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f  =  0.1208... >  1/9,
Thus, the choice of F can lead to the possibility of bubbles in this econ­
omy where bubbles cannot appear if borrowing isn’t constrained.
A P P E N D I X  B  :
C o n d it io n s  for  t h e  P o s s ib i l i t y  o f  B u b b le s
We want to show that i f { e < l ^ c r > l } ,  then bubbles might be possible 
in an unconstrained economy even if agents prefer present consumption. The 
upper bound for F allowing bubbles to appear is :
y-^^-^(l -  Of)A -  ( 1  -h OfA)
with
If / ? ( 1  +  p) >  1 , then :
lim (y) =  0 .
€-*0+^
This proves that there exist economies such that F >  y . 
If we now suppose { e > l < = ^ c r < l } ,  then :
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1 +  S M =
l  +  /3' +  /9' 1 +
a
It is easy to see that this is smaller than I +  /9 =  \- \ -aA  under the assump­
tion /? <  1 , whatever are the other parameters, because then e >  1  = > /? '<  1 . 
This means that f  is always smaller than y  if we do not assume strict pref­
erence for future consumption. Thus we have the following : in an uncon­
strained economy, and assuming that the rate of intertemporal substitution  
is smaller than or equal to 1 , bubbles are incompatible with the standard 
hypothesis on
A P P E N D I X  C :
A  S im p le  T a x /S u b s id y  S c h e m e  
C . l .  R e s o lu t io n  o f  t h e  c a s e  /? =  0
The Lagrangian Lt of the problem at time t is :
L, =  -  (C, ,  +  ^  ))
,=0 ^<+1 ^<+1
+ -f- Tt t^Ÿj.
Agents do not internalize the effects of their actions on the rate of interest 
or the labour income, therefore we have :
{Ct,t)  ^ 4 -
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Since we suppose that agents are already constrained in the bubbleless 
economy, we can write (Tt t^ =  ^tBt) :
c ,,, =
The budget constraint gives :
Ct,t+i =   ^ +  Y q r ^ ( i +  pW tB f
Thus, writing the equilibrium of the capital market =  5_i,o =
0-1 =  0) ;
i^t+1 +  (1 — ^i)Bt — Cf +  St-1,t — (1 +  p ) ( r -  (2 _|_
we get the following equation for capital accumulation :
( 1  +  r — - — ) ( 1  +  gt) =   ^ ^  ^ , ( 1  -  r ) ( l  — a) A — ( 1  — 6t)ht +  ■^■Ot-\ht.
The government chooses Ot. If Ot € ]0 , 1 [, the optimality condition is :
S = “ -




1 - r A ( r )
(1 — a )A




c,,Ji + iP ' + /3'^ )(i + ^)] = wr)]-' c,,< = ^
At J 1 +  /)
OtBt = n(r) et+i(^ t = 0),
where :
n(r) = r -  (^r)
i + />A(r)<^ (r) + i -  r/i(r)
The conditions for consistency of the hypothesis '‘Ot g]0, 1[’ are therefore :
(1). r > ^ ( r ) ,
(2,). n ( r ) ! ! ^  <  1.
Condition (1) is purely structural, so if (1) is not true, then for all t, 
=  0 because, as is shown below, (f) is increasing in its variable. Condition 
(2t) on the contrary is not purely structural ; it is time-dependent ; if (1) 
holds and (2^) is not true, then necessarily =  1 as is shown below. 9q =  1 
can be optimal when bo is small as is easy to verify.
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C .2 . E x is t e n c e  o f  E c o n o m ie s  w it h  P a r e to - S u p e r io r  O u tc o m e s  b y
T a x /S u b s id y  s c h e m e s
We have to show that there exist economies for which condition (1) holds. 
Since we are preoccupied by existence, it is sufficient to exhibit one example. 
Nonetheless, we shall prove the existence in the two cases e >  1 and e <  1 
because of the difference of the possibility condition for bubbles (remember : 
if /) <  1 the existence of bubbles requires a rather strong constraint on 
borrowing if e >  1).
Let us therefore first take ^ =  e =  1, /I =  12 and a  =  0.125. We get :
f  =  0.1208.. >  1/9.
[^i(f ) ]- ' =  9.275 >  9.
As (j) is obviously increasing in F, we have the existence of F such that 
f  <  F, where =  f .
If e <  1, then Appendix B has shown that we can have F >  y  ; but 
^{(f) <  y), and ^ is strictly increasing and concave. □
This proves, for both cases e >  1 or <  1, the existence of economies where 
a. R  =  0-policy can achieve a Pareto-improvement by eliminating the bubbly 
asset by a tax/subsidy financed policy. If we reflect on what the policy 
considered here consists in, we realise that F must be such that it allows for 
a Pareto-improvement by stronger constraints on borrowing ; indeed, for the 
case e =  1, we verify that ^(F/?=o) >  ^R=o ■
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1 +  +  (xA[a +  +  ^2)
<  1 +  (^ +  /?^)— =  [r/2=o]
OL
since a  E ]0,1[. Furthermore, we can see that choosing F according to a 
welfare criterion does not necessarily lead to the possibility of bubbles (e =  1 
for the calculus) :
Fh=o <  f
g{^R=o) > p ( f )  
since the rate of growth of capital is decreasing in P.
1 +  S'(Fh=o) — -—, '~o " 2^ ~  oc)A.É  
1 +  /? +  /?'
Thus, the condition ^(0) >  p does not imply 5r(P/î=o) ^  P =  ^(F). This 
enables us to ascertain that there exist parameter values such that ^(F) >  F, 
which means that there are parameters (3, a and A such that, whatever is 
the value of F, there do not exist Pareto-improving tax/subsidy policies of 
the type considered here when a bubble appears in the economy.
C.3. D ynam ics
Capital accumulation is given by (0_i =  0) :
(1 4- F—- — ~  ~  oc)AKt — (1 — Ot)Bt
+  +  p)O t-iB t-u
1 1 5
Bt+1 =  (1 +  p)Bt.
Another way of writing the accumulation equation gives us, for  ^ >  1 and 
under the assumption of 6t G]0, 1[ :
bt+^  = ^((1 -  6t)bt, 3(F)) < (^bt, ^(r)) < bt,
where ^  is the function relating bt+i to bt in the bubbly economy without 
government intervention. Thus, if F G]F, F[, as long as $t <  1, the sequence 
is strictly increasing : indeed, writing
OtBt =  n(r)e<+i(^i =  0),
we get
<^+1 _  bt I — abt+i ^  ^
Ot bt^i 1 — abt
a >  0, bt =  B t lK t .  But as necessarily lirrit^+oobt =  0 (with non interven­
tion, a non stationary reduced bubble is always vanishing ; the government 
policy converts progressively the bubble into an 1 0 U equivalent to public 
debt (‘forced loans’ to the government here), but Bt =  {I p Y B q whilst 
the rate of growth of capital is enhanced compared to the non-intervention 
case ; if the bubble starts with the stationary value, a consequence of the 
government’s intervention at time 0 is that B\ has a non stationary value,..), 
we see that there must exist a finite lapse of time after which the bubbly 
asset has been entirely eliminated from the investment market (i.e. Ot =  I
1 1 6
for t >  T^).
P r o p o s it io n  : After a finite lapse of time, the government has bought 
the entire stock of the non-productive asset, and the policy becomes a pure 
redistribution scheme.
• For t >  T® +  1, the rate of growth of capital is given by :
9i =  S (r) +  ^
a
The mechanism works as a sort of supplementary restraint on borrowing 
of Bt for young agents at time t. Therefore savings must increase by +
/3')]Bt^i at t+ 1 .
• For t > T ^  I, the dynamics of St =  bt are given by :
st+i =  ' ^ { -  Y ^ ^ s t , r ) .
Since this function is concave and lies always beneath the 45 degree line, we 
verify that limt^+oo'St =  0.
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A b str a c t
We consider a neo-classical OLG Model with two sectors, one for 
a consumption good and one for an investment good. We show that 
the presence of externalities can enlarge the dynamical system with 
the possibility of Hopf bifurcations. Applying Bifurcation Theory, we 
establish the possibility of attractive closed orbits around the steady 
state of the economy. We derive some results on the questions of 
existence, multiplicity and stability of balanced growth paths. Fur­
thermore, we show that some of the results obtained in the framework 
of Overlapping Generations also hold for the discrete-time version 
of the Infinitely Lived Agents Model ; as a consequence, we conclude 
to non robustness with regard to the time structure assumption.
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I n tr o d u c t io n
The question whether economic cycles always originate in exogenous 
shocks or can be, at least partly, explained endogenously is a fundamen­
tal question of modern economics, not only from a theoretical point of view 
but also for the purpose of policy. The idea of endogenous cycles is old, since 
we can find it in the work of Hicks, Kaldor or Goodwin but, for a long time, 
the argument of irregularity of the real-world business cycles forbade serious 
consideration of such theories which were predicting periodic recessions. The 
main part of the economics profession therefore concentrated on the study  
of exogenous shock models of economic fluctuations, which have become so 
familiar that many textbooks refer only to this type of explanation. How­
ever, nothing induces to believe that the so popular exogenous shock theory 
provides the only possible relevant explanation for business cycles or other 
fluctuations : the internal mechanics of a market economy might bear at 
least a part of responsability.
The fact that irregular cycles and even a certain type of chaos can have 
their roots in an entirely deterministic dynamic is well known by the math­
ematicians since the foundations of bifurcation and chaos theory have been 
elaborated. Very simple dynamics like the so often used ‘tent map’ or the 
unidimensional discrete logistic map have been shown to lead to cycles and 
to different types of deterministic chaos. Furthermore, the research on multi­
dimensional dynamic systems has had a considerable impact on several fields 
such as physics, biology, chemistry and ecology, spheres in which several ex­
amples of chaotic behaviour originating in determinism have been found in
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recent years, and some economists have started to investigate the possibility 
of endogenous cycles and of chaos in the framework of modern economics.
Research has shown that competitive equilibrium models may, in the 
absence of any exogenous shock, generate endogenous fluctuations which are 
entirely consistent with complete markets and perfect foresight. The fact that 
the literature on endogenous fluctuations almost exclusively concentrates on 
models with no intrinsic uncertainty does not mean that its attem pt is to 
explain business cycles etc exclusively by the effects of market mechanisms ; 
to look at extreme situations in which only extrinsic uncertainty may m at­
ter constitutes a methodological choice which aims at exposing the direct 
effects of the market and to avoid, at this stage of mathematical knowledge 
about non-linear dynamical systems, unextricable technical complications. 
The literature can be divided into two parts : on the one hand, there is the 
research on Optimal Growth Models, on the other, the work on Overlapping 
Generations Models. The latter constitutes the main part, fact which has 
quite simple an explanation : it is the only neo-classical model which requires 
sequential trading in the absence of market imperfections.
Endogenous equilibrium cycles in the framework of Overlapping Gener­
ations Models have been, in fact, a fashionable topic since the mid-eighties, 
when Jean-Michel Grandmont, in his seminal paper [8], studied and proved 
the possibility of endogenous cycles in a pure exchange, perfectly com peti­
tive economy. In his model however, endogenous cycles are possible only if 
saving is a decreasing function of the interest rate and, to be more precise, 
no cycle can exist if the lES (interest rate elasticity of saving at the Golden
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Rule stationary state) is larger than —0.5. Farmer’s paper [6] was the first to 
consider an OLG economy with production, but in his model the existence of 
cycles depends on the presence of financial debt of the private sector toward 
the government (negative outside money). The very first paper to study the 
problem in the framework of a OLG economy with production and no inter­
vention of a public authority, thus in a world of “laisser-faire”, was Reichlin
[11]. In his one-sector model, production is characterised by a CES function 
with two production inputs, capital and labour, the latter being supplied 
wage-elastically. Reichlin showed that cycles are possible in his framework 
with a positive lES and a low elasticity of substitution between the factors 
(enough complementarity is required). In another paper [12], now in a two- 
sector model, Reichlin proved that cycles and chaotic dynamics with positive 
lES do not necessarily require wage-elastic labour supply. Jullien [10] exam ­
ined an OLG economy with one sector, where production is made through 
a neo-classical CRS technology (capital and labour are supplementary), and 
labour supplied inelastically ; the existence of a nominal asset (a bubble) 
is required to relax the link between investment and aggregate saving and 
generate cycles through self-fulfilling expectations on returns. However, a 
drawback to his model is that again Grandmont’s condition on the saving 
function is required, and thus makes the model empirically unlikely. Further­
more, the example given for the existence of cycles of order three involves a 
negative rate of time preference (agents prefer future consumption...).
A topic which appears to be very interesting is the study of endogenous 
cycles in an economy with externalities. In his paper “Dynamic Externali­
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ties, Multiple Equilibria, and Growth”, Boldrin [1] considered a one-sector 
OLG model with perfect markets, neo-classical production with a dynamic 
externality of Romer [13] type, a rate of depreciation of capital equal to one 
per period and established the possibility of multiple equilibria and trapping 
regions. In the case of a time-separable utility of GRRA type with the same 
coefficient of relative risk aversion in each period, a rate of time-preference 
equal to zero and Cobb-Douglas production with externality, Boldrin showed 
that the overspill-effect has to be rather important for poverty traps to occur. 
His example proves cycles to be possible with positive TES and supplemen- 
tarity of the production inputs.
The present paper deals with the least possible level of disaggregation of 
an OLG model satisfying all the neo-classical assumptions from the point of 
view of the private sector, namely a two-sector model with one consumption 
good and one investment good, only one type of capital and one type of 
labour. We study, under the conditions insuring existence of a stationary 
state of the economy, the local dynamics around this point and conclude to 
the impossibility of Hopf bifurcations. We then consider the effects of positive 
spillovers from total capital stock onto the efficiency of labour in each sector 
and show how local dynamics are changed, allowing now Hopf bifurcations to 
occur. We establish the existence of attractive closed orbits around the steady 
state by using the Hopf Bifurcation Theorem for the discrete-time setting. 
Furthermore, we look at the existence and stability problem of balanced 
growth paths in the two-sector OLG economy and show the difference with
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regard to one-sector models. Finally, we prove that some of the results extend  
to the Infinitely Lived Agent problem in discrete-time setting and establish  
therefore the link between the results obtained by Cazzavillan [4] and the 
setting of continuous time.
1 T h e  M o d e l
We take the framework of Galor [7] augmented by spillover from the total 
capital stock onto the efficiency of labour in each sector. Tim e is discrete. At 
each date a new generation of agents is born ; the size of each generation is 
assumed to remain constant over time and will be normalised to one. Agents 
live for two periods ; in the first period of their life, they work, consume 
and save for their old age, and in the second, they consume their actualised  
savings. Bequests are not allowed. There are two goods in the economy, one 
homogeneous perishable consumption good and one homogeneous investment 
good. Both production sectors combine two factors, capital and labour, the 
latter being provided inelastically. There exists only one type of capital and 
one type of labour which can be costlessly allocated between sectors. Firms 
are owned by the old people ; the number of firms is supposed large enough 
to have perfect competition and thus profit maximisation in both sectors.
Agents are characterised by their utility, which is supposed time-separable 
and of CRRA type :
+  0L7?.(c<,<+i )
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where Q,t+i denote respectively consumption when young and when old 
of an agent of generation t, cr >  0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
(equal to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between consumption at 
any two points in time) and 0  =  1/(1 +  r), where r g] — l,+ o o ]  is the rate 
of time preference.
The production of each good is of the following type :
c ,  =  
h  =
(a ,/?) G]0, l p and (j>',i/’) G X [0,1[, Ki t^ being the level of capital at 
time t in sector z, the aggregate level of capital at tim e t. The rate of 
depreciation per period of the capital is 6. We suppose a  ^  fS (two sectors) 
and assume full employment.
T ^ 2,t — 
L\^ t +  T2,< = Lt.
We reformulate the model in per capita terms ; denoting < the proportion 
of the labour force allocated to sector i and the per capita capital stock 
in sector z, we get :
it =  k i i k t K f -
Since we have
+ h,t — 1
+  l2,t^2,t =  kt
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we can eliminate and obtain :
Firms behave com petitively and maximise their profits in each period, 
without taking into account the externalities. Let Ct be the com petitive 
wage rate and the competitive rate of return on capital and pt  the relative 
price of the consumption good in terms of investment good (the numeraire 
here). Profit maximisation and constancy of labour force imply :
=  (1 -  I3)k ltk t,
rt =  ptak^-^k'^ =  /3k^~^kf,
If we denote by W( the wage-interest rate ratio, we see that
ki,t — 2^,t — )
where a =  a / { l  — a)  and 6 =  /) / ( !  — /?). Thus price, wage and interest rate 
can be expressed as functions of ujt and kt  ^ which will be chosen as state  
variables. Notice that only kt is predetermined.
Maximisation of utility
m a x  u{ct^t,Ct^t+\) 
s .t .  ptct,t  4-  ,  —  <  et,
1 -  6 +  rt+i
yields the Euler equation :
\ i  -  - ^ 0 ( 1  -  +  n + i)c t,^ r
V i + i
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The equilibrium conditions
~  PtCt t^ =  (1 — 6)kt +  {kt^i — (1 — S)ki),
t^+i — (1 T Hi
give the dynamics of the economy :
kt+i =  — -— j ^ b ^ u f ~ ^ k f {1 -  S)kt, (1)
CL —  0
(jJ(3-aiJ)-v t + 1  ^ t + 1
1 k(+1
0  6t — kt+i
=  -  5) + (2)
If <7 =  1, equation (2) reduces to :
It is easy to see that a steady state (k^ôj) can only exist if /? +  1. If this
condition does not hold, then the economy does not admit any stationary 
state for the variables k and w, but there is a possibility for balanced growth 
to occur. We shall proceed as follows : in section 2, under the assumption 
^ +  1, we look at the existence of a stationary state and study the nature
of the local dynamics around this point, proving the possibility of attractive 
closed orbits. In section 3, we consider the case /3 tp =  I and examine the 
questions of existence, uniqueness, stability of balanced growth paths.
2 L o ca l D y n a m ic s  a ro u n d  th e  S te a d y  S ta te
Contemplating (1), (2), we realise that we are confronted to a highly com­
plex system of non-linear dynamic equations which cannot be formally stud­
ied in general : except for the cases a =  0 V 1, a formal and relatively
132
‘useful’  ^ expression for the steady state cannot be determined. We shall 
therefore adopt the following strategy : we consider the limit case of risk 
neutral agents (< 7 =  0) and study the behaviour of the variables in a neigh­
bourhood of the steady state. All the results obtained for this extreme case 
will also hold for cr small enough. The argument we use here is continuity of 
the operators trace and determinant of a matrix and is exposed in Appendix 
A.
2.1 Steady S tate, and L inearization
Fixing <7 equal to 0 we get :
<5(1 — J^ ) +  r(l -  a)
w =
a (r-hS)
r + 8 r<5( l  — 4- r(l — a)
1




(C l) r 8 > 0.
(C2 ) : <5(1 - /? )  +  r(l -  a) > 0.
Condition (Co) rules out, as we shall see below, the case where balanced 
growth may be possible. Condition (C%) imposes a restriction on agents’
^It is c lear  t h a t  t h e  e q u a t io n  g iv in g  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  c a n  b e  s o lv e d  fo r m a l ly  for m o r e  
v a lu e s  o f  cr, n a m e l y  for all t h o s e  w h ic h  y ie ld  a lg eb ra ic  e q u a t i o n s  o f  f irs t ,  s e c o n d  or  th ir d  
o r d e r .  N e v e r t h e le s s ,  o n ly  t h e  c a se s  0 a n d  1 e n su r e  r e la t iv e ly  s im p le  d i s c u s s io n s  o n  lo ca l  
d y n a m ic s .
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preference for future consumption ; thus, whenever agents are supposed to 
prefer strictly present consumption (r >  0), this condition is automatically 
met. Finally, (Cg) is automatically met whenever agents prefer, in a large 
sense, present consumption^ (r >  0) ; if this condition does not hold, then 
(C 2 ) imposes an investment good production not too much more capital 
intensive than the consumption good production. Conditions Ci and C2 can 
be summarised by : r +  6 >  maa:(0, S{P — ct) / ( l  — a )).
Since we want to study the local behaviour around the steady state, we 
linearize the system around (^, w). We write :
/C( =  k ( l  +  €t),
Lût = w ( l  +  r]t).
Thus, the jacobian of the system (1),(2) evaluated at the steady state has 
the same roots as the matrix J  defined by :
/   ^ \  /  T T \  /  \J\2




\  ^ < + 1
which has a slightly simpler expression. We obtain : 
J ii =  1 — 6(1 — — (r +  6)
a  — /3
J\2 — 6(3 +  (r -f- 6)
[(1 +  r)(V’ -  z/) 4- [(1 +  r)u -  (1 -  6)^][1 -  6(1 - ? / ) ) -  (r +  6 ) ^ —^ ])
J 2 1 —
J22 —
[(1 +  r){(3 -  o) +  (r +  6)(1 -  /?)]
[(1 +  r)[j3 -  q) +  [(1 +  r)u -  (1 -  6)^][6^ +  (r +  6 ) ^ ^ ] ]  
[(1 +  r)(^  -  o) +  (r +  6)(1 -  (3)]
^ P re fer e n c e  for a c tu a l  c o n s u m p t io n  is o f t e n  ta k en  as an a s s u m p t i o n . . .
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if [(1 +  r){(3 — a ) +  (r +  6)(1 — /?)] ^  0. If this denominator happens to 
be equal to zero, then the system is locally degenerate and reduces, in a 
neighbourhood of the stationary state, to :
(^+1 =
situation which is of no interest for us here since our purpose is to look at 
parameter configurations which give complex eigenvalues for the Jacobian.
For convenience, we define :
(C'a) : [ (1+ r ) ( / ? - a )  +  (r  +  (Ç)(l- / ? ) ] >  0. 
and symmetrically :
( c ; )  : [ ( l + r ) ( / 3 - a )  +  (r +  6 ) ( l - / 3 ) l < 0 .
None of these conditions does, a priori, reflect any theoretical economical 
idea. But we can notice that if 6 =  1, then (C3) reduces to (1 + r ) ( l  — a) >  0, 
which is always true. Thus, this condition imposes a restriction on the capital 
intensity of the consumption good sector compared to the one characterising 
the investment good sector if and only if capital does not depreciate in one 
period^.
For the rest of section 2, we suppose that conditions (Co), (C i) and (C 2 ) 
hold and show which results can be derived from the supplementary assump­
tion (C3) or (C3).
*As a  m a t t e r  o f  fa c t ,  m o s t  O L G  m o d e l s  fix 6 =  1 ... for a  q u e s t io n  o f  tr a c ta b i l i ty .
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If we consider the slope of the locus : kt+\ — /:< =  0, we see that it is 
always positive under assumption (C2 ). We have indeed :
M l  -  ^ )  +  ( r  +  5 ) ^ 1 ^  =  W  +  ( r  +ot — p  k a  — p  uj
We have thus consistency with the theory’s prediction saying that the lower 
the interest rate for a given wage (i.e. the higher u j ) ,  the higher the demand 
for the investment good and the higher the total per capita capital stock'*. 
Furthermore, we see that the slope of the locus : — W( =  0 has a sign
depending upon the relative magnitude of the parameters of the spillover 
effects 'ip &nd u.
2.2 A bsence o f Spillovers
This corresponds to the standard neo-classical model. But caution is 
required here : saddle-point stability is not, in general, the only possibility 
under this assumption, as Galor [7] has shown. Indeed, we shall see below 
that even with our extremely nice utility and production functions, saddle- 
point stability is guaranteed only if the consumption good sector is less capital 
intensive than the investment good sector (i.e. when a < /3). If this condition 
does not hold, then the steady state can be a node, a saddle point or a source.
When z/ =  0  =  0, the dynamical system (I), (2) is of the following form :
kt+i  =  — -— T  (1 -  S)kt ,  ( ! ' )
a — 0
< T  =  - S )  +  (2')
'N o w  th e  a s s u m p t i o n  i p  G [ 0 , 1[ b e c o m e s  c learer . . .
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which means that the dynamic of W( is completely independent of kt  ^ which 
implies a matrix J  of upper triangular form :
\  0 J22
where
Jii =  (1 — — (r + 5)
J22 =
a  —13 
( 1  + r )( /?  -  a )
( 1  +  r)(/? -  q) +  (r +  6 ) ( 1  -  /)) '
But this means that the eigenvalues of J  are always real, and the dynam ­
ics are thus limited to non-spiral behaviour, and Hopf bifurcations^ cannot 
occur in the dynamical system. Condition (C 2 ) implies that J\\  is strictly  
larger than 1 if a  <  ^ and condition (C3) implies that it is strictly negative 
if /? <  a . J 2 2  is positive and strictly less than 1  if a  <  /9, and, under assump­
tion (C3), strictly negative otherwise. As a matter of fact, to assume (C3)  
appears to be rather useless here since it does not rule out any possibility for 
the nature of H : it can be a sink, a saddle-point or a node, just as under 
assumption (C 3 ) (but under the latter assumption H is monotone, whereas 
it is oscillating under (C3)). Therefore, we can conclude to :
P r o p o s it io n  : In the absence of spillovers, there is no possibility for  H 
to be a spiral sink or a spiral source, and Hopf bifurcations are excluded for  
the dynamical system. Under the assumptions necessary for  existence, the 
steady state equilibrium. Q is always a saddle-point if the consumption good
 ^A  H o p f  b i fu r c a t io n  o c c u r s  in a  d y n a m ic a l  s y s t e m  w h e n  th e  e ig e n v a lu e s  o f  t h e  J a c o b i a n  
cro s s  t h e  u n i t  c ircle  in C ~ .
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sector is less capital intensive than the investment good sector (a <  l3). If  
the reverse is true, then the steady state can be either a sink, a saddle point  
or a source.
2.3 P resence o f  sp illovers
In a discrete-time setting, complete stability is guaranteed whenever both  
roots of the characteristic polynomial of J  are strictly smaller in modulus 
than 1. This offers, of course, far more possibilities than the continuous-time 
setting where the real part of both roots must be negative to have complete 
stability. As a matter of fact, four situations can arise in our framework ;
(i) 0 <  D et{J )  <  1 and A < 0
(ii) 0 <  D et{J )  <  1 and A >  0 and 0 <  T r (J )  <  1 -f Det{J)
(iii) 0 <  D et(J )  <  1 and A >  0 and —[1 -(- Det(J) ]  <  T r (J )  <  0
(iv) —1 <  D et{J)  <  0 and |T r(J )| <  1 +  Dei(J )
where A  denotes the discriminant of the characteristic equation (A  =  —
4Z)ei( J )). The first case corresponds to two complex conjugate roots : this 
is the case which gives a spiral sink. The second case corresponds to two 
positive roots that are smaller than 1 : H is then a monotone node. The 
third case gives two negative roots larger than -1, and the fourth leads to 
one negative root larger than —1 and one positive root smaller than one, and 
convergence to the node H is oscillating in these situations.
A first consequence of the presence of spillovers is that the steady state 
Ü is no longer necessarily a saddle point when a  <  /3. It is indeed very easy 
to exhibit numerical examples showing that all four cases cited above can
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occur, and to show that the dynamical system  bears the possibility of three
types of interesting bifurcations : saddle-point, flip and Hopf bifurcations.
In the following, we shall nevertheless focus our attention on the possibility
of Hopf bifurcations.
It is (nearly) straightforward to verify that we have ;
r S  6(1 — /)) 4- r ( l  — a )
T r ( J ) = l  +  £)e/(J) +  (^ +  ^ - l )  
+ (1 - 6)
a  — /? (1 +  r){/3 -  a ) +  (r +  6)(1 — /3) 
(1 +  r ) ( l -  a )
(1 +  r){P - a )  +  (r +  6)(1 - / ? ) '
We know that if there exist values of the parameters such that D e t (J )  =  +1
and A  <  0, then there is a possibility of obtaining Hopf bifurcations. These
conditions impose :
r +  6 6(1 — /3) r ( l  — q )
- 4  < (^  +  ^ -  1)
A -  /? (1 +  r){(3 -  O') +  (r +  6)(1 -
, n _  _______ (1 +r) ( l  -  a ) _______
'  ' ( l  +  r ) ( / 3 - a )  +  ( r  +  i ) ( l - / 3 )  <  '
We see that if o  <  /9, then we need /? +  '0 >  1 to have the possibility of
Hopf bifurcations. Furthermore, Det{J)  =  +1 then implies that necessarily 
u >  Ip. If we suppose <  a,  the discussion is more complex : under 
assumption (C3), we need /? +  0  < 1, but if we suppose (C3), then there is no 
general condition on ^ +  0  ; furthermore, D et(J )  =  +1 does not impose any 
general condition on the relative magnitude of the sector specific spillovers 
under assumption (C3), but it is easy to verify that 0  has to be smaller than 
V under assumption (C3). We can summarise :
(a <  /3) A  (/? +  0  >  1) A  ( 7/ > 0 )
(/? <  O ' )  A  { [(C3 ) A  (/9 +  0  <  1)] V [(C3) A  (// >  0 )1} .
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Notice the interesting fact that in the case of a more, but not too much more, 
capital intensive consumption good sector, Hopf bifurcations can only occur 
when the externality in the investment good production is not too strong 
(/? -f <  1), a strong externality in the investment good sector enhanc­
ing on the other hand the possibility of Hopf bifurcations in the situation 
where the investment good sector is the more capital intensive. Numerical 
examples given below will establish that Hopf bifurcations do indeed occur 
in both situations, and that it is possible to exhibit parameters such that 
the bifurcation is supercritical. But first, a remark : following Grandmont 
[9], we should avoid cases of large resonance, which are not well understood 
until now and correspond to the cases where, for the value of the bifurcation 
parameter t/q, the argument is of the form 27r/ç, q =  1 ,2 ,3  or 4. Thus,
we should look for Det{J )  =  -\-l and |T r(J )| < 2 and T r ( J )  ^ { —1,0}.
2 .3 .1  E x i s t e n c e  o f  S t a b l e  C lo s e d  O r b i t s  in  t h e  C a s e  ( a  <  j3)
Let us take the following values for the parameters : 6 =  r =  0.1, 
(3 =- 0.7, Oi =  0.5. We have :
D et(J )  — 1.1 +  (4.5)%/) — (4.1)//,
T r (J )  =  3.15 +  %/) — (4.1)//.
When 'Ip =  ipQ =  41/70 and // =  383/574, we have T r (J )  =  4-1 and D et{J )  =  
4-1. Therefore, the eigenvalues are =  c o s ( 7 t / 3 )  4- i .szn(7r/3) and A 2  =  A % .
®Tlie two com plex  conjugate  eigenvalues are written under the  form A =  and
A =  p(T7)e-‘®( )^.
HO
Since
, d p .  l , d T r { J ) .  1 ^
the real part of the eigenvalues is not stationary with respect to the parameter 
if^  at the point considered here and we have a Hopf bifurcation. For ^  D.
is completely stable, whereas for <  ‘0 , is completely unstable. The Hopf 
bifurcation Theorem applies : in the neighbourhood of the bifurcation value 
0 0 , there exist values such that the economy exhibits closed orbits around 
the steady state. The stability properties of these orbits depend on whether 
the bifurcation is subcritical or supercritical. If the bifurcation is supercri t­
ical, then we can conclude to the existence of a whole family of parameters 
such that a stable closed orbit around the steady state exists. A subcritical 
bifurcation only gives unstable closed orbits and seems therefore a pr iori less  
interesting. We shall give here, without any justification, the methodology 
to apply to determine whether or not the bifurcation is supercritical :
P r o p o s it io n  : Suppose A =  cos(0 (0o)) +  zs in (0 (0 o )) and X are the 
eigenvalues of the jacobian at if =  0q. There always exists a basis where 
the local dynamical system can be written under the form :
V y t + i  )
cos(0 (0 o)) - s i n ( 0 (0 o))
 ^ sin(0 (0 o)) cos(0 (0 o)) )
+
\  7
f {^ t , y t )  
\  y (xu y t )
Then the bifurcation is supercritical z/a(0o) >  0 and subcritical z/a(0o) <  0,
^For d e t a i l s  o n  th e  th e o r y  o f  b i fu r c a t io n  in d i s c r e te  t im e  s e t t i n g s  s e e ,  for in s t a n c e ,  
G r a n d m o n t  [9].
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]V’O5 0 2 [; the orbits are aperiodic and even dense in the closed curve C-^ p.
2 .3 .2  E x i s t e n c e  o f  c lo s e d  o r b i t s  in  t h e  c a s e  <  a)
We consider now a case where the consumption good sector is more cap­
ital intensive than the investment good sector. We know from a preceding 
discussion that if a Hopf bifurcation occurs in this situation when (C 3 )  holds, 
then necessarily the parameters p  and if) satisfy the condition ^ ^  <  1 at
the bifurcation point.
Let us take a  =  0.7, /? =  0.5, 6 = 1  and r =  0.1. This choice of parameter 
values leads to saddle-point stability in the absence of externalities. We have :
D et{J )  =  (0 .3)-^[2 .15i/ -  2.35^ +  0.33],
53 1
T r ( J )  =  l +  D et{J)  +  j ( r l > - - ) .
We choose to look for a Hopf bifurcation such that 0(V ’o) =  37t/4, which 
requires D et{J )  =  - f l  and T r [J )  =  —\ /2 . This leads to the choice of :
2 9 - I 2 V 2
Wq =
106 ’ 
6497 -  2820 \/2
22790
1 ,5 3  2 . 3 5 , ^ ^
2 \  h o  2T12 0.3  ^ ^
Again, the Hopf bifurcation theorem applies. Notice that ^ xI^ q <  1, and
Oi-\- Vq < \ .  To determine the nature of the bifurcation, we apply exactly the
same method as in the preceding example^ and thus get :
^(V’o) ~  —1274.25 <C 0.
'^For t h e  c a lc u lu s ,  se e  A p p e n d ix  B.
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Therefore, the bifurcation is subcritical and we can only proclaim the fol­
lowing : there exist V’l <  '0o <  ' 0 2  and an open neighbourhood V of H such 
that :
• If î/>i <  ^ <  00? then n  is asymptotically unstable and there exists no 
invariant closed curve in V.
• If î/jq <  0  <  02, then n  is stable and there exists a unique, asymptotically 
unstable closed curve in V.
We see that closed orbits exist even if the externalities are not very strong. 
Models with externalities like Boldrin [1], Cazzavillan [4], [5]... exhibit closed 
orbits only when the spillover is strong. But as a matter of fact, the result 
is not really astonishing since Galor [7] showed that cycles are possible in 
a neo-classical two-sector model in the absence of spillovers for an adequate 
choice of the utility function characterising the agents preferences and of 
the production functions. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that, in our model, 
strong externalities are required if the investment good sector is the more 
capital intensive, but not if it is the consumption good sector which is the 
more capital intensive.
The question whether supercritical bifurcations can occur when the con­
sumption good sector is the more capital intensive remains to be investigated. 
We shall now turn our attention to the problem of balanced paths in the two- 
sector economy.
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3 B a la n c e d  G r o w th  P a th s
We address here the question of existence of a balanced growth path, 
and study, under the assumption of existence, the stability of the path. It 
is sufficient to show that these questions are non trivial in the case cr =  0, 
which we shall assume in this section.
Balanced behaviour takes place whenever :
<fi±i =  b p .  =  X > 0 .
uJt kt
There is balanced growth if A >  1, Injecting the assumption of balanced 
behaviour into the dynamic equations (1) and (2), we get immediately the 
following condition :
—^ and independent o f t  /? +  ^  =  l .
kt
Notice that, at this stage, no condition on a  +  i/ appears. If we pose =  pkt^ 
we get the following equations for the existence of a balanced path ;
A '-(“+‘') =  0 [ ( i  -  i )  +
\ ( a  - b )  =  [ail -  +  (1 -  S).
Not only is it impossible to exhibit a formal solution for this system except 
for the special case a  4- =  1, but it may well be that the system does not
have any solution at all for a  ly ^  I : then existence is guaranteed only if 
{a u <  1) A (a  >  p)  or {a ly > I) A (a  <  (3). Furthermore, even in 
the case a  ly =  1, existence of a balanced path does not necessarily imply 
growth since the condition A >  1 may not hold, and this in both cases a  <  P
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and /? <  a .
Proof  : If a  +  i/ =  1, then (r +  6) =  and A(a — b) =  [afi —
^). If the parameters of the economy verify r+^  =  /3b^~^{al(l — 
a )Ÿ ~ ^  ^ then /z =  (1 — a ) / a  =  1 /a  and A =  (1 — S). Thus in this situation, 
which can occur in both cases a  <  /3 and a  >  /?, the only balanced path is 
the non-production path® which for sure does not correspond to growth. □
Let us suppose now that a balanced growth path does exist. Is it stable 
or unstable ? To see which situation occurs, we pose Zt =  (jOt/kt and study  
the stability of the steady state of :
i y ( 3— a
a — b
l - ( o r + i / )
= Zf“"0[(l - 6 )  +
There is no general answer to give concerning stability of the path. To 
illustrate the complexity, let us consider the very simple case ol u =  1. We 
see that, at a fixed point /z :
/ dZt+i  \   1__________
dz,  i +
p — a
We see that if a balanced growth path exists, then it is :
•  stable if a  <  ^.
•  either stable or unstable \f (3 <  a.
=  l / a  = >  /] t =  1 and  th ere  is th ere fo re  n o  in v e s t m e n t .
H 7
Thus, there exists a great difference with regard to the one-sector model 
where balanced growth is taking place for all initial conditions of the economy 
if the condition for the existence of a balanced growth path, which is simply 
u 4- V =  1 if the production is of the form F ( K , L )  =  is met.
In the framework of a two-sector model, existence is not guaranteed and 
stability or non-stability are both possible. But this is not the end of the 
story : in a forthcoming paper, we shall prove that there is the possibility 
of cycles of the growth rate around a steady state value and that the model 
considered here allows even the dynamics of to be chaotic.
4 C o n c lu s io n
We used a two-sector OLG model meeting all standard neo-classical as­
sumptions from the point of view of the private sector to show the role of 
externalities in the determination of the dynamics of the economy. We estab­
lished first that, in the model without externalities, the nature of the steady 
state depends on the relative magnitude of the capital intensivities in the 
different sectors of the economy, showing that saddle-point stability is guar­
anteed only in the case of a more capital intensive investment good sector, 
the stationary state being either a sink, a saddle point or a source if this 
condition is not met. Spiral behaviour is excluded under our assumptions 
when externalities do not operate. But when there exist spillovers from the 
total capital stock onto the efficiency of labour in each sector, then Hopf bi­
furcations can occur in the dynamical system, without any specific condition
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on the relative magnitude of the external effects. Existence of supercritical 
Hopf bifurcations, and therefore existence of attractive closed orbits around 
the steady state for whole continua of the parameters, has been proven for 
the case of a more capital intensive investment good sector. Whether su­
percritical Hopf bifurcations can appear in the alternative situation remains 
to be investigated. Finally, the difference with the one-sector model with 
regard to the existence and the stability of balanced growth paths has been 
emphasized.
In Appendix C, we show that the local dynamics around the steady state  
of an ILA model in discrete-time setting are of the same nature as for the OLG 
model when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is sufficiently small. From 
this we conclude to the non-robustness of the conditions for Hopf bifurcations 
or the existence and the stability of balanced growth paths with regard to 
the specification of continuous or discrete time, for the results obtained here 
differ strongly from those found by Cazzavillan [4] in the continuous-time 
setting. For instance, in the continuous-time setting, Hopf bifurcations can 
occur only if the spillover in the investment good sector is strong +  >  1)
and if z/, the spillover in the consumption good sector, is larger than 'if). We 
have seen that in the discrete-time setting, neither of these conditions is 
necessary. We therefore have to give this sad conclusion of non-robustness.
The problem of existence of parameter configurations such that the econ­
omy exhibits self-sustained growth with a cyclic, or even chaotic, growth rate 
is clearly appealing since most existing models deal with economies where no 
long run growth is possible. Until now, this type of dynamics has been ob­
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tained in only two models, namely Cazzavillan [5] and Boldrin and Rustichini
[3]. Unfortunately, these two papers contain important errors which invali­
date the claims of their authors. Cazzavillan’s paper studies a discrete-time 
one-sector ILA model with an externality, onto the productivity of labour in 
the production of the consumption good and onto the utilities of the agents, 
of a flow of public services which are financed through a proportional tax 
on income. The use of immediate feedback, which seems already abusive 
in a continuous-time setting à la Barro, appears to be absolutely unaccept­
able when time is discrete, and the whole result of Cazzavillan relies on this 
strange assumption. Therefore we cannot accept this model. Boldrin and 
Rustichini’s model, a two-sector infinitely lived agents model with externali­
ties in the production sector, leads to dynamics which cannot, except in the 
case of total capital depreciation in each period, be studied with the stan­
dard mathematical tools used to detect cycles or chaos ; the authors’ claim  
of chaos relies on results ‘established’ by Boldrin and Persico [4] who, un- 
fortunaly, consider an incorrect representation of the dynamics. Thus, both  
existing models have to be rejected, and the challenge still remains.
Further research could be undertaken to study the question of what is 
called sunspots. In OLG models, the rational expectations equilibria are not 
necessarily deterministic, even in the absence of exogenous shocks. Perfect 
foresight equilibria are only one class of possible equilibria as the research 
on sunspots has shown, and the fact that fluctuations can also originate in 
self-fulfilling beliefs should not be underestimated. It could be interesting 
to look at the possibility of sunspot equilibria in our model and to estab-
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lish conditions for their existence, conditions that have to be compared to 
those necessary for deterministic cycles, which are often more constraining. 
Furthermore, the non Pareto-optimality of com petitive equilibria when ex­
ternalities do operate in the economy leaves open a whole field of research 
concerning the welfare improvement through government intervention and 
the effects of public policies on the possibility of endogenous fluctuations. 
And last, but not least, there remains the problem of implementation of ra­
tional expectations equilibria, i.e. a possible process according to which the 
values of variables predicted by the equilibrium are reached. The problem of 
stability under learning of perfect foresight equilibrium trajectories has been 
examined, for instance, by G rand mont and Laroque [10], in the context of 
back ward equilibrium dynamics ; in our framework, the dynamics happen 
to be forward, and the problem should be rather easy to study.
' ° T l i e  d y n a m i c s  o f  a s y s t e m  are b a ck w a rd  if  th e  e q u a t i o n s  are u n d e r  t h e  fo rm  X t  
F { x t  +  \ ) ,  w h e r e  F  is no t  h i jec t iv e .  A forward d y n a m ic  h a s  th e  form  y t + \  =  G { y t ) .
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A P P E N D IX  A : T he C ontinuity A rgum ent
From basic mathematics, we know that (<7, =  (cr, a , /), f/, r, 6) —»
J a c(F ), where F  =  (0 , ^ ), is continuous. Furthermore Det  and T r  are con­
tinuous operators. By composition of continuous applications, we deduce 
continuity of the eigenvalues with respect to the parameter vector. This con­
tinuity and the intermediate value theorem imply that if a Hopf bifurcation 
occurs for (0,^), then there exists a neighbourhood F  of cr =  0 such that for 
all cr G y ,  there exist such that a Hopf bifurcation occurs at the point
As a consequence of this, in a sufficiently small neighbourhood of cr =  0, 
the analysis undertaken in this paper is still valid.
A P P E N D IX  B : H o p f B ifurcation
A glance at equation (2) induces us to simplify the tedious calculus of 
partial derivatives of an implicitly defined function by assuming 6 =  1. Under 
this assumption, Ut+i is explicitly defined.
1.1.) Derivatives of F  defined by : =  F{kf>ujt).
These partial derivatives are easily determined ;




Ftt =  -  l)(aw  -  k) -  2k
a — b
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^ +  ( P -  2) ( aw -  t ) l . 
a — 0  '■
Fkuj =  - -  [a^w +  xf>{/3 -  l){au) -  A;) +  (1 -  P)k^.
[(ÿ  -  2)(ow -  A:) -  3A:).
— ~ —  ^|2a /^jo; +  (/? — 2){auj — k) — {P — 2)&j.
Fktw =  -  l)w  -  (0  +  1){P -  l)&j.
[3aw + {p -  3)(aw -  A:)]. 
a — 0 '■ J
1.2.) Derivatives of G defined by cjt+i =  G(A:(, w j .
To get not too boring expressions, it is preferable to write :
G =  Aw'^ Ar^ F",
where A — , x =  {P — o :)/(l — a ) , y =  {ip — u ) / (1 — a) and
z =  y / ( l  — a ). We obtain thus the following expressions for the partial
derivatives of G  :
Gkk =Acj""A:^+^“^[y(y -  1) +  2.yzFk +  z[z -  l )F l  +  zkF^k]-
Gww =Au;'^“^A: '^'' ~^ [^.t(.t — 1)A;^  +  2xzujkF^ +  z(z — 1)lj'^F  ^ +  zw^A:fLw]-
Gkuj =Xuj'^~^k '^^^~ [^xyk +  xzkFk +  yzw fb  +  z[z — l)ujFkF^ +  zuokFku]-
Gwww =Aw''-^A;^+"-^[2'(3; -  l ) ( z  -  2)A:^  +  3a:(T -  l)zwA;"F.
+  3zz(z  — l)uj^kF  ^ +  3a:zw^A;^Fuw +  3z(z — l)Lû^ kF^ F^ ^^
T z ( z  — l) (z  — 2)uj^F^ +  ZLÜ k ^Lww]-
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Gkku =Au;^ — 1) +  2 yzF k  +  z { z  — l ) F ^  +  zk^Fkk]
+  z w  |^?/(y — 1)F^  +  2y{z  — l)FkFf^  +  2ykFkw  +  — 1 ) ^
X {FkkFi  ^+  ‘^ FkFkuj) +  (^ ~  1)(^ — 2 ) ^ ^  +  }•
=Aw-:»A;:'+-"[%/(y -  l) (y  -  2) +  3y(y -  l ) z F ,  +  3yz(z -  1)F^
+  3 y z k F k k  +  3z(z — l ) k F k F k k  +  z(z — l) ( z  — 2 ) F ^  +  zk^Fkkk]-  
Gkwuj =Aw^ — l ) k ^ [ y  +  zFk]  +  2 x z L o k [ y F ^  +  (z — l )F(^Fk]
+  z u } ^ [ x ( z  — l ) F ^  +  x F f ^ ^  +  (z — l ) (z  — 2 ) F ^ F k  
+  (z — l )k {F^^^^Fk  +  2Ff^Ff^k)  +  j -
We give now the calculus of the two numerical examples of 2.3.1 and
2.3.2, thus showing the procedure used to calculate a(^o)-
2.1.) Case a  <  P and /3 F fp >  I
Take o; =  0.5, ^  =  0.7, r =  0.1, 6 =  1, =  41/70 and u - 383/574. We
have seen that this corresponds to a Hopf bifurcation, the unit circle of 
being crossed at First, we have to find a basis in which the Jacobian
takes the desired form
/ cos(7r/3) — sin(7r/3) 1 /2  - V 5 / 2  ^
 ^ sin(7r/3) cos(7r/3) y  ^ V ^/2 1/2  y
This is achieved by finding an eigenvector in C  for the eigenvalue A =  
1/2  +  z \/3 /2  of the Jacobian in the old basis. If z — a +  z 6 is an eigen-
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vector corresponding to A, then (6, a) is an adequate basis.
Proof:  if we develop J{a-\-i 6) =  (u +  z u)(a +  z 6), we get : Ja  =  u a —v b, 
Jb =  V a u b. This shows that the Jacobian takes the right form in the 
basis (6, a), □
The Jacobian is :
'  J n  J M k l ü , ) 467/140 - (2 0 5 /1 0 0 ) ( l l /7 )
J 22 j  (172309/40180)(7/11) 
An eigenvector of this matrix for 1 /2  +  z \/3 /2  is :
(  1
z =
\  (2779 - ï490v 5)/3157  









P  being the inverse of the matrix P  and thus equal to :
/ 2779/(490v^ ) -3 1 5 7 /(4 9 0 ^ 3 )
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The extremely tedious calculus yields
Fk =  +3.3357142857.
TL =  -3.2214285714.
Fkk =  9kk =  +0.4043340068. 
Fku, =  gtw =  -0.4320911097.
=  gww =  +0.4826744131. 
Fkkk =  9kkk =  —0.03056115. 
Fkka =  Atw =  —0.0135788512. 
Fkwuj =  gWw =  +0.0945225245. 
TLww =  gwww =  —0.9391088488.
Gkk =  +0.6633836309.
G w  =  -0.55750081862. 
Gww =  -0.51800217818. 
Gkkk =  -0.0256236692. 
Gkku, =  +0.063696038.
Gtww =  +0.2201104268. 
Gwww =  -0.5826399932.
fkk =  -1.14369308191. 
fku. =  +0.6589712779.
=  +3.5073993024. 
fkkk =  -0.0047560.525.
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fkku; =  -0.8632261326. 
Aww =  +0.0725690451. 
/www =  -0.9077230925.
We calculate now the characteristic complex numbers which determine whether 
the bifurcation is supercritical or not :
C2o = -0 .6894  - 2  0.174528. 
C n  =  0.590907 +  i 0.221752. 
Co2 =  -0 .473345 +  i 0.154943.
C 21 =  -0 .091668 +  i 0.0783174.
We get a(V’o) =  —0.03737 +  0.44723 — 0.02199 % +0.387 and conclude to a 
supercritical Hopf bifurcation.
2.2.) Case a  >  (3 and /) +  %/)< 1
Take a  =  0.7, /? =  0.5, r =  0.1, 6 =  1, ^ 0  =  (29 — 12\Æ )/106 and 
ly =  (6497 — 2820\/5)/22790. This corresponds to a Hopf bifurcation in the 
case of a more capital intensive consumption good sector, the unit circle of 
being crossed at Again, we have to find a basis in which the Jacobian
takes the desired form
 ^ c o s ( 3 7 t / 4 )  —sin(37r/4) \   ^—1 / \ /2  —1 /\ /2
 ^ sin(37r/4) c o s ( 3 7 t / 4 )  j   ^ l / v ^  —1 /\ /2
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The Jacobian in the old basis is :
- 1 . 5 3 6 5 1 4  + 3 . 1 2 3 5 8 5
- 0 . 3 8 0 3 0 6  + 0 . 1 2 2 3 0 1
An adequate basis is given by the matrix
P  =
0 1 
0 . 2 2 6 3 7 7  0 . 2 6 5 5 3 1
(
P-^  =
- 1 . 1 7 2 9 6 0  + 4 . 4 1 7 4 2 0  
1 0
The values of the partial derivatives evaluated at the steady state are
V
F k =  — 1 . 5 3 6 5 1 .
&  =  + 3 . 1 2 3 5 8 .
F kk =  9kk =  — 2 . 2 5 3 5 8 .
Fku  ^ =  9kuj =  + 7 . 3 6 6 6 6 .
Fujtj =  Quju =  — 1 9 . 0 2 2 3 5 .  
Fkkk =  9kkk =  + 1 5 . 4 7 4 6 9 .  
Fkku, =  9kkuj =  - 0 . 9 4 9 6 6 .  
Fkujuj =  9kuuj =  - 3 7 . 4 3 2 4 1 .  
=  9 luwu =  + 2 8 2 . 0 0 9 8 1 .
G kk  =  - 0 . 1 0 8 3 6 2 .
=  + 7 . 2 9 0 2 9 9 .
G w w  =  - 1 1 . 7 9 6 9 6 1 .
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Gkkk =  -1188.320761.
Gkkw — "765.983671.
Gww =  -113.032485.
(juiwu» — —8734.614381.
fkk =  +2.096398. 
fk^ =  +23.784486.
=  -29.799625. 
fkkk =  -5267.458502. 
fkk^ =  +292.591244.
/ w  =  -455.404802. 
f ^  =  -38915.212744.
The characteristic complex numbers are now :
C 20 =  5.8286 -  i 3.8499.
C n =  -6 .9258  -  i 5.3189.
C0 2  =  2.1453 +  i 8.0422.
C 21 =  -340 .1127 +  i 2412.5415.
We get a()/>o) % —1274.25 and conclude therefore to a subcritical Hopf bifur­
cation.
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A P P E N D IX  C : T h e ILA M odel
We keep all the assumptions concerning production and form of the one
period utility, assume preference for the present (r >  0), and consider the
problem of infinitely lived agents. The agents’ problem is :
4-00
max  ■; ,
0 1
s . t .  kt^i  =  (1 — 6 4- +  Cf — ptCa t^'
If we let the coefficient of relative risk aversion cr tend to zero, we see that 
the dynamics of the ILA model are given by :
<^4-1 — it +  (1 ~
Pt+i = P ( 0 ( ( I  — ^) +  n4-i) ,  
which can be written under the following form :
ki+i =   ^ +  (1 -  S)kt ,  (1")
=  w f -“ i f - ‘'0 [ ( l  - S )  +  (2")
These are exactly the equations characterising the dynamics of the OLG 
model. In particular, Hopf bifurcations can occur in both situations (/? +  ?/>> 
1) and {/3 ip <  1), which is at the opposite of the results established by
Cazzavillan [4] in the continuous time setting^^. We must even see that
^^Our n u m e r ic a l  e x a m p l e s  g iv e n  for th e  O L G  M o d e l  a s s u m e d  6 =  1, w h ic h ,  o f  c o u r se ,  
d o e s  n o t  m a k e  m u c h  s e n s e  in an IL A  M o d e l  w i th  sp il lo v er  from  c a p i t a l  u n d e r  t h e  fo r m  o f  
l e a r n in g  b y  d o in g .  B u t  it  is e a sy  to  ver ify  t h a t  H o p f  b i fu r c a t io n s  are  p o s s i b l e  w i t h  6 < <  1. 
W e  t o o k  6 =  1 in order  t o  s im p l i fy  th e  c a lc u lu s  n e c e s sa r y  to  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
b i f u r c a t io n . . .
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many other results (concerning for instance the problem of balanced growth 
path) are linked to the continuous-time specification and do not hold in the 
discrete-time version of the model. This is of course a sad conclusion, since 
results are not robust with regard to time specification.
A P P E N D IX  D : T he C ase a =  1
Let us look at the particular case cr =  1 where savings are independent 
of the interest rate. We know^^ that the dynamical system  (1),(2 ') collapses 
into one single equation since (2') is of the form kt+i =  w^). Indeed, we
find :
kt+i =  +  (1 -  S)k,, (1)
=  (2')
It is immediate to verify that
and we can apply the implicit function theorem to write : (1),(2 ')
= F{kt),
LOi — G( k^i .^
A steady state ÇI =  {k ,ü)  exists if and only if /3 ip ^  1. Under this 
assumption, we get :
<5(/? — a )  -I- (2 4- r ) a





S ( j 3  — q ) 4- (2 +  r)o:^ ^ /3+V--1
(1 — a ) ( 2  +  r )
There are no conditions imposed on the parameters. If we want to study
the stability of the stationary state, we linearize the dynamical system  to
obtain :
^t+i =  — k)^
. _  ^ -  (^ -f V>)(2 +  r ) a / ( g  -  /3)
 ^ <5 +  ( l - ^ ) - ( 2  +  r ) a / ( a  -  (3)
We have^  ^ :
• Complete stability
•  Complete unstability o f n ^ ^  +  V^>l .
Let us suppose now (3 ip =  1. Equations (1), (2) imply : 
kt^i aZf — 1
a — b 
0 (1
1 + 0
where Z< =  (^tlkf  Therefore Zt is constant^^. Thus, if the coefficient of 
intertemporal substitution is equal to one, the dynamics are of a very simple 
type and do not bear any possibility of endogenous cycles.
^^Equation (2 ' )  c lea r ly  s h o w s  t h a t ,  in t h e  n e ig h b o u r h o o d  o f  Q ,  { u > t ) t  is o f  t h e  s a m e
n a tu r e  as { k i ) i  s in c e  w e  m a d e  th e  a s s u m p t i o n  G  G [ 0 , 1[.
^ ^ E xistence  o f  a  s o lu t io n  for th e  e q u a t io n  is g u a r a n t e e d  i f  6 =  1. B u t  th is  im p l ie s
e x i s t e n c e  for all S . . .
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* E c o le  p o ly t e c h n i q u e  a nd  D E L T A  ( E N S - E H E S S - C N R S ) ,  P a r is ,  a n d  L o n d o n  S c h o o l  
o f  E c o n o m i c s  ; E -m a i l  : ( V O N C O E S T @ L S E . A C . U K ). F in a n c ia l  s u p p o r t  in t h e  fo r m  o f  
a  s c h o la r s h ip  E c o le  p o l y t e c h n i q u e / M R T  a n d  a g r a n t  fr o m  F o n d a t io n  d e  l ’E c o le  p o l y t e c h ­
n iq u e  is m o s t  g r a t e f u l ly  a c k n o w le d g e d .  I a m  in d e b te d  t o  G a b r ie l le  D e m a n g e ,  G u y  L a r o q u e ,  
R o g e r  G u e s n e r ie ,  Ai'lsa R oe l l  an d  m y  referees G i l l e s  C h e m l a ,  I sa b e l l e  D u a u l t  a n d  M a rc  
H e n r y  for th e ir  p r e c io u s  s u p p o r t  and  m o s t  he lpful  c o m m e n t s .  A n y  r e m a in in g  errors  are,  
o f  c o u r se ,  m in e .
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A b str a c t
We establish that a two-sector OLG economy where production 
inputs substitute perfectly and savings monotonically increase with 
the interest rate can exhibit endogenous growth with endogenous 
cyclic or even chaotic fluctuations in the growth rate i f  externali­
ties operate in the production sectors. We show that this requires a 
strong externality in the consumption good sector in the absence of 
bubbles or sunspots, but not necessarily in their presence. We fu r­
thermore prove that there exist production economies where, in the 
absence o f any intrinsic uncertainty, the only possible equilibria in­
volve bubbles or sunspots, a result which makes appear questionable 
the notion of fundam enta l’ equilibrium trajectory.
Keywords : Externalities, Bubbles, Cycles and Chaos.
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I n tr o d u c t io n
Business Cycle Theory explains the fluctuations displayed by economic 
time series as deviation from trends in consequence of exogenous shocks 
originating in variations of private sector behaviour, technological changes, 
stochastic shifts in government policy etc. In the standard models of this 
theory, the equilibrium is, in the absence of shocks, defined and at least lo­
cally unique (determinate and stable), and the economy converges to this 
steady state. This conception is so widespread that most textbooks refer 
only to this type of explanation of economic fluctuations. Nothing induces 
us, however, to believe in this idealized story of a world that would be nicely 
monotone in the absence of shocks from the outside. Fluctuations may well 
have, at least partly, endogenous origins. The methodology that is adopted  
by researchers interested in this area of ‘endogenous business cycles’ is gen­
erally the following : they consider models without any intrinsic uncertainty 
(no exogenous shocks), and show that, under certain conditions on tastes, 
technologies and beliefs of the agents, cycles, closed orbits or even chaos can 
occur. This does not mean, of course, that these economists do not take 
seriously the importance of exogenous shocks, but is simply the result of two 
considerations : first of all it is, from a purely epistemological point of view  
and to gainsay the traditional conception, interesting to show that the stan­
dard assumptions on the agents’ behaviour, on production etc. do not rule 
out fluctuations in the absence of extraneous uncertainty, and that at least a 
part of real world fluctuations may be explained endogenously ; secondly, the 
mathematical tools available nowadays simply do not allow to deal formally
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w ith  non-linear models subject to  exogenous shocks.
The question of endogenous cycles or chaos in economic models without 
any intrinsic uncertainty has now been studied for several years. This does 
not mean that the topic has been exhausted : in fact, when we consider 
the main part of the literature on endogenous fluctuations, one fact strikes 
our attention : nearly all models. Overlapping Generations Models (OLG) 
as well as Infinitely Lived Agents Models (ILA), need, in order to establish  
existence results for cycles or chaotic trajectories, and especially for the lat­
ter, assumptions on the utilities of the agents or on the production functions 
(when production takes place) that are not empirically défendable. For in­
stance, one often met assumption is the negative interest rate elasticity of 
savings at the Golden Rule steady state (see G rand mont [20] ; Jullien [24]...) ; 
another is that of complementarity, or not too important substitutability, of 
the production factors (see Reichlin [27], [28]). A recently published paper 
by Boldrin and Rustichini [8] tries to give an example of a two-sector ILA 
economy with externalities where, under the assumption of linear utility, en­
dogenous growth with chaotic growth rate can take place ; unfortunately, the 
dynamics exhibited by the authors do not correspond to the optimal path. 
Two preceding papers have established, one in the ILA framework with con­
tinuous time (Cazzavillan [9]), the other in the framework of OLG and ILA 
in discrete-time setting (v. Coester [11]), that a model meeting all standard 
neo-classical assumptions from the point of view of the private sector, but 
with externalities of the total capital stock onto the efficiency of labour in
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each productive sector of the economy, can exhibit closed orbits of the econ­
om y’s state variables.
All these papers show the possibility of cycles or of chaotic, but bounded, 
trajectories of the capital stock, and therefore deal with economies where 
there is no real growth, except Boldrin and Rustichini’s model. In a critical 
note on their paper, we have shown that the authors’ claim of chaotic trajec­
tories for the growth rate must be considerably attenuated since observable 
chaos cannot be established in their model unless assuming that capital de­
preciates entirely in each period, an unacceptable assumption in the ILA 
framework given the period’s length. Furthermore, we proved that even cy­
cles or topological chaos cannot be claimed for without the assumption of a 
very important capital depreciation per period.
We exhibit here a two-sector OLG economy with standard utility, where 
savings increase monotonically with the interest rate (positive lES), and 
where production inputs substitute perfectly, for which endogenous growth 
with endogenous fluctuations of observable chaotic type is a possible issue. 
We use again here the two-sector OLG model of v. Coester [11] under the 
assumption of an externality in the investment good sector such that bal­
anced growth may take place. A question arises : why consider a two-sector 
model with externalities since we know from Galor [18] that endogenous cy­
cles may occur in a neoclassical two-sector OLG model without externalities
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and from O N. Fisher^ [26] that it is not necessary to assume any externality 
to get self-sustaining growth in such a framework ? The answer to this is, 
first, that standard utility and production functions give neither cycles nor 
self-sustaining growth in a two-sector model, secondly that we wish to have 
the possibility of balanced growth paths, a property which can be obtained in 
a simple manner only by assuming externalities or an A K  investment good 
production function.
The fact that bubbles on an intrinsically useless asset can generate flip or 
Hopf bifurcations and thus cycles or closed orbits is well known by now. Most 
models show this with negative bubbles, called ‘negative outside money’, re­
sulting from a ‘constant zero budget deficit’ constraint of the government 
(Benhabib and Day [3], Farmer [15]...) ; Farmer’s model is particularly inter­
esting because it establishes the fact that in a one-sector OLG model with 
production and inelastic labour supply, Hopf bifurcations can be generated 
only by negative bubbles ; the examples he exhibits to show that negative 
bubbles can generate cycles all involve production with complementarity of 
inputs. Jullien [24] shows, in a very elegant manner, that cycles can be gen­
erated by positive bubbles in a one-sector economy with production, where 
production inputs substitute perfectly, if the savings function is non mono-
^O’N. F isher e sta b lish es the very im p ortan t fact th a t any grow ing con vex  O L G  econ om y  
w ith  a t least tw o sectors m ust ex h ib it an in vestm en t sector  w ith  a sy m p to tica lly  linear  
tech n ology . T h a t on e-sector  convex OLG  econ om ies can n ot ex h ib it su sta in ed  grow th is a  
w ell know n fact.
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function already appeared in Grandmont’s [20] seminal paper on a pure en­
dowment economy with endogenous fluctuations generated by flat money 
(positive bubble). Jullien's example of a period three cycle furthermore re­
quires a preference for future consumption. Reichlin [29] shows that, in a 
two-sector model, positive bubbles can lead to closed orbits through Hopf 
bifurcations, but he needs not only a negative lES but also complementarity 
of the production inputs to get his result.
The paper “Growth, Externalities, and Sunspots” by Spear [31] analyses 
the existence problem of sunspots in an ILA model of neo-classical capital 
accumulation with production externalities. His conclusion is that, in the 
presence of the externalities, sunspots can exist, and thus cyclic trajectories 
of the state variable. Spear’s externality is really non-standard : the spillover 
comes from the anticipated average savings of all agents, i.e. from the antici­
pated per capita stock of capital of the following period ; furthermore, cycles 
in Spear’s model are cycles of the capital stock, and therefore the title of his 
paper is misleading since there is no real growth taking place.
We show that, in our framework with positive lES and perfect substi­
tutability between the production factors, we can have positive as well as 
negative bubbles generating Hopf bifurcations. This can lead to a situation  
where we have endogenous growth with endogenous fluctuations. In the pres­
ence of bubbles, we can have self-sustaining growth with a fluctuating growth 
rate even if the externality in the consumption good sector is not very strong, 
and even in the absence of any externality in this sector in the case of neg-
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and even in the absence of any externality in this sector in the case of neg­
ative bubbles. This is an important result since Boldrin and Rustichini [8] 
(if we take their model seriously and accept to take the unappealing param­
eter configurations which are required to guarantee the existence of cycles or 
topological chaos in their framework) need a strong externality in the con­
sumption good sector for the possibility of cycles or chaotic trajectories^. We 
also show that if the consumption good sector is more capital intensive than 
the investment good sector, then we cannot obtain endogenous fluctuations 
through Hopf bifurcations in the presence of a positive bubble. Furthermore, 
we exhibit an economy having no non-bubbly equilibrium, but equilibria with 
bubbles. This is due to the non-convexity at the aggregate level of the pro­
duction function of the investment good. A similar result of economies with 
sunspot equilibria but no equilibrium without extrinsic uncertainty has been 
established by Pietra [27] in the context of a pure endowment economy with 
a finite set of agents and a finite horizon.
1 T h e  O L G  M o d e l
Tim e is discrete. At each date /, a new generation of agents is born ; 
the size of each generation is assumed to remain constant over time and will 
be normalised to one. Agents live for two periods ; in the first period of 
their life, they work, consume and save for their old age, and in the second, 
they consume their actiialised savings. Bequests are not allowed. Firms are
“In our m odel to o , a stron g  ex tern a lity  m ust op era te  in the con su m p tion  good  sector  
in th e  ab sen ce o f  bubbles.
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owned by the old people ; the number of firms is supposed large enough to 
have perfect competition and thus profit maximisation in both sectors.
Agents are characterised by their utility, which is supposed to be time- 
separable and of CRRA type :
1 — <7 1 — (7
Ln{ct,t) +  QLn{ct^t+i) 
where Ct t^+i denote respectively consumption when young and consump­
tion when old of an agent of generation t, cr >  0 is the coefficient of rela­
tive risk aversion (equal to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution be­
tween consumption at any two points in time) and 0  =  1/(1 - |-r ), where 
r e] — 1, -f go] is the rate of time preference.
The production of each good is of the following type :
C, = C I < l , L \ - “K^,
(a , g]0, Ip  and i/ G JR+, Ki t^ being the level of capital at time t in sector z,
Ki  the aggregate level of capital at time t. As is easy to verify, the externality 
in the investment good sector is such that the necessary condition for the 
existence of a (not necessarily unique) balanced growth path is met. W ithout 
any loss of generality, we take C =  I ; the parameter /  will not be taken equal 
to one since endogenous growth in a context of total capital depreciation, an 
assumption which simplifies the study of the dynamics, requires /  >  1. The
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rate of depreciation per period of the capital is 6 >  0. We suppose a  ^  ^ 
(two sectors) and assume full employment.
+  1^ 2,t =
+  ^2,t =  Lit.
We reformulate the model in per capita terms ; denoting the proportion 
of the labour force allocated to sector i and the per capita capital stock 
in sector z, we get :
ct =  ,
i. =  ■
Since we have
h,t +  h,t =  1
h,tk\ , t  +  h,tk2,t =  kt 
we can eliminate li^ t and obtain :




it =  I
ki,t — k2,t
Firms behave competitively and maximise their profits in each period, 
without taking the externalities into account. Let be the competitive 
wage rate and the competitive rate of return on capital and pt the relative 
price of the consumption good in terms of investment good (the numeraire 
here). Profit maximisation and constancy of labour force imply :
e, =  p ,(l -  a)k l ,k^  =  (1 -  0 ] lk l ,k ]~ " ,
u  =  PiC^k-j'K =  0 ii4 j'k 'r ^
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If we denote by W( the wage-interest rate ratio, we see that
h \  i ~  ,  k2^t —
where a =  a / ( I  — a)  and 6 =  /3/{ l — /3). Thus price, wage and interest rate 
can be expressed as functions of W( and kt  ^ which will be chosen as state  
variables. Notice that only kt is predetermined.
In the next section, we study the competitive equilibria in the absence 
of any intrinsic uncertainty (no exogenous shocks), bubbles or sunspots, the 
so-called ‘fundamental’ equilibria. We show that flip bifurcations may occur, 
and that for adequate parameter configurations, topological, ergodic or even 
turbulent chaos can exist, erratic trajectories requiring a strong externality in 
the consumption good sector >  1...). In the third section, we consider
the equilibria in the presence of bubbles and show that Hopf bifurcations may 
occur and thus generate closed orbits of the growth rate. We show that a 
strong externality z/ is no longer required to obtain endogenous growth with 
endogenous fluctuations. The last and very short fourth section is devoted to 
the problem of economies that do not exhibit any ’fundamental’ equilibrium  
but do have equilibria in the presence of bubbles, a result which shows that 
the notion of ‘fundamental’ equilibrium does not make much sense in a non­
linear world.
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2 F lu c tu a t io n s  in  th e  B u b b le le s s  E c o n o m y
In the absence of any bubble, all the savings St are used for productive 
investment purposes, one part being used to buy the capital (1 — S)kt stock 
from the old generation, the rest being used to produce the investment good. 





S.t. PtCt t^ +
1 -  (5 +  rt+i < e u
yields the Euler equation :
Pi+i
The equilibrium conditions
St = ~  Pt(^t,t =  (1 —  ^)kf  +  {h+ i  —  (1 —
kt+i =  (1 — S)kt +  




1 k( + 1
0  — kt^i
( 1)
=  -  S +  ]■ (2)
If <7 =  1, equation (2) reduces to
kt+\ =
0 
1 + 0 et. (2')
178
For simplicity, we consider the case of total per period depreciation of 
capital. This could seem to be a rather strange assumption to take after 
having criticised Boldrin and Rustichini by showing that it is not possible to 
establish, in their framework, existence of observable chaos unless assuming 
entire depreciation of the capital in each period. But remember ; in an ILA 
framework, periods are short, whereas in the OLG context they are long. 
Furthermore, for our model,  ^ <  1 does not imply impossibility of prov­
ing that observable chaos can occur, but simply increases the mathematical 
complexity (see Appendix A).
We rule out the case cr =  1 since we have established, in a preceding 
paper^, that logarithmic per period utility does not lead to any type of erratic 
dynamics in the absence of bubbles or extrinsic uncertainty. It is immediate 
to verify that, under the assumption of <7 ^  1, the dynamical system  in 
is equivalent to the following system, giving the dynamics of (A ,^ 






aZt  — (1 — A)
It is therefore sufficient to study the dynamics of Zt which give those of the 
growth rate A, — 1. Notice that the dynamics are forward. We can rewrite 
our second equation under one of the following forms :
• If O' <  /? ,
'S ee  V.  C o e s t e r  [11].
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• If a  >  /?,
Ut+^ = Kur{Ut-lnl-cUty,
where Ut =  aZf, c =  l^oc^
I -  ^
m  = \ —   {a  +  I/),
1 —  0:
0 1 -
_ ! _ /  1/3 \ “ + V  1 - a




1 / I n
p = (1 - o ) ( l  -  a)'
Linear conjugacy does not, of course, affect the nature of the dynamics. The 
dynamics are defined on a subinterval of [1/c, 1] if (o  <  and of [1,1/c] 
otherwise. Since our aim is to give an example establishing our claims, we re­
frain from exposing a general study of the dynamics. It can be shown that if 
n <  0 or p <  0, then a steady state always exists and is necessarily unstable, 
which is of no interest. For our purpose here, we need a hump-shaped map­
ping T , which requires n >  0 and p >  0, and therefore a strong externality in 
the consumption good sector {a 1/  >  1) and a coefficient of intertemporal 
substitution larger than one (1/cr >  1).
Since our aim is to establish an existence result, we suppose now that 
a  <  /?, and choose m =  0, n =  1 and p==l  by taking :
1—0 
ly — 3(1 — o ) .
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a
3 - 2 a
a , 0  and I  remain parameters. The mapping T =  Ta,K{@j) is hump­
shaped and of the simplest possible form : a well chosen restriction of it is 
linearly topologically conjugate to the standard logistic map defined by :
P r o p o s it io n  : Va g]0, 1[, >  2, there exists a closed interval  A =
[7^2,/Ffî] such that ; 7F G A 3J  C ]a /^ , 1[, 3fi G [2, J5] such that the re­
strict ion to J  o /T  is a linear topological conjugate ofV^ : Ta,i</j 55^ F^.
Proof  : This is obvious. If K  is large enough, then there exist two fixed 
points, Ui <  Ü2 -, the first being always unstable, the stability of the second 
one depending on K .  The mapping Tc,jc(0,/) admits a maximum at
If we write
Ut — U\
2 ( U * - U ^ Y
then we get :
^(+1 — — Xt),
c K
fl — —
n u ' - u , y
It is easy to see that there exists A =  [772,/7jg] such that when K  increases 
from I\ 2  to K b i  increases from 2 to 7?. □
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If we consider our family of maps T, we see that for each a , we can 
choose K  such that is conjugate to /i >  2. We can thus invoke all 
the classical or less classical results about the maps F  ^ : from fi increasing 
from 2 to 4, the family undergoes a flip bifurcation cascade. First, there 
appears a cycle of period 2 for the value ^ =  3. A two-cycle exists and is 
stable for all fi G [3,3.449499[. For fi =  3.449499, a 4-cycle appears ; at 
H =  3.549090, a cycle of period 8 emerges etc. The periods of the emerging 
cycles follow Sarkovskii’s ordering which is defined as follows : 3 5 7 >-
^ 2 * 3  2 5 ^  ••• X" 2  ^ • 3 ^  2”^ *5 ^  2”^  )>- • • • ^  4 ^  2 )>- 1.
For fi comprised between two bifurcation values, the existing cycle is stable. 
Sarkovskii’s theorem says that for any continuous hump-shaped map from an 
interval [a, 6] into itself, if a cycle of order k exists, then there exists a cycle 
of period k' for every k >- k'. But for fi large enough, there exists a cycle 
of period three. From Sarkovskii’s theorem, we can thus deduce that for fi 
large enough, there exist cycles of every imaginable period. An important 
question is then stability of these cycles.
As a consequence of a theorem established by Li and Yorke^ in 1975, for 
all values of fi large enough to allow the existence a cycle of period three, the 
map T exhibits topological chaos. We know that the notion of topological 
chaos is not exhilarating because nothing prevents the set of initial conditions 
giving chaos to be of zero Lebesgue measure : this happens when there exists 
a stable cycle, for instance when fi =  3.839 where the map admits a stable
‘T h e  fa m o u s  a n d  o ften  m is in te r p r e te d  “p e r io d  3 im p l ie s  c h a o s ” ...
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cycle of period three, but where chaos as well as the infinity of cycles of other 
periods than three are simply unobservable.
Fortunately, sufficient conditions to guarantee a non zero measure of the 
set S  of initial conditions for chaos have been established, and we know that 
exhibits ergodic as well as turbulent chaos on [0,1], the set S  being even 
of full measure. Furthermore, a less standard result is that, for // >  4, 
is defined and chaotic on a Cantor set included in [0,1], the set S  being of 
full Cantor measure, and that // >  2 +  \/5 , guarantees structural stability. 
Unfortunately, these last ‘exotic’ dynamics are of no interest for economists 
since they require an assumption on the degree of calculation power of the 
agents that cannot be accepted. However, we have very nice properties for 
the dynamics in this model, since we can claim existence of parameter config­
urations such that the spectrum of a trajectory a.s. resembles the spectrum  
of a random noise.
For a given /F, we can choose I  such that A, >  1 on the whole interval 
), )], where U^{K)  is such that Ta,K{U^{K)) =  Ui(A"), and then
take 0  such that / \ ( / , 0 )  =  A", which is always possible^. If we do this, 
we obtain, of course, a very unrealistic type of endogenous growth with a 
chaotic rate of growth since no recessions can take place. But using the fact 
that, in the case of the logistic map, we know the ergodic distribution, we 
can choose our parameters in order to have a positive average growth rate of 
a reasonable value and possibility of recessions.
’W e  d o  n o t  rule o u t  here p referen ce  for fu tu re  c o n s u m p t i o n . . .
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Notice that to obtain endogenous growth under the assumption of total
capital depreciation per period, we need a parameter I  larger than one :
A, =  (1 -  i )  +  / ^ ( i  -
It is immediate to realise that <  A (l/c). But then we have :
A, < ( l - A )  +  / ( l - ; 9 ) ' - ' ’( l - a f .
We see that if A >  7(1 — — a)^, then the trend is negative and the
economy collapses in the long term. This is especially true when capital de­
preciation is one per period and /  <  1. □
P r o p o s it io n  : In our framework, self-sustaining growth with a chaotic, 
and in the average positive, growth rate is a possible observable issue. Thus, 
even if the neo-classical assumptions on utilities or production are met from  
the point of view of the private sector, we cannot rule out endogenous f luc­
tuations in growth in the absence of exogenous shocks. In the absence of 
bubbles or sunspots, erratic dynamics require a strong externality in the con­
sumption good sector and a coefficient of intertemporal substitution larger 
than one.
3 B u b b le s  as G e n e r a to r s  o f  F lu c tu a t io n s
We consider the situation where there exists an intrinsically useless asset 
in which the agents can invest. This type of asset is traditionally called a bub-
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ble. What changes compared to the situation encountered in the first section  
is that now productive capital stock of next period is no longer necessarily 
equal to actual savings : a positive bubble for instance diverts capital from 
productive investment. The traditional interpretation of a positive bubble is 
fiat money, and a negative bubble can result, for instance, from a ‘constant 
zero budget deficit’ constraint of the Government® : the private sector is then 
a net debtor. It is clear that positive bubbles are far more appealing since 
a negative bubble’s interpretation lies in a public policy, and a very specific 
one, whereas positive bubbles can exist in a pure ‘laisser-faire’ economy.
We show here that the introduction of a bubble can generate cycles in an 
economy where cycles do not occur in a bubbleless equilibrium. This idea is 
not new, as we have explained in the introduction, since it has been exploited  
by Benhabib and Day [3] and Farmer [15] etc. in the case of negative bub­
bles, Grandmont [20], Jullien [24] and Reichlin [29] and others in the case of 
positive bubbles. But the latter only prove that endogenous cycles can occur 
in the presence of positive bubbles under the following assumptions : Grand­
mont, in a pure endowment economy, and Jullien, in a one-sector economy 
with production, need an interest rate elasticity of savings at the Golden Rule 
state smaller than —0.5, condition needed again by Reichlin, in his two-sector 
model, in addition to his assumption of production with complementary fac­
tors. Complementarity of production inputs appears also in the two examples 
given by Farmer of negative bubbles generating Hopf bifurcations in a one 
G S e e  F a rm er  [15].
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sector economy with production.
We present here a model which not only meets all standard neo-classical 
assumptions from the point of view of the private sector and where positive 
as well as negative bubbles can generate endogenous cycles, but better : in 
our framework, cycles are cycles in the growth rate and not in the capital 
stock, and we can thus exhibit again a model of endogenous growth with a 
fluctuating rate of growth. As we shall see hereafter, the conditions for en­
dogenous fluctuations generated by bubbles differ much from those required 
for cycles or chaotic trajectories to be possible ‘fundamental’ equilibria.
We consider the general case 8 g]0, 1]. We want to study the dynamics 
of com petitive equilibria with bubbles. Let Bt be the per capita value of the 
bubble at date t. The equilibrium condition ‘investment equals savings’ is :
~  PtCt,t =  (1 — 8)kt +  {kt+i — (1 — 8)kt) -f- Bt.
The no arbitrage condition concerning the useless asset which yields no div­
idends (or the Government’s ‘constant zero budget deficit’ constraint in the 
case of a negative bubble) imposes :
-^<+1 =  (1  ~  8 r t ^ i )Bt .
Maximisation of utility, perfect competition and equilibrium in the markets 
imply, if we define Xt =  kt+i/kt,  Zt =  tjOtjh, and bt =  Bt/k t  {bt is the ‘re­
duced’ bubble^), a dynamic system of the following form :
^ B y  p u re  la z in e ss ,  w e  sh a l l  h erea fter  u se  th e  te rm  ‘b u b b le ’ in s te a d  o f ‘r e d u c e d  b u b b l e ’.
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A, =  +  (1 -  S),
a — 0
“ t+ l    a
A,
1 - a  +  Dy>-H z^^^,
0(+i — ------------- :--------------- Ot.
A,
In the very special case of cr =  1 we must, of course, write :
A, +  6, =  Y ^ ( l  -  0 ) > ^ I Z t
These equations show clearly that is uniquely determined by Zt ; we 
can therefore substitute and study the dynamics of {Z^bt)  and characterise 
the dynamics of the whole economy.
The equations obtained here do not allow a global characterisation of the 
dynamics ; we shall therefore restrain our study to the local behaviour in the 
vicinity of a stationary point =  (%*, 6*). The technique employed is the 
following : we look at the conditions for the existence of a bubbly steady 
state ; under the assumption of existence, and if the dynamical system  is 
of dimension two, we linearise the dynamic equations in the vicinity of the 
stationary state Q* in order to study the possibility of Hopf bifurcations®. If 
the dynamical system  is degenerate of dimension one, which happens here.
^In a  t w o - s t a t e  d y n a m ic ,  a  H o p f  b i fu r c a t io n  h a p p e n s  w h e n  t h e  e ig e n v a lu e s  o f  th e  J a ­
c o b i  a n  a t  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  are c o m p l e x  a nd  cross th e  u n i t  c irc le .  H o p f  b i f u r c a t io n s  are  
m o r e  s a t i s f y i n g  th a n  flip b i fu r c a t io n s  s in c e  t h e y  are m o re  r o b u s t  t o  c h a n g e s  in t h e  p e r i o d ’s 
l e n g t h .
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as we shall see below, when the agents’ one-period utility is logarithmic, 
we look for the possibility of flip bifurcations^ or even try to characterise 
globally the dynamics. A very readable introduction to the mathematical 
method invoked here can be found in Grandmont [21].
3.1 C ase a =  1 \ Im possib ility  R esu lts
Let us suppose here that the agents’ per period utility is logarithmic. 
Under this assumption, we determine the bubbly steady state by writing 
Zt =  bt =  b* ^  0. We see that a stationary state with a bubble always 
exist unless the solution b* is equal to 0. We get :
A* =  (1 - 5 )  + / / 3 V ' ’ ,
0  1 - / 3
-  1
1-1-0  Oi
We see that the steady state corresponds to self-sustaining growth (A* > 1 )  
if and only if 6 < which is not met, for instance, in the case of total
capital depreciation (6 =  1) when I is too small (for instance, smaller than 
or equal to one). Furthermore, it appears clearly that positive bubbles are 
possible only if a  -f ^ <  1. The dynamic system given is degenerate and of 
order 1 : we can express A(, bt and as functions of Zt. It is therefore 
enough to study the dynamics of (Zt)t£N- We distinguish two cases :
flip b i fu r c a t io n  cor rep on els, in a  o n e - d im e n s io n a l  s y s t e m ,  t o  th e  e ig e n v a lu e  c r o s s in g  
— 1. F u r th e r m o r e ,  a  c o n d i t io n  in v o lv in g  th e  first th r e e  d e r iv a t iv e s  e v a lu a t e d  a t  th e  s t e a d y  
s t a t e  has  to  be  m e t .
188
3 .1 .1  C a s e  o f  T o ta l  C a p it a l  D e p r e c ia t io n
It is easy to see that, under this assumption, it is possible to write ;
0 a
1 +  0  a  — 13 Zt+i = a — 13 '  ^ ' I -{■ Q aZt — {1 — a)
The function H  defined by Zt+i =  H{Zt)  is therefore homographie. The 




1 +  0  a  — (3
It is immediate to check that the steady state is always unstable with H'{Z*) >  
+  1 if {b* >  0 and o  <  /?) or (6* <  0 and o >  /)), and always stable with 
0 <  H \ Z * )  <  1 if (6* <  0 and o  <  /?) or (b* >  0 and o  >  (3). Local cycles 
are thus excluded^®. But we can even exclude global cycles by considering a 
further argument invoking the shape of the function .
3 .1 .2  C a s e  o f  P a r t ia l  C a p ita l  D e p r e c ia t io n
The case where capita] is supposed to depreciate only partially in each 
period (0 <  6 <  1) is far more difficult to deal with, and we cannot obtain  
very strong results. We can eliminate the emergence of local cycles through 
flip bifurcations, but cannot say anything about the possibility of global
A n o t h e r  a r g u m e n t  t o  ru le  o u t  c y c l e s  th r o u g h  flip b i f u r c a t io n s  c o n s i s t s  in in v o k in g  t h e
f a c t  t h a t  a  h o m o g r a p h ie  f u n c t io n  h a s  a  z er o  S c h w a rz ia n  d e r iv a t iv e .
H  is s t r i c t ly  c o n v e x  if  a  <  ( 3 ,  s t r i c t ly  c o n c a v e  i f  a  >  /? ; th i s  fa c t  im p l ie s ,  w i t h  th e
s ig n  o f  th e  d e r iv a t iv e  a t  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e ,  t h a t  e v en  g lo b a l  c y c le s  are im p o s s ib le .
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cycles. The analysis remains local because Zt^\ remains defined implicitly. 
We determine the slope at the steady state ; it is given by :
1 h*
J  =  1 +
where 6* is given above and :
c  = y 1 + 0 + 11 +  0  j5 — a
A necessary condition for the emergence of local cycles through a flip bifur­
cation is that, for some parameter configurations, the slope J  is equal to —1. 
Ad absurdum : let us suppose that this is possible. It implies :
(0) i* =  -2A* +  2A' 1 1 +  0  A1 +  2(/) -  a )
Notice that the expression of b* implies h* >  —A*, whatever is the parame­
ter configuration. Suppose now that the investment good sector is the more 
capital intensive (a  <  /9). Then (0) implies h* <  —2A* +  A*, which is ab­
surd. Flip bifuractions are therefore excluded, for both positive and negative 
bubbles, if o  <  /?. Suppose now that a  >  Obviously, we have
0  (3'
0 < 1 - 1 + 0  a < 1
and
< 0  if l + 2 ( ^ - a ) > 0 ,
l + 2 ( ; g - a )
and thus positive as well as negative bubbles are excluded in this case, for
(0) implies b* <  —2A*. Let us consider the case 1 +  2(/? — a) <  0. Now we 
have
2(/3 -  a )
l + 2 ( ^ - A )
> 2.
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It is not possible to conclude directly ; but let us replace 6* by its formal 
expression. Noticing that 0 / ( 1  +  0 )  <  1, we obtain the following necessary 
condition :
(O') 0 <  -  1] +  (1 -  S) [ a ( 2P  -  1) -
But a  — (5 — \ is obviously negative, and 1 -f 2 (^  — a ) <  0 implies 2(3 — 1 < 0 .  
Therefore, (O') cannot be met and the assumption J  =  — I is absurd. Again, 
flip bifurcations are not possible. We can proclaim the following :
P r o p o s it io n  : In our framework, if the agents’ coefficient of in te r tem­
poral substitution is equal to one, the dynamical sys tem collapses to d im en­
sion one and local cycles through flip bifurcations generated by bubbles are 
excluded. Furthermore, if capital depreciates entirely in each period, even 
global cycles cannot exist.
3.2 C ase a ^  1 : E x istence R esu lts
Bubbly steady state : under the assumption Zt — Z*, bt =  b* 0, v/e 
get :
a
A* =  (1 +
. - 1 -  ‘ '
O (1 - 6 )  +  Q\/aX*(o + i .ni-a)/a J '
Hereof we deduce  th a t  th e  s teady  s ta te  (Z*, b*)  c a n n o t  co rrespond  to g ro w th  
if ^ >  I(3^a^~^ which, in p a r t icu la r ,  is m et if capital deprecia tes  en tire ly  in
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one period (^ =  1) and /  <  1. Furthermore, we see that a positive steady 
state value of the bubble cannot exist, and therefore that Hopf bifurcations 
generated by positive bubbles cannot occur in our model, \i a-[- ^ > 1 .  If the 
consumption good sector is the more capital intensive (a  >  ^), then positive 
bubbles require even ^ <  1 — ( 1 — <5)// <  1 unless 6 =  1. Notice that the 
externality operating in the consumption good sector does affect neither Z* 
nor A*, but only the stationary value of the bubble h*.
Linearization of the dynamics (Z ,^ around the steady state (Z * ,6*) 
gives, if we write Zt =  Z*(\ +  Ut) and bt =  6*(1 +  u<), the following linear 
first order system :
/  \  /■^Ut+l
 ^ A'ut+i +  Vt+\ J
B  C  
B'  1
with
• A  =(/? -  a ) +  (1 -  P)-
1 -  8 +
=(/? -  a )  +  (1 -  /?)( l  +  - ( «  +  »/))—  ^+
+  +  ^  +  +
X [1 +
• C  — —
(J
1 — ( 7 a  1 — <5 +
-0
-0
T + W a ^ '
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The Jacobi an of our dynamical system has then the same eigenvalues as the 
matrix J  defined by :
<^+1 




D et{J )  =  ^  
T r {J )  =  1 +  Det(J )  +  (S' -  A!) ■
Total stability of the stationary state corresponds, for the Jacobi an of 
the dynamic system, to two eigenvalues of modulus strictly smaller than one. 
There exist several configurations, corresponding to a monotone, an oscil­
lating or a spiral convergence to the steady state. It is easy to see that all 
configurations can occur in our framework. What is of real interest for us 
is the possibility of two complex (conjugate) eigenvalues of modulus one : if 
this situation is possible, and if the real part of the eigenvalues is not station­
ary with respect to the chosen bifurcation parameter, then a Hopf bifurcation 
occurs in the dynamical system, and the Hopf bifurcation theorem ascertains 
the existence of closed orbits in our economy.
Let us consider now the following problem : do parameter configurations 
exist such that D et{J )  =  +1, A =  T r { j y  — 4 <  0 and T r { J )  ^ { — 1,0} ? 
The latter condition is needed to rule out cases of large resonance which can 
be very complex^
’ “S e e  G u c k e i i l ie im e r  an d  H o lm e s  [2.3].
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P r o p o s it io n  : In the framework of our model, positive as well as neg­
ative bubbles can be at the origin of endogenous f luctuations in the growth 
rate. Neither a negative lE S  nor complementarity of the production inputs  
are required for  the possibility of endogenous cycles, even in the case of 
a positive bubble. There exist parameter configurations giving endogenous 
growth with endogenous fluctuations.
Proof : To establish this proposition, it is sufficient to exhibit adequate 
parameter configurations. Let us take 7 = 1 , 0  =  0.1, (3 =  0.7, a  =  0.5 and 
<5 =  0.38 ; we see that the steady state value of the growth rate (A* — 1) 
is approximately one per cent. It is easy to see that if u is large enough^^, 
then there exists 0  such that 6* >  0, D et{J )  =  -|-1 and A <  0. Thus, this 
example gives endogenous growth with endogenous fluctuations generated by 
a positive bubble (money...). But it is immediate to check that if we take u 
small but such that :
then we can obtain Hopf bifurcations with a negative bubble (to require a 
positive steady state value for the bubble means just to impose an additional 
constraint for the externality parameter i/). Taking i/ =  0.7, we can choose 
0  in order to have a configuration where the economy exhibits endogenous 
growth with endogenous fluctuations generated by a negative bubble. □
^^Existence is e s tab lish ed  by tak ing  a  +  i/ =; 3, for instance .. .
194
We shall now look more precisely at the constraints imposed upon the 
parameters, for our purpose is to establish some technical lemmas and propo­
sitions on general necessary conditions for Hopf bifurcations in our frame­
work, on the role of the externality in the consumption good sector, or of the 
relative capital intensity in the two sectors. The first lemma concerns the 
possibility of Hopf bifurcations, without imposing any condition on A* or b*.
L e m m a  : In our framework and under the assumption a  ^  if the 
investment good sector is more capital intensive than the consumption good 
sector (a  <  j3), then Hopf bifurcations require the following : oc ^  <  1, 
0 <  cr <  1 and u >  0.5. If the consumption good sector is the more capital 
intensive, then there are no such general conditions, and endogenous f luctu­
ations can be generated even in the case a  >  1, but only by negative bubbles.
The proof of this lemma is not difficult but rather long and tedious, there­
fore it has been banished to Appendix B. A consequence of this lemma, and 
of numerical examples given below establishing the possibility of Hopf bi­
furcations with =  0 if o  >  /?, is that increasing returns to scale at the 
aggregate level are not necessary in the consumption good sector if this sec­
tor is the more capital intensive, whereas strong increasing returns to scale 
are required if the converse is true. We have exposed previously an example 
of Hopf bifurcation giving endogenous growth with endogenous fluctuations 
in the presence of a positive bubble for the case of a more capital intensive
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investment sector. What can be said if o; >  ?
P r o p o s it io n  : In our framework, if the consumption good sector is 
more capital intensive than the investment good sector, then positive bub­
bles cannot generate endogenous fluctuations through Hopf bifurcations, but 
negative bubbles can give endogenous growth with endogenous fluctuations.
Proof : This is immediate. If b* >  0, then, in order to have {B'—A ')C /A  <  
0, we need cr >  1. From the formal expression of b*, we know that :
{ ( 6 * > 0 ) A ( a > , g ) }  =#>
( V l - S L .  -  >  1,
Thus, we have
(A' 1 (1 -
A  cr — I { a  — /?)(! — a) (1 — — (a  — /3)(1 — S)
a  1
^ cr — 1 (a — ( I ) [ \  — a)
But
cr 1 cr 4
> ------------   —  >  4.
a  — I {a — /3){l — a)  cr — 1 (1 —
As a consequence, A >  0 and Hopf bifurcations cannot occur. The fact that
negative bubbles can give fluctuations in the context of self-sustaining growth
is illustrated by numerical examples given below. □
We have seen above, in the technical lemma, that Hopf bifurcations al­
ways imply an externality parameter // strictly larger than 0.5 in the case of
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a more capital intensive investment good sector, and that (a  >  (5) did not 
seem to imply any general condition for u. An interesting question is whether 
the additional requirement of growth (A* > 1 )  imposes stronger restrictions 
on the parameters. The answer is no :
P r o p o s it io n  : In our framework, if the investment good sector is the 
more capital intensive, then Hopf bifurcations in the context of growth re­
quire, in the presence of positive as well as in the presence of negative bub­
bles, increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level in the consumption  
good sector. If the consumption good sector is the more capital intensive,  
Hopf bifurcations can occur even if no spillover operates in the consumption  
good sector, and it is even possible, but only with negative bubbles, to obtain 
endogenous growth with endogenous f luctuations when constant returns to 
scale operate in the consumption good sector.
Proof:  Let us consider first the case a < /3. \f we take a =  0.01, /? =  0.95, 
6 =  0.74, (j =  0.01 and i/ =  0.7, then a  u <  1, A* >  1,6* > 0  and there 
exists a 0  such that the conditions for a Hopf bifurcation are met. Notice 
that, in this case, the initial condition resulting from the equalisation of 
D e t {J )  to one gives i/ >  0.515. The lower bound 0.5 seems therefore rather 
correct. Consider now the case a  >  /3. We want to give examples of Hopf 
bifurcations in the context of self-sustaining growth and absence of spillovers 
in the consumption good sector. Let us take I =  I, a  =  0.9, (3 =  0.1, 
8 =  0.71, (j =  5 and u =  0. Then A* > 1 and 6* <  0 and it is easy to check
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that there exist a 0  such that a Hopf bifurcation occurs. □
4 N e c e s s a r y  S e lf-F u lf il l in g  B e l ie f s
This short section deals with the following problem : can there exist a 
world with agents characterised by rational expectations, where the ratio­
nally unfounded, but self-fulfilling belief in the realisation of some event is 
necessary ? In other words, can there exist an economy under rational ex­
pectations with no equilibrium path in the absence of bubbles or sunspots, 
but exhibiting bubble or sunspot equilibria ? The traditional answer to this 
is “no”, since standard economic theory defines the notion of ‘fundamental’ 
equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in the absence of any bubble or sunspot, and 
thus implicitly defends the point of view that an economy either exhibits 
no equilibrium path or admits a fundamental equilibrium and perhaps, for 
instance in the OLG framework, some other, ‘odd’ equilibrium paths with  
bubbles or sunspots due to shocks on beliefs. But the traditional point of 
view simply results from the abusive use of linear models in the past. As a 
matter of fact, non-linearities allow far more complex situations to arise as 
we shall see here.
An interesting paper on the existence of economies with sunspot equilib­
ria and no non-sunspot equilibrium has been written by T ito Pietra [27]. The 
author shows, in the context of a pure endowment economy where intertem­
poral transactions and transactions across states of nature between a finite
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set of agents take place through trade in assets, that there are economies for 
which there are no equilibria if there is no extrinsic uncertainty, while there 
are sunspot equilibria. Pietra gives two examples : the first one concerns an 
economy where non-existence of equilibria in the economy without sunspots 
is due to the collapse of rank of the return matrix ; the second one is an 
economy with non-convex preferences for one consumer.
Let us consider our model : there is a large, or even not finite, set of 
agents, all identical, and production of two goods can take place. At the 
private level, the model is neo-classical, there is no externality operating on 
the utilities, but there are spillovers of Romer type at the aggregate level 
in the production of the goods. In this framework, it is possible to exhibit 
economies with no ‘fundamental’ equilibrium path but with equilibria in the 
presence of bubbles. This can occur with positive or with negative bubbles, 
depending of course on the parameters of the economy.
P r o p o s it io n  : There exist economies with production where the only 
possible equilibrium outcomes are equilibria with bubbles. The economy ex­
hibited here is such that the result is due to a non-convexity, at the aggregate 
level, in the production of the investment good.
Proof : The role of the externality in the investment good sector is estab­
lished by the following consideration : if no externality operates at all in the 
investment good sector, then there always exist a stationary state {k*,u>*) if
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the investment good sector is more capital intensive (o: <  /9), and the dy­
namics are therefore defined, at least in a neighbourhood of the steady state, 
in this case. Existence of a steady state is established as follows ;
^ =  0 
6k* = I
e [ i  -  < 5  +
au) - 1
a — b 
1 k
If we write Z* =  uj*/k*^ then we have :
e [ i  -<5 +
S{/S -  a )
(1 — a )  — olZ* 
Since a  <  ^, we have :
0 ( 1 — — k’
(1 — O') — aZ*
e[ { l - 6) a +  / 3 ] Z * - ( l  -  a)
1 — a
<
1 — O '
(1 — 6 )a  j3 a  
The two curves obviously intersect in the case 0 < cr <  1 . In the case 
cr >  1, existence of a solution Z* is guaranteed by the fact that cr >  1 => 
cr/(cr — 1) >  1 and lima;_+oo =  Too. Thus, Z*, and therefore k* and
LÜ* always exist in the absence of spillovers in the investment good sector.
We have to consider the dynamics of the bubbleless economy. Simply 
writing 6< =  0 in the dynamic equations of the previous section, we get the 
following degenerate system :







(1 -  5) + ’ 
$ (Z )  = 0 1 /(1 -» ) . 2"*'
where
+  (1 _  ^ )zi-H
p — a
I0b^ -^ Z -  + (1 -S)Z^-A
m' =(1 — Q.)m =  (1 — a) — (1 — /?)(a +  u)
n = (1  — a)n  =  [a u) —  -------
1 — ( 7
p '  =(1  —  a ) p  =
< 7
1 — a
We want to give here an example where the equations above show that the 
economy does not exhibit any dynamic in the absence of bubbles, but does 
so if a bubble appears near enough to the steady state value determined by 
the parameters of the economy. Let us take the following numerical values 
used above to establish the possibility of endogenous growth with endoge­
nous fluctuations resulting from the existence of a positive bubble : /  =  1, 
a  =  0.1, =  0.7, (7 =  0.5, 8 =  0.38 and a  -{- i/ =  b. The condition ^ > 0
implies <  (1 — a ) / »  =  9, and et — kt+\ >  0 implies Zt >  2.5877. To
obtain a Hopf bifurcation, we need 0  % 0.9201. W ith these values, we get : 
( ( ^ “ )^ o 0)^ >  0, on the interval [%,9], and o 0 (9)  % 2.0188 <  Z_ =>
VZ E [Z, 9], ( 0 “ )^ o 0 ( Z )  <  Z. Therefore, the dynamics are not defined in 
the absence of bubbles. □
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C o n c lu s io n
In a context of inelastic labour supply, without requiring savings to be 
non monotone in the interest rate or the production to exhibit complemen­
tarity or not too much substitutability, but with standard CRRA utility and 
production with perfect substitutability between inputs, we showed that, in 
the absence of any intrinsic uncertainty, bubbles or sunspots, self-sustaining 
growth with cyclic or even chaotic trajectories of the growth rate is possible 
in the framework of overlapping generations. For this, we needed external­
ities à Romer in the two production sectors, and a necessarily strong one 
in the consumption good sector. Boldrin and Rustichini [8] exhibited, in 
the framework of infinitely lived agents, an example of endogenous growth 
with chaotic growth rate in the case of a linear utility function ; they too  
required a strong externality in the consumption good sector. But we showed 
that observable chaos cannot be established in their model under the (in the 
ILA framework) standard assumption on capital depreciation, and that even 
the proof of the existence of cycles or topological chaos requires a very high 
rate of capital depreciation. Furthermore, we showed that in the presence 
of bubbles, we can have endogenous growth with a fluctuating growth rate 
with a weaker, and in the case of negative bubbles, even with a zero exter­
nality in the consumption good sector. Endogenous growth with endogenous 
fluctuations generated by positive bubbles through Hopf bifurcations can be 
obtained, in our framework, only if the investment good sector is the more 
capital intensive.
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We also established the existence of economies with no non-bubbly equi­
librium but with equilibria in the presence of a bubble, a result which makes 
us reflect on the term ‘fundamental’ used traditionally to qualify equilibria 
in economies without intrinsic shocks, bubbles or sunspots. Furthermore, we 
proved in Appendix C that with the same type of utility and production func­
tions the assumption of multiple sectors is crucial : in a one-sector economy 
with CRRA one-period utility and production function of Cobb-Douglas type 
with externality à la Romer [30], Hopf bifurcations can be generated by nei­
ther positive nor negative bubbles. In one-sector economies, non neo-classical 
assumptions at the private level seem to be necessary to obtain endogenous 
cycles, even in the presence of bubbles. Notice also that in the one-sector 
economy with externalities à la Romer, in the absence of exogenous shocks, 
bubbles or sunspots, there always exists a unique balanced growth path on 
which the economy starts immediately, whatever is the initial capital stock, 
whereas in the case of the two-sector economy with externalities, the dynamic 
is not necessarily defined, a balanced growth path does not necessarily exist, 
is not necessarily unique, can be stable or unstable etc.
It would have been nice to characterize the stability properties of the 
closed orbits generated by the Hopf bifurcations. To achieve this, it is neces­
sary to determine whether a given bifurcation is supercritical or subcritical : 
a supercritical Hopf bifurcation gives the existence of attractive, a subcritical 
only existence of unstable closed orbits. The latter seems clearly less exhil- 
erating since non-stability means zero probability to have an economy on or
203
remaining close to such an orbit^'*. But studies of the problem of learning 
perfect foresight equilibria have shown (see Fuchs [16] or Grandmont and 
Laroque [22]) that the notion of stability of an equilibrium trajectory can be 
entirely reversed under learning : in Grandmont’s model, for instance, the 
only equilibrium trajectory that is stable under a certain learning process is 
an unstable equilibrium orbit. Therefore, unstability of a given orbit does 
not necessarily imply it ’s economic insignificance. This is a nice excuse for 
avoiding the utmost tedious calculus necessary to determine the nature of 
a given Hopf bifurcation. The nevertheless interested reader may find the 
methodology in Grandmont [2 1 ].
A P P E N D I X  A  :
F u n d a m e n t a l  E q u i l ib r ia ,  C a s e  S
The equations giving the dynamics of (%(, AJ in the case 0 <  6  <  1  can 
be found in section 4. We suppose here a  < (5 \ the other case is similar. 
Let us consider a parameter configuration =  (ao, cro),(Go, ^o),  ^ =  1
such that the map has a negative Schwarzian derivative, satisfies
T|o^(0 o a n d  thus exhibits observable chaos. Arguments 
invoking the functional form and regularity insure that, at least for 8 close 
to one, the map has a negative Schwarzian derivative at every non
critical point (the parameters 0  and I  are completely neutral with regard 
to the Schwarzian derivative). The conditions it >  0 and >  0
'A  c u r v e  has  z er o  L e h e s g i ie - m e a s u r e  in IR . ...
204
yield Z t  G [Z_(g, i ) , s^ Z ^ q j ) ^ s ] ,  where %(e,/),g >  1 /ac  and %(ej),g >  1 / a  are C°° 
functions of S (implicit function theorem) such that :
1 +   1 +
/jm  ^(0,/),« =  -  , £ m  Z,e,j),« =  -  •
It is ea^y to see that, by continuity, for 6 close enough to one, it is possible 
to choose ( Q s i h )  such that :
n.(os.win < zi,
where we have omissed to indicate the dependence in ( 0 ,  / )  etc.
A P P E N D I X  B  :
P r o o f  o f  t h e  L e m m a ,  a n d  E x a m p l e s
Proof  : First of all, notice that cr =  0 implies T r { J )  =  1 -f D et{J).  
Therefore, a linear utility rules out any possibility of Hopf bifurcations. Let 
us assume cr >  0. The determinant of J  is given by :
D e t [J )  —
-1
( » - . )  +  0  -  « ( . +  ^  
X ( / i  +  ( 1  -  / î ) ( l  +  ~ )  ,  _




We must distinguish the two cases a  <  j5 and o: >  /?.
1. Case (a  <  /?). Under this assumption, B' — A  and R  are all 
positive. If we suppose <t >  1, then A  • D et{J)  <  /3 — a ,  with A >  /3 — a,  
which implies D et{J )  <  1 and excludes the possibility of Hopf bifurcations. 
Therefore, 0 <  (7 <  1, which implies a  +  /3 <  I since to allow A  <  0, we must 
have C <  0. Notice that all this does not imply anything general for A* or 
b \
If we return to the equation '‘D e t (J )  =  1’, we see that necessarily :
which imposes, for given (a , cr), a lower bound to the externality parameter 
ly. Let us try to find the best general lower bound for u. Consider the 
following function :
1 A (3 — a
This function is strictly increasing since
do' I A P — a
Furthermore, we know that a  A /3 <  1. Therefore, if ^ <  1 — then
which implies
Ff3 {a) <  lim Fp(a) =  /?,
1 _ 1 
2-
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If ^  >  1 — /?, then
Fp{a)  <  F(j{l -  /?) =  2 -  ^
and thus
since here 0.5 <  ^ < 1 .
2. Case (a  >  /?). Let us denote
1 - / 3  
a  1 - 6  +  //3<’a>-<5
We distinguish two subcases :
2,1. 5  >  0. This implies, i f / < l  +  and therefore, as is easy to
check. A* <  1, but in the case of a large / ,  we can have A* >  1. The sign of h* 
is indeterminate, but we know from a proof given in the paper that positive 
bubbles cannot give Hopf bifurcations, therefore they are of no interest for 
us here. We have /I >  0, and therefore must have a >  I. But A >  0 implies
/ 1 \ I3^a^~^
(i + ^
and thus /? <  —(1 — a) <  0. If we now look at the equation D et{J )  =  1 
which previously yielded a lower bound for the parameter f/, we realise that
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now noth ing  general can be deduced concerning v  :
<  1
P
imposes simply <  0 ^ / ( 1 + 0 :), but we see that if  ^=  1, a  —> 1“ and /? 0+,
then there results no constraint on u.
2.2. 5  <  0. Then 6* <  0, but nothing can be said concerning A*. As 
numerical examples will establish, we can have A >  0, which implies 0 <  
a  <  \ and /? <  0, but also A <  0, which implies a >  \ but does not give the 
sign of R.  In this latter case, the condition D et{J)  =  1 does not impose a 
general condition on f/, but in the first case (A >  0), it is easy to check that 
the externality must be strictly positive :
ly >  — ^ ------------------
i  — cr
where Fp{ct) has been defined previously. Notice that now Fp is decreasing 
in a  since a  >  (3. Thus we know that necessarily
Furthermore, the condition S' <  0 implies a  >  (1 — /3)I{1 +/?) .  Therefore, if
0 <  /? <  -  1 ,
1 - ^ x  /3^  + 4 / 3 - 1e  I \  ^  J7 ( '■ ^  - r ‘i p  -  ^
) -  '’ ( 1  +  ^ )  ^ ( i + / 5 ) ( 3  +  ^2 ) ’
and we have
S " P  o ) =  r > (  V 2  -  1) 0.446.
]o,\/2 -U ' 1 + / 3 '/ 3 € ] 0 , \ / —  1
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and if \/2  — 1 <  ^  <  1,
We conclude therefore only to z/ >  0, and u >  0.554 if /? <  \ /2  — 1 0.414. □
It is easy to verify that all the situations described here can occur, pa­
rameter configurations illustrating this statement can be found in the paper 
when we prove the proposition on the role of the externality z/, two cases 
remaining to be illustrated here. To obtain 5  <  0, .4 <  0 and i? >  0, take 
/  =  1, q: =  0.9, /? — 0.1, 8 =  0.05, <7 =  1.3215 and z/ =  0. A* >  1 and b* <  0 
and an adequate 0  exists. If we want 5  <  0 and A >  0, then from what 
precedes, we know that necessarily <  0 and i/ >  1 — 0.5 =  0.5 : take 7 = 1 ,  
a  =  0.51, /3 =  0.5, 8 =  0.49 and a  =  0.1. Then A* >  1 and b* <  0. If we take 
z/ small, but larger than the lower bound (1/99 +  1/0.9 —0.51 ~  0.612), then  
the conditions for the Hopf bifurcations can be met.
A P P E N D I X  C :
T h e  O n e - S e c t o r  M o d e l .  A  N e g a t i v e  R e s u l t
We consider the standard one-sector Diamond OLG model augmented 
by an externality of Romer [29]-type in the production of the consumption 
good, and look at the problem of the possibility of Hopf bifurcations in the 
dynamic system  when a bubble exists in the economy. We keep notations 
similar to those used in our two-sector model (in particular, a  denotes the
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capital intensity in the consumption good sector^®, and u the externality pa­
rameter).
The equations giving the dynamics of the economy are :
(2) g ,+ i =  [ ! - «  +
If o: +  i/ =  1, then the two-state system collapses into one characteristic 
dynamic equation :
_  ( 1 - 6 - 1 -  a)6(
Ot +  l  —
0 7 ( 1  +  0 ' ) - 6 , ’
where =  Bt/k t  is the reduced bubble and 0 '  =  0^/^[l — 6 +  The
steady state is given by :
If we write =  ^(6(), it is easy to verify that ^  is always strictly increasing 
and convex. The slope at the stationary state b* is :
^ ( ^ . )  ^  1 0 '
db 1 —6 +  0 1  +  0 '
Therefore, if the parameters of the economy are such that the steady state  
value of the bubble is positive, then '^'(6*) >  1 and the steady state is unsta­
ble. If b* <  0, then ^'(6*) <  1 and the steady state is stable. In both cases, 
local cycles are excluded, and global cycles are excluded because of the shape
^ ^N otice  t h a t ,  a g a in ,  w e  can  take  ( 7 = 1  w i t h o u t  a n y  loss  o f  g e n e r a l i ty .
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of th e  m apping ip.
Let us suppose a  -{■ u ^  I in the following. Under this assumption, 
a stationary state necessarily corresponds to a constant level of capital^® 






a + iy — l 1 — Q;
[ 1 +  Q i/f a
We employ the standard technique ; linearization around the steady state  
and study of the possibility of Hopf bifurcations by looking at the 
determinant and the trace of the dynamic’s Jacobi an. If we write :
Bt = B % l  +  et) 
kt =k*{l  +  rjt). 
we get :
[ 6 0 F / ( l  +  0 F ) ] ( l ^ ) ( a  +  r/)
1 -  (a  +   ^ -  1 ) ( 1^ )  ( l ^ ) « 2 0 i / ( i  +  0 i ) 2 ’
and
T r ( J )  =  1 +  D et (J )  — (o +  z/ — 1) —
16 . . .whereas a s tea d y  s ta te  corresponds to  a con stan t  growth rate o f  cap ita l if  a +  u =  1.
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Necessary conditions for a Hopf bifurcation are, as usual :
Det(^J) =  -|-1
and
A  =  T r { J Y  - 4 < 0 .
The first condition implies that necessarily v4 >  0, the second condition gives
0 < ( a  +  i/ — ! ) •  — < 4 .
A
Let us show now that Hopf bifurcations can occur neither with positive nor 
with negative bubbles in this one-sector model :
Notice that B* =  k* x B.  As a consequence, to obtain a Hopf bifurcation 
with {B* > 0 < = > 5 > 0 } ,  we must have a  -f i/ — 1 >  0. Suppose B* >  0. 
Then, since A >  0, we have Det(J )  >  (a  -j- p )IA >  1/A. Now, if cr is smaller 
than or equal to one, A <  1 and thus D et{J)  > 1 .  If cr is strictly larger than 
one, then we have, if we write :
60^/^ 1 — a
l d D e t { J ) { U ) \  _
C =  sign I  g j j  j  =  sign
The sign is indeterminate if B* >  0. But
C >  0 => Det{J)  > Det{J)a+i,=i =  1 +  B  > 1,
(7 1 -k
(  <  0 => Det{J) >  l im Det{J) =  -------  p------ >  1.
a - f- i /^ + o o  cr — 1 6
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Therefore, in the presence of a positive bubble, Hopf bifurcations are ex­
cluded.
The case <C 0 is nearly symmetric : necessarily B  <  0 and a  u <  1. 
But then we have D et{J )  <  1 if cr <  1, and under the assumption of a  larger 
than one, we get U < I and (  )> 0, where U and (" are defined as previously. 
Indeed, the sign is clearly positive since B  <  0 and
( 7 — 1  6
^  cr 1 +  0 ' / '  ^  ■
Therefore, D et(J )  <  Det{J)a+u=i  =  1 +  B  <  1, and we can again conclude 
to the impossibility of Hopf bifurcations.
We conclude to the fact that the one-sector model with CRRA utility 
and Cobb-Douglas production function with Romer externality cannot give 
balanced growth with local or global cycles generated by bubbles (case =  
1), and cannot give local cycles of the capital stock through Hopf bifurcations 
generated by bubbles (case a  -{■ ly ^  1). □
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A  C R ITIC A L  N O T E  O N  
“G R O W T H  A N D  IN D E T E R M IN A C Y  IN  D Y N A M IC  
M O DELS W IT H  E X T E R N A L IT IE S ”
A N D  O N
“A  C H A O TIC  M A P  A R ISIN G  IN  T H E  
T H E O R Y  OF E N D O G E N O U S  G R O W T H ”
By Sorb as von Cœster^
A b s tr a c t
In a recently published paper, Boldrin and Rustichini present a two-sector 
infinitely lived agents model with production externalities and, invoking results 
exposed in a paper written by Boldrin and Persico, claim that their model can 
exhibit endogenous fiuctuations in the growth rate under the fo rm  o f chaotic 
trajectories. Unfortunately, Boldrin and Persico are m istaken in  their conclu­
sions, fo r  the dynamics they propose do not correspond to the optimal path. We 
describe here qualitatively the possible dynamics and show why it seems difficult 
to conclude to chaos.
Keywords : Topological, ergodic and turbulent chaos.
^ F in a n c ia l s u p p o r t  in th e  fo rm  o f  a  s c h o la r sh ip  E c o le  p o ly te c h n iq u e /M R T  a n d  a  g r a n t  
fr o m  F o n d a tio n  d e  l ’E c o le  p o ly te c h n iq u e  is m o s t  g r a te fu lly  a c k n o w le d g e d . I a m  in d e b te d  
t o  C a b r ie lle  D e m a n g e , D o u g la s  G a le , K u r t  K la p p h o lz , A d s  a  R o e ll a n d  to  m y  r eferees G ille s  
C h e m la , I s a b e lle  D u a u lt ,  S u z a n n e  G a rc ia , M arc  H en ry  a n d  M a x  H o lla n d  for th e ir  h e lp fu l  
c o m m e n ts .  A n y  r e m a in in g  errors a re, o f  c o u r se , m in e .
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I n tr o d u c t io n
In section 3.2 of their paper, Boldrin and Rustichini (1994) present a 
two-sector one capital good ILA model and, refering to some research work 
undertaken by Boldrin and Persico (1993), claim for it the possibility of 
chaos. Both papers unfortunately contain several errors, some minor, others 
apparently not. We take here leave to address several critiques to the three 
authors. To enable non specialists to understand the main critique, we shall 
briefly expose, in section 1, the different notions of chaos and their most im­
portant characteristics ; our argument to criticize the claim of chaos will then 
be developed in section 2. The conclusion will allude to two minor points of 
m ethodology concerning Boldrin and Rustichini’s paper and to a secondary, 
but highly incorrect statement made by Boldrin and Persico.
1. Som e D efin itions and Standard R esu lts
In the literature on erratic dynamics, we can find several notions of chaos : 
topological^ ergodic and turbulent chaos. Mathematicians do not accept the 
notion of topological chaos, for it is too weak and does not allow nice con­
clusions. Chaos in the ergodic sense has several interesting implications, but 
the most important is observability oî erratic trajectories. Finally, turbulent 
chaos is chaos in its strict mathematical acceptance ; it is a very strong no­
tion with rather spectacular implications. In this section, we shall present 
the definitions of these notions and briefly discuss the features of the differ­
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ent types of chaos. We consider here continuous functions which map a real 
closed interval J  =  [a, b] into itself.
1 .1 .  T o p o lo g i c a l  C h a o s
Its abstract definition is :
D e f i n i t i o n  : H  : J  J  exhibits topological chaos if :
•  "iN, such that =  X] .^
• 3 S  C J  non denumerable and >  0 such that : V(z, %/) G , x ^  y 
limsup„^+oo >  e and liminf„.^+oo ~  ^ " ( 2/ ) I =  0.
An intuitive interpretation is that the orbits of x and y become infinitely 
close an infinite number of times and again separate. Topological chaos is, in 
general, established by invoking Li and Yorke’s (1975) theorem which states 
that if a unimodal map exhibits a cycle of period three, then there exists a non 
empty set S  of initial conditions whose orbits are chaotic in the topological 
sense. A unimodal map is a continuous function H  from J  into J  for which 
there exists T* G]«, 6[ such that II is strictly increasing for x < x* and strictly 
decreasing for x > x* (i.e. H is ’hump-shaped’). Notice that the existence 
of a period three cycle has another very strong consequence : cycles of every 
imaginable period can exist. Indeed, Sarkovskii’s (1964) theorem says that 
for any continuous map from an interval J  into itself, if a cycle of order 
k exists, then there exists a cycle of period k' for every k >- k \  where the 
ordering is defined as follows : 3 x 5 > - 7 > - - ' X 2 3 x 2 5 > - - ' > - 2 " ^ 3 ) > -
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2"--5>------ )----------------------4 2 X 1.
The problem with the notion of topological chaos is that the Lebesgue- 
measure of the subset S  may well be equal to zero, and chaos therefore 
unobservable : this is the case, for instance, for the logistic map defined 
by : Xij^i =  - X ( ) ,  when $  =  3.828427 or 0  =  3.839, where almost all
initial conditions lead asymptotically to a period three cycle. The problem 
thus is to find conditions that ensure m[ S)  >  0.
1 .2 .  E r g o d ic  C h a o s
D e f i n i t i o n  : H exhibits ergodic chaos if :
• m{ S)  >  0.
•  asymptotically, the sequence approximates an ergodic and absolutely 
continuous distribution which is invariant under H and which summarises  
the limiting statistical properties of the (determinist ic)  chaotic trajectories.
This is a far more attractive notion than topological chaos. For in­
stance, in the case of the logistic map F$, when 0  =  4, the set S  is of 
full measure and the absolutely continuous ergodic invariant distribution is 
f { x )  =  1 / — .t ) ) .  Ergodic chaos is observable ; if we choose at ran­
dom an initial condition xq, there is a positive probability of generating a 
chaotic trajectory. To establish the existence of an invariant, ergodic and ab­
solutely continuous distribution, the standard method is to invoke Singer’s 
(1978) theorem which states that the number of stable orbits of an arbitrary
map H  with negative Schwarzian derivative is bounded above by the
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number of its critical points. The Schwarzian derivative of a function H  is :
2
at a non-critical point U . The Schwarzian derivative is therefore negative 
if and only if is convex on each interval of monotonicity of / f ,  and
sufficient (but not necessary) conditions are : \ H ' \ ot log \H'\ convex on each 
of these intervals. If the Schwarzian derivative is not negative on the whole 
interval, then we cannot rule out little waves for H  or its itératives, the 
attractor is not necessarily unique and it is often very difficult, if not impos­
sible, to establish strong results.
Let us now assume the following :
1. H  \s unimodal and
2. H \ x )  =  0 => ar =  X * ^
3. H{x)  >  T if a; <  æ* and H'(a) >  1 if H(a)  =  a,
4. <  0,
5. 5 / /  <  0 on the whole interval J.
Under these assumptions, the orbit of the sole critical point is fully in­
formative of the dynamics defined hy H : if there exists a stable cycle, then 
it attracts the critical point ; thus, if the trajectory of the critical point is 
unstable, then there does not exist any stable cycle and the map exhibits 
ergodic chaos (see, for instance, Grandmont (1988)). In the case of the map
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r 3 .8 3 9 , for instance, there exists one stable cycle, of period three, which at­
tracts very quickly the critical point, and the map thus exhibits an infinity 
of unobservable cycles ; the map P4  admits cycles of all possible periods, but 
none of them is observable since the set of initial conditions giving chaos is 
of full measure ! Ergodic chaos exists for 0  =  4 because r ^ (l/2 )  =  0 and 
the origin is an unstable fixed point, and thus the critical point 1 / 2  has an 
unstable orbit.
1 .3 . T u rb u len t C h a o s
This notion corresponds to what most mathematicians consider as the 
true chaos ; if a map exhibits turbulent chaos, not only are there erratic 
orbits but there exists strong sensitivity on initial conditions. We adopt here 
the definition given in Devaney (1987), which finds its inspiration in Guck- 
enheimer (1979). Let 7 be a set.
D e f in it io n  : 77 : 7 —> 7 said to he topologically transitive if for
any pair of open subsets U and V  of I , there exists k >  0 such that
7 7 ^ (7 /)n y  0.
Intuitively, a topologically transitive map has points which eventually 
move under iteration from one arbitrary small neighbourhood to any other. 
Therefore, the dynamical system cannot be decomposed into two disjoint 
open sets which are invariant under the map. The existence of a dense orbit 
thus implies topological transitivity.
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D e f i n i t i o n  i H  : I  I  has sensitive dependence on initial conditions 
if : 3e >  0 such that, Va: G I , VW neighbourhood of x, 3y G N  and n >  0 
such that \H'^{x) — H^{y)\  >  t.
Notice that the existence of a stable cycle is incompatible with sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions. In the case of an aperiodic, i.e. without 
any stable cycle, and sensitive map, to be able to describe, even approxi­
mately, a trajectory, it is not at all sufficient to know the law of motion of 
the dynamic system and to have a proxy of the initial state ; this could lead 
to believe that computer simulations do not make any sense in an area where 
the characteristic dynamics exhibit chaos but, fortunately, the situation is 
not as desperate as one might believe at first glance^.
D e f i n i t i o n  : H exhibits turbulent chaos on the set I  if :
• H  has sensi tive dependence on initial conditions,
•  H is topologically transitive,
• periodic points are dense in I.
Unpredictability, indecomposability and an element of regularity thus 
characterise a map which is chaotic in the turbulent sense. The fact that 
periodic points are dense in /  does not, of course, imply anything on the 
measure of the subset these points constitute in I : consider Q fl [0,1], for
“W e invoke here th e  so -ca lled  ‘P u r su it’-lem m a.
227
instance ; this is a dense subset of [0,1] which has a zero Lebesgue mea­
sure. And indeed here, for a map exhibiting turbulent chaos, there exists a 
set of initial conditions, with positive Lebesgue measure defined on / ,  such 
that any trajectory starting from it looks ‘chaotic’ in the sense that its spec­
trum closely resembles the spectrum of a random noise. Other definitions 
are possible : Ruelle (1979), for instance, has given a definition involving the 
so-called Lyapounov exponent ; he looks for maps with an absolutely invari­
ant measure for which ( 1 /n )  log |D / ” | tends to a strictly positive constant 
as n —> -foo almost surely with respect to the invariant measure. For the 
logistic map P4 , /  =  J  =  [0,1] and L =  ln(2) >  0. Notice that turbulent 
chaos is implied neither by topological nor by ergodic chaos.
2. B oldrin  and R iistic liin i’s M odel
We invite the reader to consult Boldrin and Rustichini (1994). We only 
summarise here the assumptions and results exposed by these authors in 
section 3.2. of their paper. Time is discrete. The economy is composed of a 
continuum of identical infinitely lived agents, indexed by z G [0, Ij. There are 
two goods in the economy, one homogeneous perishable consumption good  
and one homogeneous investment good. Both production sectors can combine 
two factors, capital and labour, the latter being provided inelastically. There 
exists only one type of capital and one type of labour which can be costlessly 
allocated between sectors. Labour supply is normalised to one and there 
is full employment. The agents’ coefficient of time-preference is denoted by 
6 g]0, 1 [, their one-period utility is assumed to be linear and the production
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technologies of the consumption and the investment good are respectively ;
It = 6 x 2 ,
a  G]0, 1 [ and 7/ E JR+, being the level of capital at time t in sector z, kt the 
aggregate level of capital at time t (equilibrium implies kt =  Xt =  Xi t^ +  a;2 ,t). 
Capital depreciates at rate /z >  0  (in an economy with production of an 
investment good, we must suppose // >  0 , for otherwise the capital stock 
necessarily increases at each date) per period.
W ith these assumptions, Boldrin and Rustichini come to the conclusion 
that the dynamics of Xt =  Xt+i jxt  are given by :
A,+i =  r(A,) =  0  -  (5 e ) ' /< '-“ )Af(0 -  A,), (3.10)
where 0  =  6  +  ( 1  — //) >  1 is necessary to make persistent growth possible, 
and (3 =  (a  +  T/ — 1 ) / ( 1  — a ). This is an extremely nice and rich dynamic. 
The problem is that (3.9), from which (3.10) is derived, does not corre­
spond to the optimisation problem we have to consider here, for one con­
straint, ( 1  — fi)xt <  Xt+i  ^ implied by the capital accumulation equation, has 
been om itted. The correct optimisation problem, under the assumption of a 
CRRA utility with coefficient of intertemporal substitution a , is;
+ 00
m a x ^ 6 ' ( l - a )   ^ -  axt+i)"")
<=0
(1 -  fl)Xt <  Xt+I <  Qxt
229
Af+1 =  <
This is the optimisation problem considered by Boldrin and Persico (1993). 
Unfortunately, Boldrin and Persico, while writing down their first order con­
dition ( EE) ,  completely forget the constraints and the use of Lagrange mul­
tipliers, and thus propose a dynamic which is not the solution of the here 
considered program, unless assuming that capital depreciates entirely in each 
period, a very unappealing assumption in the ILA framework where periods 
are supposed to be short. Indeed, they propose the following first order 
difference equation (2.2) ;
’ r(A,) = e - ( 6 0 ) ' / ( ' - “<'-’>)Af'(0-A,) if r ( A , ) > ( l - ^ ) ,
(1 — fi) otherwise, 
where j3‘ =  {{a t/)(1 — a) — 1)/(1  — a ( l  — <%)). Of course =  1 — // if
^  f — and r(A() <  1 — (f, but the intuitively obvious thing is that here, 
because of the presence of the floor value (1 — //), the dynamics cannot be 
written under the classical form A^ +i =  ^(A(). Indeed, let us suppose that 
(1 — l^) is strictly smaller than A]. This implies r ( l  — ^) >  1 — /z. If we 
believed in (2.2), then we would think that (1 —/z) can be mapped onto only 
one possible point, namely t ( 1  — /^), but this would be highly surprising : 
imagine, for instance, that A< >  1 —/z and t(Aj) is very small compared to 
1 — /z ; intuitively, agents would like to disinvest actively, but here, unlike 
in standard one-sector models, investment is irreversible, therefore there can 
only exist passive disinvestment under the form of waiting until enough cap­
ital has vanished through obsolescence, and thus Xt+i will remain equal to 
(1 —/z) for more than a period. When the dynamics start again, the optimal 
choice obviously must take into account the history of capital accumulation,
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in the sense that (1 — /z) will be mapped onto a point which depends on 
Xf  Therefore the dynamics cannot be written under the form 
which allows standard cycle or chaos detection. This intuition is confirmed 
by the very basic calculus exposed in the appendix.
Boldrin and Persico thus expose a very nice and thorough study of the 
case =  1, but their treatment of the more natural case 0 <  ^ <  1 is 
incorrect. In order to give a clear understanding of what can be concluded 
to, we shall proceed step by step, often invoking results which can be found 
in Boldrin and Persico (1993), but which we deem prudent to recall here. 
The fact that we take <7 =  0 is absolutely innocuous since the unconstrained 
dynamics (2.2) remain of the same type as (3.10) and it is easy to check that 
the results established in the appendix hold for every < 7  <  1.
We have to distinguish the two cases A2 <  1 — // and A2 >  1 — //. The 
first case is simpler for there cannot exist orbits lying in ]1 — /f, 0 [  (remem­
ber that the fixed point Ai =  0  is always unstable under the assumption of 
existence of two fixed points, and is furthermore ruled out as an equilibrium  
by the transversality condition), and there exist only two possible types of 
trajectories. As we said previously, the results invoked here are established 
in the appendix.
Thus, let us assume A2 <  1 — fi. We then have r ( l  — fi) <  1 — fi. For 
every admissible initial condition Aq (G [1 — // ,0 [ ) ,  there exists an infinite 
sequence (fj, ij >  0, such that Xt =  1 — V/ G  ^ T Zj], and
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\ t  G]1 — /^ ,0[ otherwise (in the very special case A2 =  1 — //, one of the ij 
may well be infinite, i.e. the ‘growth’ rate remains constant and equal to 
(1 — /i) after some finite date ; otherwise, all ij are obviously finite). As 
we said previously, there exist periods where the optimal choice leads agents 
to ‘disinvest passively’. In periods where this happens, the ‘growth’ rate is 
equal to 1 — //. When investment starts again, the optimal choice takes into 
account the capital accumulation preceding the investment stop ; the point 
onto which (1 — //) is mapped depends on the orbit described by the growth 
rate before taking the value {1 — fi). It seems hardly possible to determine 
whether cycles or erratic trajectories are possible or not.
Let us suppose now that 1 — ^ <  Ag. We know that ( 3 . 1 0 )  holds for 
Xt G [1 —//,0] such that r(A<) >  (1 —fi). Considering the map r, we see that 
there may well exist r-orbits remaining in [1 — //, 0 ], especially when (1 — fi) 
is small. From a purely theoretical point of view, we can thus have cycles and 
topological chaos. Notice however that to be able to ascertain the existence 
of cycles or of topological chaos, we need I — <  X2 and r(A*) small enough,
and for topological chaos the additional condition r(A*) > ( ! —//) must also 
hold ; all this has a bad consequence : classical parameter values do not fulfill 
all the requirements imposed by these conditions. Thus, unless assuming a 
very important capital depreciation per period, it is not even possible to de­
duce the possibility of cycles or topological chaos in the true dynamics from 
their existence in the r-dynamic. Furthermore, even if we take non appeal­
ing, but adequate parameter configurations, the claim of topological chaos
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is not especially exhilarating as the previous section has shown. It must be 
established that chaos can be observable, and we must therefore show that 
the set S  of initial conditions giving chaos can be of strictly positive mea­
sure. Our methodology is the following : we first consider the T - dynamics 
and show under which assumptions chaos can be shown to be observable. 
The fact that 0 is then an accumulation point of every chaotic trajectory 
implies that none of these chaotic orbits can lie in [ 1  — //, 0 ], even if ( 1  — /i) 
is very small. A first consequence of this is that the existence of observable 
chaos in the r-dynamics does not imply anything for the true dynamics.
Thus let us consider first the dynamics without the constraint Xt >  ( l —fi). 
By a simple change of variables, the family of maps Tp^ s,e can be transformed 
into the family defined by Xt+i =  where $  has the
following expression :
with /3 =  {a T])/{1 — a ) and Q =  b {I — /i). It is immediate to verify 
that for every fixed /?, the parameters of the economy can be chosen such 
that 0  describes the whole interval [0 , -f oo[. Some properties of the family 
can be derived very easily, others are more demanding. For every given 
/? >  0 , for 0  large enough, there exists a cycle of period three ; therefore 
topological chaos can occur. As we have seen in the previous section, this 
is not very satisfactory since stable cycles, perhaps of very long period and 
thus difficult to observe in a simulation, may exist and the set S  may well 
be of zero Lebesgue measure. Therefore, it is necessary to study the possi­
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bility of ergodic or turbulent chaos. For the family of maps considered here, 
establishing m{ S)  >  0  requires the following conditions :
I 3 > 1  and >  1, (*)
where X*  is the point at which the map reaches its maximum. The first 
condition is necessary to guarantee a negative Schwarzian derivative on the 
whole interval of definition and existence of at most one (weakly) stable cycle. 
Notice that if this condition holds, the classical flip bifurcation cascade occurs 
as $  increases from 0 to the value where a three cycle appears. As long as 
there does not exist any period three cycle, a standard result is that the 
cycle generated by the last flip bifurcation is stable (and it is the only stable 
cycle). In the case where a period three cycle exists and r^_$(X*) <  1, 
stability of some cycle, and thus zero measure of 5 , has been established for 
some values of but nothing general could be obtained until now. If we 
assume a negative Schwarzian derivative, then the second condition is needed 
to establish that the measure of S  is not equal to zero. We can distinguish 
two cases : F(%*) =  1 and F(%*) > 1 .
The first case is relatively simple : if F^,$(%*) =  1 , then the second 
iterative is equal to 0, which is an unstable fixed point. Since the here 
considered maps are and meet all the required assumptions, we can apply 
the same reasoning as in the case of =  Fj 4 and conclude to the existence 
of ergodic chaos, which implies a strictly positive Lebesgue measure of S.  It 
is even possible to show that the map is aperiodic and sensitive and exhibits 
turbulent chaos on [0,1]. Thus, the orbit of any point in S  is dense in [0,1].
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The second case is more exotic and more difficult to deal with, for the set 
of definition of the dynamic is no longer the whole interval [0 , 1 ], but a subset 
A which is a Cantor set, i.e. a fractal. A Cantor set is a set that is closed, to ­
tally disconnected (it does not contain any interval) and perfect (every point 
in it is an accumulation point). The definition set A thus has a zero Lebesgue 
measure in [0 , 1 ]. The map exhibits turbulent chaos on A, the set of initial 
conditions S  giving chaos has a strictly positive Cantor measure in A and the 
trajectory of any point in S  is dense in A. In the case of the logistic maps 
r  1 0 , we are in this situation if $  >  4, and the dynamics are even structurally 
stable at least for $  >  2-f-\/5  (see Devaney (1987)). Furthermore notice that 
(0 , 1 ) G A ,^ which implies that these are accumulation points of any chaotic 
trajectory. The fact that the definition set is a Cantor set is rather simple 
to establish in the case of the logistic map when $ > 2 4 -  y/E and uses the 
property of expansiveness of the map ; this property cannot, obviously, be 
invoked when $  g]4, 2 -f \/^] or in the case >  1 , and the proof is much more 
elaborate (see, for instance, Boldrin and Persico (1993), relying on a theorem  
proven by Nusse (1987)). It is clear that the case of a Cantor definition set 
constitutes a mathematical curiosum, without much economic significance.
Let us turn back now to the correct dynamics. We do not treat the case 
T(A*) <  0 which is similar to the case r(A*) =  0 except for the fact that the 
optimal choice has to be done such that A< always lies in the Cantor set A. 
The results exposed here rely on those established in the appendix. Since 
I — fl <  A2 , there can exist r-cycles which lie in [ 1 —/f , 0 ], especially when
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(1 — f i )  is small, and these are possible cycles in the correct dynamics. Notice 
however that the set of initial conditions giving chaos in the unconstrained 
dynamics is of full measure, which implies that r-cycles which do not lie in 
[1 — / i ,r ( l  — f i ) ]  are unobservable. Now, if the initial condition corresponds 
to chaos (this is almost sure), then there exists a finite date to at which 
agents decide not to invest. If in the r-dynamics =  1 — fi^  then for sure 
Afo =  I — f i  and Xto+i =  r ( l  — f i )  in the true dynamics. But when we have 
A^o_i >  1 — fi and r(A^g_i) <  1 — /f, then there exists a finite zq >  0 such 
that Afo =  . . .  =  A(^+,o =  1 -  f i  and Xto+io+i G]1 -  /z ,r ( l -  f i ) [  as is shown 
in the appendix. Thus, after a finite lapse of time, the trajectory a.s. lies 
in [1 — /z ,r ( l — f i ) ] .  There are two possibilities : A(Q+,Q+i can be on a r- 
orbit C  [1 — //, r ( l  — //)] or not. Remember that a random choice has a zero 
probability to be on a cycle, but Xto+io+i is predetermined and does not fall 
‘at random’ into the interval. If Afg+^ q+i is not on a cycle C  [1 —/ / ,r ( l  — f i ) ] ,  
then necessarily there exists a finite date ti at which r(A^) hits the lower 
boundary (1 — f i ) ,  and we have again the phenomenon described previously.
We can thus conclude to the following : either there exists a finite date 
after which the orbit is a T - cycle C [1 — / / , T ( 1  — / / ) ] ,  or there exists a finite 
date after which the orbit is a cycle which is not a r-cycle (because in the 
r-dynamics there exist dates at which r(A<) <  1 — fi), or the orbit is not 
cyclical and there exists an infinite sequence {tj , i j)j£i \f  such that Xt =  I — fi, 
Vf € [ t j , i j  4- Zj], and A< e]1 — /z ,r ( l — /z)[ otherwise for t >  to zq. Thus, 
the only thing we can say is that cycles may well exist, but to establish their 
existence (or, perhaps, the impossibility of their occurence) seems difficult,
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if not impossible because of the fact we mentioned previously for the case 
A2 <  1 — and which also holds here : the point onto which (1 — is 
mapped depends on the initial condition, and therefore standard cycle and 
chaos analysis, which considers classical first order difference equations, can­
not give answers to the questions we want to address here. The only thing 
we know for sure is that if we choose an initial condition at random, then  
the dynamics lie, with probability one, in [1 —// ,r { l  — ^)] after a finite lapse 
of time. □
The dynamics are thus quite different from those exhibited by Boldrin 
and Persico, and unlike for the dynamics given by (3.10) in Boldrin and Rus­
tichini (1994) or (2.2) in Boldrin and Persico (1993), current mathematical 
knowledge does not seem to provide any ‘simple’ argument in favour of ob­
servable chaos if 0 <  /i <  1 in the case of the optimal solution. Furthermore, 
as we mentioned earlier, we need non classical parameter values to be able 
to claim the existence of cycles or of topological chaos.
C o n c lu s io n
W hat are we to conclude on Boldrin and Rustichini’s model ? It es­
tablishes the important fact that even in the framework of infinitely lived 
agents, indeterminacy of the steady state and endogenous fluctuations can­
not be ruled out under the assumption of perfect markets and perfect fore­
sight. Unfortunately, the authors’ claim of endogenous growth with a chaotic 
growth rate is indéfendable since the correct solution of the right optimisa­
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tion program does not yield a solution allowing to characterise thoroughly 
the trajectories. The different types of possible orbits can be described qual­
itatively, but it does not seem possible to establish the existence of cycles or 
of chaos (even topological) unless assuming a very high depreciation rate of 
capital. Chaos cannot be shown to be observable in Boldrin and Rustichini’s 
framework unless assuming entire capital depreciation in each period, an un­
appealing assumption which we should elude in an ILA context where periods 
are short. Therefore, we deem prudent to conclude only to the possibility of 
self-sustaining growth with a, fluctuating growth rate. Two further critiques : 
first of all, there is an evident lack of consistency in taking a linear investment 
good production function since such a function does not meet assumption 2.2 
(which implies, in particular, strict concavity in X2,t) imposed in the rest of 
the paper ; secondly, the assumption of linear utility certainly simplifies the 
formal analysis but is not necessarily innocuous in the context of global anal­
ysis : local analysis, like Hopf bifurcation detection, easily allows reasonings 
‘by continuity’ (see, for instance, Cazzavillan (1992) or v. Cœster (1993)), 
but this is not true in general when we practice global analysis (structural 
stability, for instance, is not automatically guaranteed). It is true that in 
Boldrin and Rustichini’s model the assumption is innocuous, but this fact 
has to be established and especially emphasized. Notice also that in certain 
models the assumption of linear utility is simply desastrous : there are cases 
where it is possible, with well known mathematical tools, to establish the 
existence of cycles or even chaos under any assumption on a finite coefficient 
of intertemporal substitution while it is impossible to characterise in a sat­
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isfactory manner the orbits in the case of a linear utility, which corresponds 
to an infinite coefficient of intertemporal substitution (see, for instance, v. 
Cœster (1994)). We should therefore handle such an assumption with great 
care.
Endogenous growth with (observable) chaotic trajectories of the growth 
rate has been established in a two-sector OLG economy meeting all neo­
classical assumptions from the point of view of the private sector (CRRA  
per period utility and Cobb-Douglas production functions with externalities 
à la Romer (1986)) in v. Cœster (1994). There it is shown that endogenous 
fluctuations may require strong external effects in the absence of bubbles or 
sunspots, but not necessarily in their presence. Similar results, and espe­
cially the possibility of chaotic orbits of the growth rate, still remain to be 
established in the ILA framework.
Let us add some further critiques concerning Boldrin and Persico’s (1993) 
paper. Subsection 2.3., intitled ‘A More Complicated Exam ple’, claims to 
“dispel the impression that the example given above may be special...” . W ith  
assumptions that can be found in the paper, Boldrin and Persico obtain 
backward dynamics of basically the following type :
r _  /^6+l
V —
(1 +  6+1 )^’
with // >  0 and /? >  1. The authors conclude that by the same methods 
as applied in section 3. of their paper, cycles and chaos can be shown to 
exist for adequate parameter configurations. Let us say that the example
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is very badly chosen, for it is immediate to check that the map does not 
have a Schwarzian derivative that is always negative, which already implies 
that Singer’s theorem cannot be applied and unicity of attractors therefore 
appears to be questionable ; furthermore, no finite point is ever mapped onto 
the origin, and we do not understand how Boldrin and Persico can see any 
‘obvious’ analogy with the family. Maybe the family of maps obtained 
in 2.3. can exhibit ergodic chaos under the assumption // =  1, but standard 
arguments cannot be used to give an answer. Unless giving a specific proof, 
only cycles and topological chaos can be claimed for (and this even only in 
the case // =  1 unless exhibiting a proof), and thus the most interesting 
results of section 3. cannot be invoked here.
Subsection 3.2. contains the proof that the set of admissible initial condi­
tions has the structure of a Cantor set in the case of maps of the P f a m i l y  
when ^ >  1 and P/?,$ >  1 ; Boldrin and Persico insist on the fact that their 
case is non standard because expansiveness does not hold on the entire defi­
nition set, which implies that the method exposed in Devaney (1987) cannot 
be applied here. The proof given is quite nice, but a rather standard result 
is the fact that the definition set of Pi_$ is a Cantor set when 0  >  4, which 
includes the case 4 <  0  <  2 -f y/b where we certainly do not have expansive­
ness. Even if Devaney (1987) does not give the proof, a thorough study of 
his book reveals that he nevertheless invokes several times this fact. Boldrin 
and Persico therefore have to show that their case differs fundamentally from 
the case P i $ , 4 < 0 < 2 - | -  y/E.
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A P P E N D I X  : T h e  O p t im iz a t io n
We suppose here cr =  0 ; it is immediate to verify that this assumption  
has no effect on the result, which holds for all <7 <  1. We assume to be in the 
case where two fixed points exist. Under this assumption, the higher steady  
state Ai =  0  is unstable and is furthermore ruled out by the transversality 
condition. Our purpose is not to solve completely the optimisation problem, 





(1 -  fi)Xt <  Xt+i <  Qxt
It is easy to see that the right hand inequality is never strictly binding (in the 
sense that the r-dynamics are such that for any admissible initial condition A, 
r^(A) is strictly less than 0 ,  V/) , and therefore we can omit it. Let Bt denote 
the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the remaining constraint. Consider 
the first order and equilibrium conditions corresponding to our program :
—  o c a S ^ k ^ { ^ X t  —  a x t + i ) ° '   ^  ^ A  B t
-  (1 -  f-i)Bt+i =  0 , yt 
— (1 — — 0,
k t  — Xt, VL
241
Let us write
G - — 5 i _
' a5 ‘x f+ ’’-* '
Then we have
— a ( 7  — a A ^ ) "   ^ +  7 ^ A f ^ ( 7  — a A ^ ^ i ) "   ^ +  C t  — ( 1  — ^ Cf + i  =  0 .
Af >  1 — /Li => (7f =  0. Therefore {BR)  holds for every A^  >  1 — // such that 
r(Af) >  1—/i, but it also holds for /i), and for (1 —/Li) if r ( l —/i) >  1—/i.
Let us consider now a date such that Xto-i >  1 — /i and T(A^g_i) <  1 — /x ;
then we have CtQ-i =  0 and A<q =  1 — / x ,  and there exists a finite z’o >  0 such 
that Af =  1 — / X ,  Vt G [^ 0 , ^ 0  +  %o] and Xto+i^+i >  1 — / x ,  the latter implying 
Cfo+to+i =  0. To determine the value of we have thus to calculate
Cto+io- We are interested here only in the sign of CtQ+io- We have :
(1 — /x)6 A^t'^  ^ — 0 ( 7  — aAfo_i)" L
T h e  function  f { x )  — 6 7 ( 7  — — 0 ( 7  — a A t o _ i ) " “  ^ is s tr ic t ly
increasing in x  an d  f ( r { Xt ^^i ) )  =  0 . Since, by assum ption , r(A<o_i) <  1 —/lx, 
we have thus  / ( I  — /x) >  0 an d  therefore Cto >  0. Suppose  zq >  1 ; th e  link 
betw een Ct  a n d  Q + i ,  for t  G [^o,^o +  io — 1] is given by ;
— Ax)‘^"''’’C<+i =  Ct 7^ ( 1  ~   ^ — a.
If A2 >  1 —/ X ,  th en  th e  sequence (Ct )  is increasing and  therefore Cto+io >  0, 
which implies <  r ( l  — /x). Thus, under  th e  a ssum ption  A2 >  1 — ;lx,
th e  dynam ics  lie, a fter  a  finite lapse of tim e, in the  in terval [1 — /x, r ( l  — ji)]. 
As a  consequence, we have the  following possibilities :
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#(z) either Aq is on a r-cycle C [1 — 0 ],
•{i i )  or, after a finite lapse of time, A< is on a r-cycle C [1 — //, r ( l  — /i)],
• { i n)  or, after a finite lapse of time, A< is on an orbit C [1 — /z, r ( l  — fi)]
and there exists an infinite sequence such that A^  =  1 — /z, G
[t j , t j -\-i j ] and Af >  1 —/z otherwise. Notice that in the case where observable 
chaos exists in the unconstrained dynamics, there is a positive probability of 
Af G [1 — /z, r ( l  — ^)] after a finite lapse of time, and even probability one in 
the case of t { \ * )  =  0, for instance.
If, on the contrary, A2  <  1 —/z, then the sequence (C J is decreasing, which 
is rather intuitive since to start again, we need CtQ+io such that Atg+io+i >  
1 —/z >  r ( l  —/z), which requires a strictly negative Cto+io  ^ Under our present 
assumption on A2 , the only possible type of trajectory is {Hi) but lying, of 
course, in [1 — /z, 0[. □
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